• A Shi'ite revival and the Gulf  - Mohammed Abdel Qader Jasem
Gulf Shi'ites realize that political reform in the region, even if cosmetic, will lead to a huge improvement in their political situation.

• Turkey's options  - Bulent Aras
Any major involvement to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state in Iraq could mean a major retreat from the EU membership process.

• A worst case scenario  - Ali-Asghar Kazemi
Of all Iraq's neighbors, Iran's national interests would be most heavily affected by structural changes in Iraq.

• Economic ramifications in Jordan  - Yusuf Mansur
Future deterioration of the situation in Iraq will undoubtedly lead to more Iraqis relocating to Jordan.

A Shi'ite revival and the Gulf
 Mohammed Abdel Qader Jasem

During the Iraq-Iran war, Saddam Hussein would receive weapons shipments through Kuwaiti ports that enabled him to continue his war on Iran. Iranian sympathizers in Kuwait, either Kuwaiti Shi'ite youths or enthusiasts of the Islamic Republic or Iranian elements planted here, scattered large nails on the roads taken by trucks that transported the goods from the Kuwaiti ports to Iraq in order to hinder their movement.

In 1987, a group of Kuwaiti Shi'ites carried out a terrorist operation aimed at the oil refineries in Kuwait to punish the support of Iraq. There were also other limited acts of vandalism carried out by Shi'ite youths. In my capacity as a lawyer, I undertook the task of defending some of these defendants in the oil refinery bombings and also defended young men who took part in the minor skirmishes. I was the only Sunni lawyer on a defense team otherwise comprised of a group of Shi'ite lawyers. Accepting to defend these Shi'ites was a bone of contention with some of my Sunni acquaintances.

Kuwaiti Shi'ite sympathy for Iran was commonplace and stood in contrast with the official Sunni support for the regime of Saddam Hussein. As a result of these divergences, the atmosphere in Kuwait was uncomfortable though never in danger of any sectarian violence; Shi'ites in Kuwait do not suffer political oppression even if they feel there is discrimination against them in certain government bodies, including the army, the police and the judiciary. Furthermore, there are many Shi'ite businessmen in Kuwait whose interests require a contribution to political stability. Hence Kuwait was, and continues to be, fortified against any ramifications of the situation in Iraq. There are no historical issues between the Shi'ites and Sunnis in Kuwait that feed the possibility of sectarian strife, whatever its source.

Moreover, political openness in Kuwait acts as a safety valve in confronting extremist underground organizations, which usually thrive in an atmosphere of political oppression. Al-Qaeda components in Kuwait are very limited and have been contained. They are not able to carry out any major operations even if they attempt to create tension between Shi'ites and Sunnis.

Iraq has become a battlefield for regional and international forces and terrorist organizations. A sectarian civil war could possibly break out there, but I believe it is not part of the agenda of these forces to transfer their struggle outside Iraq. Iran, one of the main regional players in Iraq due to the nuclear file, may seek to revive its dormant cells in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and feed the sectarian strife in these countries. However, the security-oriented nature of the Saudi authorities' response to any Shi'ite mutiny in the eastern region, Shi'ite-Shi'ite disputes in Bahrain and the close connection of Kuwaiti Shi'ites with their political system should minimize any effect of Iranian incitement.

From another perspective, Shi'ites in the Gulf countries ought also be concerned with safeguarding the gains they have achieved over the past three years. In Kuwait, two members of the cabinet represent the Shi'ite community. Progress has also been made regarding publicly practicing Shi'ite rituals, as well as in the establishment of Shi'ite personal status courts.

In Saudi Arabia, Shi'ites have begun to notice a change in how the royal family deals with them. One Saudi Shi'ite scientist received a phone call from a Saudi prince offering his condolences and support for the Shi'ite community after the Samarra bombing in Iraq. The scientist said when he received the prince's call, he did not yet know about the bombing and considered the phone call a sign of change in the way Shi'ites are treated in Saudi Arabia.

As for Bahrain, the political split between the National Conciliation Society [Jamiyet al-Wifaq al-Watani], the largest Shi'ite political body in the country, and the political regime, may have come to an end when the NCS decided to participate in upcoming parliamentary elections after traditionally having boycotted them.

Gulf Shi'ites realize that political reform in the region, even if cosmetic, will lead to a huge improvement in their political situation. Therefore, I don't believe they are prepared to lose what they gained by taking part in any sectarian strife.

In terms of the division of Iraq and its impact on the neighboring Gulf countries, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, I think it is in Kuwait's strategic interest for Iraq to remain weak so that no repeat of the 1990 occupation of Kuwait or the 1961 blackmail is possible. I am not worried about the establishment of a Shi'ite state in the south of Iraq on the border with Kuwait because such a country would not be strong enough to harm Kuwait, no matter how influential Iran might be. I would be very worried, however, if Shi'ite political forces affiliated with Iran were able to take control of a unified Iraq.

