• Jordan's eastern neighbor  - Safa A.Hussein
Whether loosely connected federates or separated statelets, Iraq's future impact on Jordan's national interests will differ mainly in terms of severity.

• A unique position, for better or worse  - Ghassan Khatib
Jordan's situation is an example of the instability being foisted upon some Arab regimes as a result of the lack of solutions to regional conflicts.

• Eggs in a basket  - Waleed Sadi
Jordan has a lot to lose even under the most favorable developments in Iraq.

• The dangers of instability  - Mohammad K. Shiyyab
It is vital for Jordan that Iraq be united and not split along sectarian or ethnic lines.

• Hardly a savory combination  - Asher Susser
Unfortunately for the Jordanians, it is not they but others who really have the wherewithal to shape the regional political environment.

Jordan's eastern neighbor
 Safa A.Hussein

Though Jordan and Iraq share a relatively short border of 181 km., the interaction between the two countries will continue to have a great impact on Jordanian national interests. Iraqis repeatedly express their belief that Jordan has prospered from Iraqi misery. There is some truth in this, but for a better understanding of the dynamic between the two countries it is important to appreciate the underlying national interests and concerns that shaped their relations in the past and may shape them in the future.

Jordan has limited natural resources and a weak economy characterized by relatively high budget deficits, elevated debts, high unemployment, uneven distribution of wealth and lack of fuel resources. That's why foreign aid is important for Jordan's survival.

On the other hand, Jordan enjoys a strategic geographic position and good service sector (which employs 80 percent of the labor force); this has enabled it to be a gateway for Iraq to the world during siege and wartime. Some observers believe that Jordan's real asset is its skilled professionals who work abroad and earn an important part of its hard currency. It is essential for Jordan to maintain good relations with the Arab Gulf states, where these professionals are employed.

Jordanian concerns about national security touch on the Palestinian population in the kingdom, Islamic extremist movements, and neighboring countries. Citizens of Palestinian origin constitute 60 percent of the population. They have a very hostile attitude toward United States policies in the region and are critical of American-Jordanian strategic relations, considered by the Jordanian regime as a cornerstone of its national security strategy.

In 1985, the Muslim Brotherhood's growing influence and increasing political involvement led King Hussein to take harsh measures against its members, despite the fact that since 1946 Jordan, in contrast to other secular Arab states, had contained the Brotherhood by officially recognizing it. The period after 1990 witnessed the rise of extremist terrorist groups that are linked in various ways to al-Qaeda.

Jordan's neighbors are also problematic: it has long borders with Israel and the West Bank; its northern neighbor, Syria, is hardly ideal. And Jordanians have repeatedly expressed their concern about a collapse of Iraq or Shi'ite rule there.

These facts may well explain the Jordanian regime's traditional policy of bending with the wind. Certainly, they explain Jordanian policy toward Iraq over the past three decades: strong support by King Hussein for Saddam Hussein in his eight-year war with Iran; sitting on the sidelines and trying to play the role of mediator between Saddam and the West as well as with Arab states after Saddam's invasion of Kuwait; and, more recently, King Abdullah's public criticism of the war against Saddam while remaining a partner of the US behind the scenes.

Since the fall of Saddam, the suppression of the majority or any important minority of Iraqi society is no longer feasible. No major constituent of Iraqi society will accept to be unrepresented or misrepresented in ruling the country. The success or failure of Iraqi efforts to reach peaceful and workable agreements on power-sharing will determine the future shape of the Iraqi state or states. Three scenarios seem possible: a very loose federal state, Iraq divided into three statelets, or a unified federal Iraq.

Whether loosely connected federates or separated statelets, the impact on Jordan's national interests would differ mainly in terms of severity. In both cases, the nine southern governorates would be ruled by Shi'ites possessing most of Iraq's oil wealth as well as its only access to the Arab Gulf at Basra port. This statelet would share a border of more than 700 km with Iran in the east and would border Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to the west and south.

