• And the war came  - Ghassan Attiyah
The mere absence of the Sunni threat will highlight differences among Shi'ite groups.

• Not because of our blue eyes  - Saad N. Jawad
Should Iraq disintegrate the whole region will suffer and no state can remain immune.

• Kurdistan's future  - Khaled Salih
The fate of the Arabized regions, including Kirkuk, will lead to a serious confrontation.

And the war came
 Ghassan Attiyah

People tend to slip into civil war. As US President Abraham Lincoln in reference to the American civil war said, "All dreaded it, all sought to avert it. And the war came."

Some Iraqis feel a civil war would be in their best interests. The Jihad in Iraq (al-Qaeda) under the leadership of Abu Musaab Zarqawi wants to drag Iraq into a war between Shi'ites and Sunnis to push the Sunni minority to extremism and rally the populace around Zarqawi's group.

Radical pro-Saddam elements that have lost everything also feel that a state of chaos and continued infighting will serve their interests by shaking up the state and preventing the stabilization of the current ruling authority, even if this leads to a civil war.

A tendency toward fighting is furthermore pronounced among some Shi'ite components, who may see a need for a decisive military move to end the Sunni threat.

Is a civil war inevitable? Perhaps not, but all the components are certainly present. There are armed and trained militias whose strikes have escalated not only against the state but also against unarmed Shi'ite civilians. At the same time, operations against US troops have eased.

In response, the state's armed forces have begun to fight back, and the "Death Squads" and "Black Clothes" groups have become symbols of counter-violence. Consequently, the average number of killings per day exceeds 50.

Both Shi'ite and Sunni civilians are being driven from their homes.

Despite these factors, some, notably the American administration, persist in describing the current situation in Iraq as a low intensity war or insurgency rather than using the term civil war.

US officials insist on this terminology because there is no place for the US in an Iraq embroiled in civil war. Washington would no longer be able to justify its presence in Iraq or any bias toward one Iraqi party over another. Americans would demand a withdrawal to protect their own in a war between Iraqis. The lack of any direct intervention by the US army after fighting broke out at the Shi'ite tomb in Samarah on February 22 is evidence of this.

A disorganized US withdrawal in case of civil war and the consequent division of Iraq will be tantamount to a political and military US defeat and a victory for the forces of "terror". It will turn Iraq into a breeding ground for terrorism and an enclave for Salafi extremism that not only threatens American interests but those of all neighboring countries and beyond.

An Iraqi civil war would drag neighboring countries into intervening to protect themselves or out of greed for national gain. Saudi Arabia and Jordan may set up buffer zones along their borders with Iraq under the pretext of protecting Sunni Arabs or out of fear of a massive flood of immigrants. Turkey would set up a similar buffer zone in northern Iraq.

Iran, which already has a real and effective presence in Iraq, would be in a good position to impose its authority on vast areas in the south and even in Baghdad to prevent chaos. The situation could also affect stability in other countries with significant Shi'ite communities like Lebanon, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

As a result, some are now calling for serious consideration to be given to a peaceful dissolution of Iraq, to allow three ethnic entities to emerge and thus avoid civil war. Washington, however, would also consider this a defeat and will not accept it unless all other options are exhausted.

One option would be to transform Iraq into a second Somalia, whereby Iraq stays superficially unified in the context of the creation of separate political "entities", but its sects remain in a state of infighting similar to Kurdistan before the fall of Saddam Hussein. Some entities would be under the control of Shi'ite militias, others under Sunni militias. The Kurds would run their own affairs without clashing with the US army, which would confine itself to safe bases outside the cities. Such a situation would allow Washington to play the role of mediator between militias just as it did during Kurdish-Kurdish infighting in the mid-1990s.

Another option is for Washington to accept Iranian influence in Iraq and work toward a deal that would satisfy Iran and prevent Iraq from being drawn into a civil war. Iran holds a number of keys to peace in Iraq and should be credited for convincing Muqtada Sadr loyalists to show self-restraint and not escalate the situation after the Samarah events.

Washington's acceptance to enter into direct negotiations with Iran is an indication of this approach, but the question is what price will Tehran exact and would Washington be prepared to pay? Iran may be prepared to play a role similar to that of Syria in Lebanon but will Washington accept such a role without Iran agreeing at least to relinquish its nuclear option?