The Saudi outlook on the division of Iraq differs completely from the Kuwaiti outlook. Saudi Arabia is ultimately afraid of the idea of a division that could extend to itself. Saudi Arabia is not like Kuwait in terms of size and societal structure.

In spite of this, I think the current Iraqi case has so many internal factors that intertwine with international factors that it is unlikely to extend regionally. This is especially true if we consider that the method of transferring the Iraqi case to the Gulf countries would be the Shi'ite card. This card is not ready for use right now, even if the region has witnessed a Shi'ite revival.- Published 16/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mohammed Abdel Qader Jasem is a Kuwaiti lawyer and writer.

Turkey's Iraq policy is based on preserving Iraqi territorial unity, minimizing the risks that may emerge out of chaos and instability, collaborating with regional countries to strengthen the forces of unity in Iraq, and avoiding problems with the United States. If Iraq falls apart, this will pose many risks and challenges. Seen through conventional Turkish policy toward Iraq, the situation may seem desperate for Turkey.

The worst scenario for popular-nationalist segments of Turkish state and society is the division of Iraq into three parts: an Arab state, Shi'ites in southern Iraq and Kurds in northern Iraq. While a Kurdish state would politicize Kurds in Turkey, a Shi'ite- dominated state would yield to the increasing power of Iran in the region. Both of these possible developments are very problematic for Turkish security.

There is a concern in nationalist circles that Turkey's own Kurdish-populated areas might join with the newly emerging Kurdish state. In regional terms, Turkey, Iran and Syria share this concern and have a common attitude toward any development that leads to the emergence of a Kurdish independence tendency that threatens the regional status quo. This common concern also creates an incentive for cooperation, despite a number of problems among these states. The ruling elite in these countries shares a fear that their Kurdish minorities will be politicized and adopt separatist ideas.

Turkey's nationalist politicians, both on the left and on the right of Turkish politics, pay special attention to the Turcomans and seek to maintain Turcoman rights in northern Iraq, where Turcoman groups have benefited from the Turkish embrace. The idea of Kurds ruling Kirkuk and controlling its oil reserves touches a nerve with Turkish nationalist circles, further increasing suspicion that there are plans for an independent Kurdish state. For this reason, any alternative to a centrally governed and territorially-united Iraq is not acceptable.

Yet Turkey has undergone a serious internal reform process that has changed its domestic landscape and the framework of its foreign policy. This development in turn has created more room for maneuver in Ankara's Iraq policy. Turkey's new orientation seems more flexible and adaptive to the challenges in Iraq. It aims to develop initiatives regarding the emergence of an Iraqi state while also planning to provide security for Kurds and Turcomans in northern Iraq.

By modernizing and democratizing at home, Turkey's politicians have gained self-confidence in their ability to conduct a successful regional policy. Turkey's new active policy line strives to develop relations with the different segments of Iraqi society regardless of ethnic and sectarian differences. In this perspective this is also a domestic problem, related to Ankara's choice regarding its international orientation. The meaningful alternative is to diminish potential ethnic problems at home to a minimum degree within the context of European Union membership. This would end any serious consideration of foreign manipulation and provocation.

In accordance with this policy line, Turkey did not join the US-led occupation forces in Iraq, but has put enormous effort into mobilizing regional support for a stable Iraqi state. Indeed, Turkish policymakers have, on a regular basis, brought the countries bordering Iraq together for discussions about the future of the region. The United Nations Security Council has taken these meetings seriously and has requested further regional cooperation on the Iraqi question. In addition, Ankara brought major Sunni opposition figures and US envoys together to ensure Sunni participation in Iraqi national elections. Turkey's ruling elite has a newly developed self-confidence that it can play a constructive role in the region, including in Iraq.

On the other hand, the popular mood is under the impact of the rise of Turkish nationalism and anti-Americanism. For example a recent movie, Valley of the Wolves, which is based on a real incident involving the arrest of Turkish special forces in Sulaymaniyah in July 2003, has sparked mass hysteria in Turkey. In the movie, a Turcoman Iraqi leader complains that Americans granted the mountains to the Kurds, gave the desert to the Arabs and kept the oil for themselves. The film is full of American torture and abuses in Iraq. There is also a Jewish-American doctor who harvests organs from the bodies of dead Iraqis to send to the US, Israel and Britain.