Such a development would most likely be associated with or caused by sectarian violence and/or civil war, with probable external involvement: Arab states in favor of Iraq's Sunnis and Iran in favor of its Shi'ites. In the aftermath of such violence and external intervention, and bearing in mind geographic and economic realities, the Shi'ites would display great "sensitivity" toward Arab states and favor strong economic relations with Iran: exchange of goods, import of electric power and petrol products, and use of Iranian ports as trans-shipment points to augment the capacity of Basra port.

The Kurdish statelet in the north of Iraq would comprise four provinces: Irbil, Dohuk, Sulaymania and Kirkuk. The Kurdish statelet would be surrounded by Iran, Turkey and Syria. The Kurds would try to develop political and economic relations with these countries, making the most of Kirkuk's oil revenues.

The Sunni statelet would consist of three provinces: al-Anbar, Salah al-Din, and part of Mosul. (the cities of Mosul, Kirkuk, Diala and Baghdad would witness confrontation and probable partition.) This statelet, as well as the Shi'ite statelet, might serve as a buffer zone between Jordan and Iran, but not without a heavy price. If Taleban-style terrorists dominate this statelet, Jordan would have to allocate heavy resources for new security measures: tighter border control and enhanced internal security. If Sunni tribes control the statelet, then Jordan would have to bear the financial burden of supporting them. In both cases, Jordan would be denied the economic benefits it enjoys now: exports to Iraqi markets (Iraq imports 17 percent of Jordan's exports, making it Jordan's second largest trading partner after the US), as well as benefits built around trans-shipment activities such as growth of transport companies and collection of handling fees.

If Iraqis succeed in establishing a unified federal Iraq, then the Iraqi government would be dominated by the Shi'ites, with weak central rule and the Kurds and the Sunnis exercising a limited degree of influence. The government would try to engage positively with Iraq's neighbors, but its economic relations would be impacted by the role those neighbors play in terms of stabilization and reconstruction during Iraq's transition period.

Jordan has thus far played a positive though modest role in these two fields. But some of its efforts have been very negative, especially its attitude toward Shi'ite majority rule and its attempts to link the Shi'ites with Iran. Jordanian public opinion in support of insurgents in Iraq frustrates the Shi'ites, Kurds and moderate Sunnis. Also, Shi'ites are suspicious concerning Jordanian efforts to reach out to Sunni leaders and to accommodate ex-Baathists. Since last year, however, especially after the Amman hotel bombings, Jordanian public and official attitudes have shifted positively, if slowly.

On the reconstruction issue, the Jordanians are not employing their full capacity, particularly in the relatively stable provinces of the south. On the security level, Jordan is playing a role in training Iraqi forces, but no real cooperation exists concerning counterterrorism.

At the end of the day, Jordan's eastern neighbor will either be a unified Iraq dominated by moderate Shi'ites or a poor statelet controlled by fundamentalist Sunnis. Iraqis in general believe that Jordanian policy toward Iraq is driven to some extent by fear: fear of promoting democracy and fear of Shi'ite dominance.

Fear of democracy is understandable, as in the current Jordanian political system the king assumes both legislative and executive powers. But what is not understandable is the fear of Shi'ite dominance, especially since Jordan's population is very homogeneous from an ethnic, religious and sectarian standpoint, with Sunni Muslim Arabs constituting more than 92 percent.- Published 20/4/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. Prior to joining the Transitional Government he served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force and worked in the military industry as director of a research and development center. Currently he works in the Iraqi National Security Council.

Jordan has always been in a unique position, whether politically, geographically or demographically. That position has created both dangers and opportunities for the country.

Established in the early part of the last century roughly at the same time that its neighbor Palestine was subjected to massive Jewish immigration and aggression, Jordan was inevitably drawn into conflict.

At the same time, the creation of the state of Israel left Jordan in a significant strategic position, especially when the part of Palestine that became the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and its old city, came under the Hashemite Kingdom.