Washington hopes that the bloody events at Samarah will convince Iraqis of the tragedy of civil war and persuade all parties to move away from the brink. The problem, however, is that some believe there is greater reward to be achieved from violence.

Some Islamic Shi'ite elements consider the establishment of a wealthy Shi'ite entity a better option than staying in an uneasy partnership with the Sunnis. Some Kurds believe the dissolution of Iraq will open the door for Kurdish statehood. And extremist Sunnis believe more violence will force the others into concessions.

But the difficulties are not confined to whether or not to dissolve Iraq. Any voluntary division could itself lead to new strife. The mere absence of the Sunni threat will highlight differences among Shi'ite groups to a point where infighting in one form or another could renew the bloody cycle once again.

The United States has lost much of its clout in the Iraqi street. Still, it has enough cards in its hand but needs more money, time and manpower. The question is whether Washington, which is already feeling the pressure from its own public, is prepared to get more involved.

There is a small window of opportunity to step back from the abyss. The US needs to recruit international help to reach an agreement similar to the Dayton agreement regarding Bosnia. This necessitates the participation of the UN, Europe and Russia. With the US, such a quartet could put pressure on the parties in the Iraqi conflict as well as neighboring countries to help prevent a civil war from erupting.

It is not, however, clear that the European Union in particular has the desire or capability to do this.- Published 30/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ghassan Attiyah is the director of the Baghdad-based Iraqi Foundation for Development and Democracy, which he founded in August 2003.

Is Iraq heading toward disintegration? The question is asked frequently by observers, never mind their attitude toward Iraq and Iraqis. The question implies more fundamental ones: is Iraq an artificial state? Or is it built on certain necessary foundations? If these foundations are no longer valid, should Iraq disintegrate?

Iraq as a state and a civilization has existed well back in history. Deep-rooted civilizations, be they in the north, middle or south, came into being not because some power interest required them to but as a result of natural evolution. Even in modern history, when the Ottoman Empire introduced the villayet system it could not separate the three villayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra.

Indeed, the British occupation formed the new Iraqi state according to these lines after cutting out some of its territories. One should remember that after signing the Sykes-Picot treaty, the British found that it was not realistic and changed their minds. This was not an accidental decision. The British strategists and political officers who controlled Iraq found that for economic and strategic reasons Iraq should be formed in the way it was. They realized that the north of Iraq could not subsist without the riches of the south and the south could not be defended without the natural boundaries of the north. I believe all these factors are still valid today.

If we were to discuss the issue purely from a modern political understanding of realpolitik and national interests the facts also argue against disintegration. The only element, regionally or internationally, that could benefit from the disintegration of modern Iraq is Israel, for reasons no longer secret. Israeli analysts, in the 1980s during the Iraq-Iraq war, were the first to advocate the division of Iraq into three different states.

All other regional actors are not of this view. This, of course, is not because of our blue eyes. Neighboring countries fear that a divided Iraqi state will be a source of instability in the region. They also know that any disintegration of Iraq will be a powerful precedent that could affect other, truly artificial, states in the region.

In addition, any new and by necessity weak and fragile Iraqi entities that might emerge, would soon be swallowed by neighboring countries, seriously affecting the present balance of power in the region.

In the end, the disintegration of any state remains wholly a matter of the will and desire of the people in question. Talk of Iraqi dissolution is only entered into by those who came with the occupation, who, knowing they possess no real support among Iraqis, began to play on the sectarian divisions of the people.

Yet in spite of all that has happened in Iraq, especially after the bombing of the two sacred shrines in Samarah, Iraqi resistance to total civil war, similar to the one fought in Lebanon, has proven to be very strong. One cannot, of course, discount the possibility of a civil war under the chaotic situation Iraq is suffering under the occupation, but I maintain that it remains a remote possibility.

Should it happen, and should Iraq disintegrate, the whole region will suffer, and no state can remain immune.- Published 30/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Saad N. Jawad is a professor of political science at Baghdad University.