Turkish nationalist sentiments would be further aggravated by the likelihood of the emergence of a Kurdish state if Iraq falls apart. Any major involvement to prevent such a development--ranging from discouraging Kurds through diplomatic means to military intervention--could draw Turkey into the Iraqi chaos and mean a major retreat from the EU membership process. It could also exacerbate the Kurdish question at home.

If Iraq falls apart, Turkey's options will be determined by the interaction between these two different attitudes. If Turkey's new regional profile prevails--depending on further democratization, economic development and progress in the EU process--then we may imagine Turkey employing diplomatic measures for the purpose of conflict resolution and management in Iraq, and a Turkish initiative to mobilize Iraq's neighbors and other regional countries in this cause. The major concern will be providing security for Kurds and Turcomans in northern Iraq in order to avoid the immediate spillover impact of a civil war in Iraq. Although it will no longer be taboo to have constructive engagement with a Kurdish state in the south, Turkey's civil and economic involvement will target national reconciliation in Iraq as long as there remains hope.- Published 16/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Prof. Bulent Aras chairs the Department of International Relations at Isik University, Istanbul.

The recent escalation in violence and turmoil in Iraq after the unfortunate bombing in Samarra of one of the holiest Shi'ite shrines is considered to be the most dramatic event since the fall of Saddam Hussein. Some have equated the incident with the 9/11 attack, insofar as it could eventually decide the fate of the new Iraq and the American strategy in the Middle East.

While the likelihood of an uncontained civil war in Iraq does not seem that high, the collapse of the fragile regime and widespread chaos throughout the country is still a plausible scenario. The collapse of Iraq could produce a number of decisive short and long-term consequences at the national, regional and international levels.

At the national level, the most urgent outcome of the crisis is the mounting of new obstacles to the formation of a Shi'ite-led government based on one that has been accused of an anti-Sunni attitude and incompetence in maintaining law and order. Outgoing PM Ibrahim al-Jaafari is already under serious pressure from all sides, including secular Shi'ites and the Kurds, to withdraw his candidacy for the premiership. The Sunni faction in the parliament (with 44 seats) may harden its position regarding participation in a national unity government and the legitimacy of the political process.

The situation could either lead various factions in Iraq to pursue their own cause and establish independent governments in some sort of loose federalism, as the Kurds have already done, or precipitate the fall of the entire country into the hands of extremists. This latter would be indeed the most horrible outcome, unleashing Muslim fundamentalist forces throughout the greater Middle East. Of course, Sunnis would oppose the partition of Iraq, but Shi'ites ultimately would not mind forming their own government aligned with Iran in the southern region of Iraq. This could, in turn, upset the delicate ethnic and religious balance in neighboring countries.

At the regional level, the victory of terrorist groups could further fuel anti-American sentiments among traditional societies and impel Muslim fundamentalists to destabilize the entire region. This could lead to total transformation, including structural changes, in the Middle East political landscape. This would in turn put the fate of regional energy resources in the hands of extremists. Though this development might not please the West and many other countries, the Iranian hard-line government would at this point in time see it as a God-given opportunity.

As a matter of fact, of all Iraq's neighbors Iran's national interests would be most heavily affected by political, strategic and structural changes in Iraq. With their long history of rivalry, hostilities and war, the fall of Iraq could produce a number of challenges and opportunities for Iran. The major opportunity would be the total frustration of American designs for "regime change" in Iran through some kind of intervention. The most threatening challenges could be the susceptibility of Iranian Kurds and Arabs to appeals to join with their peers in a disintegrated Iraq.

Evidently, then, the continued turmoil and insurgency in Iraq offers immediate benefit for Iran, since the United States may not be tempted to use hard power against it in the foreseeable future. But at the same time, if the chaotic situation continues and passes a certain threshold, Sunni extremists could even endanger Shi'ite Iran. Among other states, Saudi Arabia has been at the top of the list of targets of terrorists and fundamentalist groups for some time. The small states of the Persian Gulf are also most vulnerable to such political upheaval. Eventually, Middle East peace plans and the democratization process would become targets and victims of the rise of fundamentalism. Under such circumstances, Israel should look for a safe place on the globe, since its nuclear deterrent would be no match for terrorism.

At the international level, the fall of Iraq could deal the most serious blow to US strategy in the Middle East and end American hegemony in the entire world. If the United States and allied forces in Iraq fail to contain and manage the crisis, we should expect immediate repercussions in the form of a domino effect in other countries, beginning with Afghanistan. The proliferation of radicalism could easily affect North Africa in the West and Muslim states in East and South Asia, including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia. Those in the United States and other parts of the world who push for a quick withdrawal of American troops from Iraq are evidently not conscious of these and other catastrophic ramifications.