More recently, the series of wars in the Gulf that ended with the overthrow of the Iraqi regime and the American occupation of Iraq, the resulting fierce resistance and civil war, also affected Jordan both positively and negatively.

The Qaeda terrorist attacks in Jordan are examples of the dangers Jordan is facing as a result, but Jordan has also become a gateway for exports and imports and a transit point into and out of Iraq. A growing number of Iraqis, especially an economic and, to a lesser extent, political elite has relocated to Jordan. So while the security situation has deteriorated, economically Jordan has gained.

The recent Jordanian decision to cancel a meeting with the Palestinian foreign minister, Hamas' Mahmoud Zahar, is probably the most recent but not the last example of Jordan's problematic situation.

In this case it is difficult to blame Jordan, which is actually following an Arab position, for tying its relations with Hamas' government to the extent to which Hamas is willing to adhere to the Arab political position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, namely the Arab Initiative.

That is especially so since the Arab countries arrived at that unified position to show solidarity and support for the Palestinian people. The Arab Initiative presents an Arab consensus that is identical to the political needs and vision of a solution as promoted by the Palestinian people and their leadership. It is necessary for Palestinian interests that the Arab world, including Palestinians themselves, remain united in demanding a political solution based on that initiative, which is compatible with the relevant provisions of international legitimacy.

But the recent Jordan-Hamas spat also shows the interesting dual nature of Jordanian relations with political Islamic movements. Jordan has succeeded in creating a model of a legitimate political regime that allows space for the Jordanian political Islamic movement, i.e. the Islamic Action Front, the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

But while that relationship is stable within the parameters of a pluralist political system, Jordan-Hamas relations were always tense. Jordan has consistently complained of Hamas attempts to interfere in Jordanian affairs, and that position was most dramatically exemplified by the Jordanian insistence that Hamas leaders could not be based in Jordan.

That happened in spite of the famous gesture in which King Hussein used his leverage to save the life of Khalid Mishaal, who had been the subject of an assassination attempt by Israeli agents in Jordan, and also managed to force Israel to release Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from an Israeli prison and bring him back to Gaza.

In spite of very dangerous moments in the recent history of Jordan posed by its unique and sensitive position, the danger that lies ahead is probably greater than ever. For Jordan, the Islamic terrorism apparently coming from the east must not be allowed to coincide with tensions in relations between Jordan and the Islamist part of the Palestinian political movement, especially with the growing influence of Islamist strands among Jordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

On a broader level, Jordan's situation is an example of the instability being foisted upon some Arab regimes as a result of the lack of solutions to regional conflicts such as in Palestine-Israel and Iraq.- Published 20/4/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ghassan Khatib is coeditor of the bitterlemons family of internet publications and director of the Government Media Center. This article represents his personal views.

It is axiomatic that Jordan's national interests, including its national security, are closely connected with what is going on in Iraq and what could emerge from the tortuous attempts to form a new Iraqi government. Iraq's geographic proximity and the long frontier that connects the two countries means that if Iraq is not stabilized, and soon, the violence and chaos there may indeed spill over into Jordan.

Jordan therefore has a vested interest in restoring normalcy in Iraq as soon as possible or risk also becoming destabilized and see its own security compromised. The dangers looming on the horizon for Jordan are further compounded by the tense relations with Syria and the recent disclosure that weapons have been smuggled into Jordan by Hamas, the ruling party in the Palestinian territories.

It is no secret that Jordan has put its faith in the US project to forge a democratic and peaceful Iraq. Jordan has in effect invested heavily in a successful US operation in Iraq and has aligned itself openly with US policies. If the US fails in Iraq or its forces are forced to withdraw precipitously, Jordan stands to lose the most. If a Shi'ite-led government is finally formed in Iraq as a result of the ongoing negotiations between the various factions there, the new government would be closely aligned with Iran. With Iran linked so closely and openly with Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, Jordan may soon find itself surrounded or, worse still, besieged by hostile states.