Politicians, analysts and ordinary people are concerned about the future of Iraq, especially with the prospect of heightened internal fighting between Shi'ite and Sunni groups. No doubt this process will have repercussions for the future of Kurdistan in Iraq. In fact, the fate of Kurdistan is directly related to political and security developments in the Arab part of Iraq.

State-building in Iraq has already failed. The process took a definitive turn for the worse when Saddam Hussein took over in 1979. Many specialists and commentators argued that Saddam Hussein strengthened Iraq, but in fact he contributed to an accelerated process of state failure. In addition to strong centralization of state power, Saddam Hussein initiated a gradual fragmentation of Iraq as a country by alienating the Kurds and Shi'ites.

His invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait led to the creation of the no-fly zones in the north and the south in 1992. Much of Kurdistan proper was transformed into an independent entity, politically and administratively. A gradual de facto separation of the majority of the Kurdistan population from the rest of Iraq became a political reality. Separate political institutions (parliament, regional government and political parties), infrastructure, security arrangements and economic development all contributed to this process.

However, with the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime the rules of the game changed. While Arab Iraq collapsed in terms of political authority and administration, Kurdistan maintained its institutions, police and security forces and sustained its economic development. While the Bush administration talked about "regime change" and "nation-building", the actual process since mid-2003 has been about how to rebuild the state in Iraq. Kurdish politicians, too, have been involved in reconstructing Iraq, whether they realize, recognize or deny it.

This has been important for Kurdistan on two levels. First, Kurdish politicians have managed to protect Kurdistan and its achievements since 1992. In historical terms this is remarkable, because this is the first time in centuries the Kurds have not been the first to lose out on a major change sweeping the Middle East. Second, political negotiations in Baghdad have made it possible for Kurdistan to share in the distribution of power, reconstruction aid and revenues. In this process, Kurdistan's politicians thus far have been able to secure both Kurdistan's self-rule and its shared rule over the rest of Iraq.

Now, when the prospect of state rebuilding in Iraq does not look very promising and fear of further collapse of the reconstruction process is becoming paramount, the people of Kurdistan are anxiously watching events and pondering Kurdistan's fate in the event Iraq falls apart. Several issues are at stake. First, the future status of the region as recognized now in the permanent constitution will be jeopardized because the constitution, though approved by a majority of voters in Iraq, will not come into effect before a new government is sworn in and, meanwhile, the constitutional state is not yet fully consolidated.

Second, the fate of the Arabized regions, including Kirkuk, will lead to a serious confrontation between Kurdish groups and Arab groups. In such a scenario, neighboring countries are likely to encourage and support different factions. We are likely to see Turkey assisting Turkmen groups, Iran assisting Shi'ite and particularly Sadrist activists in Kirkuk, and Syria assisting Sunni Arabs throughout the region. Inter-communal and sectarian tensions and confrontations are a likely outcome of such a development.

Third, Kurdistan's share of income, such as aid reconstruction and oil revenues, is likely to be put on hold. In a worst case scenario, neighboring countries will prove more than willing to encourage and support Kurdish schisms in an effort to undermine ongoing institution-building in Kurdistan. Direct financial and military support to radical Islamic groups and small Turkmen groups will exacerbate any internal disagreement among political groups in Kurdistan. If current security arrangements and political deals crumble, we might witness divisions along party, territorial and economic lines, more or less resembling the fighting of the mid-1990s, with additional groups across the borders joining in (the PKK from Turkey and Jihadists from Arab Iraq and Kurdistan).

But the political leadership in Kurdistan could also somehow manage to sustain current trends and keep Kurdistan safe, secure and stable. For this to happen it would have to avoid institutional breakdown, disengage from political negotiations in Baghdad without alienating the Americans, and adhere to internal political deals. In this event, Kurdistan in Iraq might emerge as a prosperous entity on which coalition forces could rely in a regional context, as well as an ally for Turkey and NATO. Tensions in Kirkuk and other Arabized territories might be solved more peacefully than we anticipate, due in part to strong unity among Kurds and disunity among Arabs, but also because American officials come to realize that a safe and secure portion of Iraq is a better scenario than the whole of Iraq sinking into internal conflict.- Published 30/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Khaled Salih is an independent analyst and consultant based in the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. He is former senior advisor to the prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government.