Despite, and alongside this gloomy scenario, an optimistic assessment leads one to believe that the majority of Iraqis now have every reason to avoid bloodshed and civil war and benefit from a potentially democratic environment created at a very high price. Yet, they too seem to think that terrorism in Iraq is now a direct consequence of the American and foreign presence, and thus would prefer to see their gradual withdrawal.

Perhaps the solution to the crisis is a planned withdrawal of US forces and their replacement by United Nations peacekeeping units, composed of major elements of the existing coalition along with additional states and charged with taking over security and order in war-torn Iraq.- Published 16/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Ali-Asghar Kazemi is professor of international relations at Islamic Azad University in Tehran.

The deterioration of the situation in Iraq could have serious economic consequences for Jordanians. Economic gains to Jordan must be weighed against the overall instability engendered by having an even larger Iraqi population residing in Jordan. We cannot envision the future economic consequences for Jordan of a political collapse in Iraq without looking at the two countries' economic interaction in recent decades.

For several decades now, Jordan has been expanding its role as a hub for Iraqis and those wanting to transact with them. During the Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s, the Port of Aqaba became a conduit for shipping to Iraq via Jordan. Jordanian products became prominent on Iraqi markets. The Jordanian bonanza grew further during and after Operation Desert Storm as Jordanian exports and re-exports became the only access to outside products for Iraqis in the1990s.

Under the UN's oil-for-food program, which started after the first war on Iraq and continued until the second, Jordan officially became the route to Iraq for anyone hoping for a piece of the pie. Moreover, the Jordanian government received significant oil subsidies (over $500 million annually) from the Iraqi regime, which lasted until the 2003 Iraq invasion. The oil subsidy was halted by the new regime, but a new influx of emigres came to Jordan from Iraq, driving the total number of Iraqis resident in Jordan to close to 400,000. The majority of these new emigres were cash rich and in search of a safe haven for their fortunes and families. Aid from the usual donors, primarily the US, rose to more than $700 million a year with a sizable portion of the aid buttressing national security.

Consequently, the economic impact and benefits shifted from the government to the private sector as Jordanians sold property and goods to Iraqis residing in Jordan. The government, however, having lost tremendous annual revenues from the oil subsidy, had to rely on foreign aid to provide the required infrastructure necessitated by the expanded population and resulting economic activity.

Contracts for the occupying forces and Iraqi government made their way into the hands of only a few in the private sector, and there was little trickle-down effect. Poverty and unemployment rates continued to hover around their decade-old levels of 15 and 14 percent, respectively. The Amman Stock Market grew by 93 percent in 2005, with Iraqis and other Arabs contributing 45 percent of the stock activity. Land prices doubled as major investment was funneled into hotels, luxury offices and residential facilities. In a repeat of the mid-1990s boom, this will be of short-lived benefit as investment is frozen into concrete blocks.

The Jordanian government, faced with declining aid and rising oil prices, attempted to expand the tax collection base, primarily through widened consumption (duties, fines, and sales) taxes since they are easier to collect than income taxes that form a meager four percent of GDP. Attempts to raise taxes were almost totally rejected by parliament. In 2005, the government thus faced a reversal of fortune vis-a-vis the private sector, which seemed to thrive with no visible impact on poverty and employment levels.

The government was successful, however, in raising oil prices and devised a seven-step, two-year plan to increase fuel prices that started in 2005. Attempts by the government to impose new taxes on trading in the stock and real estate markets to generate revenue from the rise in activity in both sectors may be on the horizon. The recent slowdown in these two markets may cause the government to abandon such ventures and concentrate on the sales tax and other consumption or special taxes.

Adding to the government's headache was the increased security threat caused by the almost open border policy toward Iraq. While Iraqi residents were discouraged from bringing their differences with them into Jordan, the nation's security was painfully tested by terrorism in November 2005. The aftermath of the disastrous attack on three hotels in Jordan led to heightened security and a mood of apprehension that temporarily dampened the status of Jordan as an oasis of safety. In addition to heightened internal security, screening at the borders with Iraq and neighboring countries was further tightened.

Clearly, the Iraqi plight has brought mixed results to Jordan. The economic impact shifted from mainly expanding the wealth of the public sector in the 1990s to enhancing that of the private sector in recent years. Ideally, the increased wealth of the people ought to lead to a wealthier government, but that has not been the case in Jordan.

Future deterioration of the situation in Iraq will undoubtedly lead to more Iraqis relocating to Jordan. With them will also come savings, increased demand for consumer goods and some new investment. While the economic impact in the short run will be positive, the Jordanian government will need to channel this new investment into the productive sectors and away from real estate, not only for wealth distribution but for internal stability.- Published 16/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Yusuf Mansur is the managing partner of the Envision Consulting Group (EnConsult) and former CEO of the Jordan Agency for Enterprise and Investment Development.