What might save Jordan from such looming dangers is a successful US policy in Iraq. Indeed, Washington must succeed in Iraq in order to save its friends and allies in the Middle East. We are not talking here only of Israel but rather all the pro-western countries including Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

It is an open question, however, whether the US can persevere in Iraq. Given the high rate of casualties for its own armed forces in Iraq and rising criticism of US policy in Iraq by even Republican congressmen, there is now a high probability that the US will turn tail and extricate itself from the Iraqi quagmire as it has done in the past in similar situations, e.g., Vietnam and Somalia.

If one adds the growing crisis over Tehran's nuclear program and the high probability that Iranian defiance of western capitals will continue, it is no longer a moot question whether a regional armed conflict will result.

Defusing the Iranian nuclear crisis by diplomacy is thus urgent. If there is a deal between Iran and the US over Iran's nuclear program, the two countries can cooperate on the future not only of Iraq but also Hizballah in Lebanon. Against this backdrop, Tehran holds the key to regional peace and security. Iran has considerable clout in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and even in parts of the Arab Gulf states where there are sizable Shi'ite populations.
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The irony in all this is the fact that Jordan has few viable options left and suffers from limited maneuverability, having all its eggs in the US basket. What the future holds for Jordan is thus still an open question. Throughout its history, Jordan survived one major regional crisis after another. Many observers wrote Jordan off in the past and were been proven wrong time and time again. Even if the odds are formidable, Jordan can still be proven right once again by adopting a pro-western posture.

But Jordan has a lot to lose even under the most favorable developments in Iraq. Either way, Jordan's relations with Baghdad will remain fraught with dangers. Unless Jordan disassociates itself from the current US policies in the Middle East or at least keeps its distance, it may still emerge as a loser when the dust settles.- Published 20/4/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Waleed Sadi is a former Jordanian ambassador to Turkey and the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. He is currently a columnist for the Jordan Times and Al Rai newspapers.

In the Middle East, we are currently witnessing the expansion of violent groups seeking to advance their extremist ideologies through terror, thus threatening the security and stability of many states. Jordan's moderate approach and consistent position that dialogue is the only means to arrive at solutions to conflict seems not to be acceptable to these extremists, who resort to chaos to disguise their failure to achieve anything.

Jordan has been living in the shadow of terrorists' threats. Terrorists loathe Jordan's friendly relations with the West, particularly the US and the kingdom's 1994 peace treaty with Israel. The horrifying suicide attacks of November 9, 2005 (11/9) carried out by Iraqis against three hotels in Amman with a toll of 60 dead and over 100 wounded drove home an important message: no security apparatus, however efficient, can prevent each and every attack by individuals prepared to die as they kill others.

Some analysts were quick to say that the Amman attacks were deeply counterproductive because they targeted innocent Jordanian civilians. This may be true, but this effect is more than countered by the much greater loss of life resulting from the vigor of US actions in Iraq. There, the motivation of the jihadis stems from their deep commitment to their cause, as well as the intensity of US military operations and the persistent use of firepower in towns and villages.

The situation in Iraq is drifting toward civil war as efforts to form a government remain stalled. This jeopardizes Jordan's vital economic interests and stability. Jordan's trade with Iraq was reduced by 50 percent during 2005, and more than 800,000 Iraqis have found refuge in Jordan. The impact is likely to become even more negative if the situation worsens.

We are nowhere near peace in Iraq. If anything, as we saw in the recent January elections, the invasion and occupation of Iraq strengthened militant Islamist forces. An Iraqi government based on the Iranian model would further destabilize the situation in the region and beyond. Thus it is vital for Jordan that Iraq be united and not split along sectarian or ethnic lines. Jordan is doing all it can to encourage all sides involved in the conflict to pursue dialogue in order to prevent the situation from drifting to civil war. One example of such efforts is an Iraqi conference due to be held in Amman on April 22, with representatives from the tribal and religious leadership.

Regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, it is in Jordan's vital interest that both parties conclude a just, comprehensive and lasting peace. Security today means economic well-being, cultural (including religious) freedom, and social justice--these are at least as important as political-military considerations. There is no prosperity without security and no security without justice.

Unless the Israelis change their declared policy, there is little prospect of convincing Hamas to drop its refusal to renounce armed struggle and recognize Israel. The problem with Prime Minister-designate Ehud Olmert's unilateral plan of action is that it completely and consciously ignores the Palestinians and their legitimate national aspiration to establish a viable state with East Jerusalem as its capital.

Israel will continue to justify ignoring the Palestinians because of Hamas, but may undertake a gradual evacuation of small and insignificant settlements in the West Bank.

Olmert's plan may, in the short run, make Israelis feel more secure, but in the long run it will lead to a dead end. If the disappointments do not stop, the Palestinians are likely to move to extremes, and somewhere down the line another explosion will be inevitable.

Hamas has a large following in Palestinian camps across Jordan, which hosts the largest number of refugees outside the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas is the democratically-elected representative of the Palestinian people, but has failed to persuade any other Palestinian factions to join its government. Jordan will deal with Hamas as a part of the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian government, as Prime Minister Ma'arouf al-Bakhit recently told a parliamentary session, "We welcome the visit of a delegation of our brothers, the leaders of Hamas, in their capacity as Palestinians."

Jordan faces a domestic Islamic opposition, and some of its members are closely linked to Hamas. Some officials have privately voiced concern about the possible negative repercussions that such a link might have on Jordan's stability if there is no progress in the peace process.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is alive and active and continues to strengthen its position, it has always been supportive of the leadership and maintained constructive dialogue with the different Jordanian governments. The Jordanian Islamic Action Front (the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood) is a non-violent movement that uses dialogue as a means of settling disputes with the government.

Israeli policies, as well as those of the PA, have helped bring Hamas to power in Palestine. There is little chance of the dead peace process being flogged back to life. Furthermore, tension is steadily growing in Palestine, economic hardships are deepening, assassinations are continuing, and it might be only a matter of time before the Israelis start staging provocative military operations against the Palestinians.

To protect itself from any spillover effects resulting from the situation either in Iraq or Palestine, Jordan has enhanced its defensive capabilities and adopted tougher security measures. Moreover, Dr. Bakhit's government, as a matter of priority, is working on a three-pronged strategy, addressing political, economic and cultural challenges. These steps include reviewing and amending laws and decisions that curtail political freedoms, implementing the proposed National Agenda, and expanding opportunities for the poor and unemployed. Most important, via the "Amman Message", Dr. Bakhit's government is seeking to promote a tolerant version of Islam in all educational institutions and provide genuine space for credible, competent, independent preachers and religious teachers who denounce violence to debate extremist ideologues.

To conclude, instability in both Iraq and Palestine presents very serious challenges to Jordan's security and welfare. Observers foresee no imminent danger of major disturbances in the kingdom today. Still, there is always the possibility that disorder might occur, which extremists could join and intensify. Finally, the possibility of some radical group carrying out new terrorist operations in Jordan cannot be excluded.

What we need in our region is the input of moderate, sensible and stabilizing Islamic movements that can offer themselves as important mediators, spread the true message of a tolerant and peaceful Islam that rejects any form of violence, proactively contribute to democratization, defend pluralism and steer people away from extremism.- Published 20/4/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


General (rtd) Mohammad K. Shiyyab is managing director of Middle East Security Consultants in Amman.

Situated between Israel and Iraq, Jordan has tended to vacillate strategically between its Arab hinterland to the east, in which Iraq has been the linchpin, and the US-Israeli protective umbrella to the west. This was well illustrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when Jordan was at first heavily reliant on Iraq both strategically and economically, as right wing governments set the tone in Israel. With the crushing of Iraq by the US in 1991, Jordan lost both its strategic hinterland and its main export market. For lack of any better choice it turned toward the protective orbit of Israel and the US, eventually securing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994.

Jordanian expectations from the peace treaty were twofold. First, Jordan banked on the implementation of the Oslo accords, signed a year before their treaty, and the conclusion of a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine. This, it was calculated, would stabilize Jordan's western front and enhance the identity of the Jordanian state, as distinct from Palestine, finally putting to rest the contention that "Jordan is Palestine." Second, on the economic front, Jordan expected a silver-lined windfall. None of these expectations materialized. Jordan's economy did improve, thanks in part to the peace treaty, but not nearly as much as Jordanians had initially imagined.

But more ominously, Israel and Palestine went to war instead of making peace, thus realizing Jordan's nightmare scenario--coupled with the constant anxiety that Israeli-Palestinian armed conflict might eventually end with massive Palestinian migration across the river into Jordan, irreparably upsetting the already precarious demographic balance of Jordanians and Palestinians in the kingdom. The election victory of Hamas has rekindled these fears as the chances of a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians have receded even further.

Hamas poses a direct challenge to Jordan in two different but interrelated ways. First, it serves to bolster the self assurance of Jordan's own Islamist opposition, which might also benefit from Hamas' influence among Jordan's large Palestinian population. The Islamists have strong support in Jordan's major urban areas that are heavily populated by Palestinians. This does not appear to bode well for the hitherto very carefully balanced relationship between the monarchy and the Islamists. But it should also be remembered that the Palestinian population in Jordan is socially stratified and politically diverse and certainly not a single monolithic bloc of opposition to the regime.

Secondly, Hamas promotes Islamism and Islamic identity as a bond between the Muslim peoples on both banks of the Jordan River, thus undermining the distinct Jordanian identity that Jordan has being trying to promote for decades as a counterweight to a Palestinian identity. It is worth recalling in this context that the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan opposed King Hussein's disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, which among other things was deliberately designed to bolster the particular Jordanian identity. King Abdullah II has taken this trend even further in his "Jordan First" policy, which he inaugurated in late 2002.

On its eastern front, after the treaty with Israel Jordan urged its Iraqi neighbors to behave with moderation to secure the removal of sanctions and thus pave the way for the unhindered resumption of Jordanian exports. But Jordan's expectations on this front, too, were dashed. Iraq did not heed Jordan's advice and, following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Sunni-controlled Baath party in 2003, Iraq has become the first Shi'ite-dominated Arab state. The Shi'ites are also on the rise in Lebanon, and Jordan's King Abdullah was therefore pretty much on the mark in his anxious reference in late 2004 to the emergent "Shi'ite crescent" of Iranian influence. The combination of the Hamas victory to the west with the Shi'ite crescent to the east is hardly a savory combination for Jordanians.

As the bombings in Jordanian hotels indicated in late 2005, the terror and total chaos in Iraq could spill over into Jordan. Worse still, Iraq faces possible disintegration. A weak Sunni Iraqi state, sandwiched between the Kurds and the Shi'ites and denied Iraq's oil wealth, could become an insufferable menace to its neighbors, especially Jordan, to which many may emigrate, thereby bringing even greater pressure to bear on an economy and infrastructure already straining under the burden of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who have taken refuge in the kingdom.

Jordan fears that if it were to be inundated with refugees from both Iraq and Palestine, the kingdom might not be able to withstand the pressure. Policy-wise, Jordan does not have many options other than to try and encourage the parties in Iraq to come to terms with each other and to urge moderation on Hamas in the hope that the worst can be avoided. But unfortunately for the Jordanians, it is not they but others who really have the wherewithal to shape the regional political environment.

Jordanian resilience, however, should not be underestimated. Jordanian staying power still rests on three main pillars: 1) the cohesion and determination of its political elite; 2) the strength and effectiveness of the country's armed forces and security establishment; and 3) the value of the kingdom's geopolitical centrality, due to which many powers, in the region and without, continue to support Hashemite Jordan politically, strategically and economically as an essential link in the chain of broader regional security.- Published 20/4/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Asher Susser is a senior fellow and former Director of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University. He is presently a visiting professor at the Center for Judaic Studies at the University of Arizona in Tucson.