• The dialectics of Islam  - Arshin Adib-Moghaddam
Neo-fundamentalist, Taliban type groupings claim the total reassertion of the objectivity of the sharia and are hence different from the Iranian case or the political ambitions of Hamas or Hizballah.

• Halal Turkey  - Soner Cagaptay and Duden Yegenoglu
The halal standard would turn life's simple pleasures of eating and especially drinking into combustive social issues.

• Between the hammer of conservatives and the anvil of Islamists  - Oraib Al-Rantawi
The murderer in an "honor crime", usually a close relative of the victim, receives a commuted sentence or several months' imprisonment.

• Hamas and sharia law  - Yehya Mousa
The main goals that Islam aims to achieve are represented in the preservation of five pillars: religion, intellect, self, money and progeny.

The dialectics of Islam
 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam

Islam, like any other belief system or religion has a political culture that is manufactured, reified and institutionalized by human beings. This "Islamic political culture" is socially engineered in a dialectic relationship between states and societies and is hence the product of specific historical circumstances. As analysts we are thus able to discourse about the theories, ideologies and ideational agents constituting the framework of that culture, without getting engaged in theological exigencies. Consequently, any analysis of political world-views permeating Muslim societies is analytically "secular"; it rigorously brackets throughout any questions of the ultimate truth or other matters of religious interpretation.

Moreover, a quick look at the imagery, symbols, ideas and semantics of Islamic movements operating in the Muslim worlds suggests that they are rooted in--and nurtured by--the dialectic between the penetrative, secular presence of western modernity and the determinations of reified Islamic traditions (political, economic, artistic or otherwise). The terminology of the Islamic republic in Iran is a case in point: terms and phrases such as the party of God (hizballah), the daneshjuan-e musalmanan-e piramun-e khatt-e imam (Muslim students following the line of the Imam), indeed the whole concept of the Islamic Republic point toward the imminent dialectics intrinsic to modern Islamic movements. On the one hand there is the rise of political, almost Machiavellian utilitarianism (e.g. the party politics of Hamas in Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan and the Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria or, in the extreme case, the terrorist violence of al-Qaeda type movements). On the other hand, Islamic modernity has also engendered the resurgence of the idea of madinat al nabi, the ideal state of the umma encapsulated in the utopia of the Prophet Muhammad's spiritual and political leadership of the city state in Medina. We thus find ourselves embroiled with a strange dialectic of seemingly contradictory ideas, embodied in culturally different ideal types: coolly expedient rationality poised against the exigencies of Islamic utopianism, in the extreme cases embodied, respectively, in nihilistic technocrats locked in political battles with hysterical ideologues. In many ways this is a politically unattractive choice, especially when the intrinsic tensions within that dialectic are not bridged.

There is a considerable tradition in Muslim political thought going back to the Mutazila (literally: those who withdraw themselves) in the second Islamic century and even before seeking to address the dialectic between Islam and rationalism. Elements of this dialectic can also be found in the writings of modernist Islamic thinkers such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Mohammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Hassan al-Banna, Abu Ala Maudoodi, Sayyid Qutb and others. An important question has been whether there can be an "authentic" Islamic polity in the absence of the Prophet's transcendental guidance (itself, a political question of course). The confines of this narrative do not allow for proper treatment of this vast and chronically under-researched subject area. But let me recur to the example of the Islamic republic in Iran to elaborate on some of the issues involved. The very existence of a constitution alerts us to the fact that Iran is not primarily governed by sharia law. Moreover, in a revealing decree in January 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini declared that an Islamic government had the right to overrule Islamic ordinances if it would be in the interest (maslahat) of the umma and the state. Khomeini announced that the legitimacy of the government was "derived from the absolute domination of the Prophet of God". This was "the most important of God's ordinances (ahkam-e elahi)" and was hence superior to "all ordinances that were derived or directly commanded by Allah". In other words, if it was in the interest of the Islamic state and the umma, major Islamic pillars (even prayer, fasting and the pilgrimage to Mecca) could be annulled. The existence of arbitrating bodies within the state, especially the "Council for the discernment of the interest of the system" (majma-e tashkhis-e maslahat-e nezam), provides further evidence for the presence of both raison d'etat and Islamic ordinance in the Iranian-Islamic polity.

Neo-fundamentalist, Taliban type groupings claim the total reassertion of the objectivity of the sharia and are hence different from the Iranian case or the political ambitions of Hamas or Hizballah that are mostly rooted within the confines of the nation-state. Conversely, for the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance, Afghanistan had been reduced to the status of an emirate, rather than a state, without an official capital or a constitution and without a definition of Afghan nationhood. Mullah Omar did not take up a position as head of state but declared himself amir al-mumenin (commander of the faithful), staying in Kandahar rather than caring to travel to the Afghan capital Kabul. The concept of the nation-state, central to the politics of Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran and elsewhere, is resolutely rejected--as in Ayman al-Zawahiri's July 2005 letter to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi where he celebrated the latter's battle against polytheism, secularists, detractors and inferiors in Iraq, anticipating the establishment of a caliphate that would follow the "pure way of the Prophet, and the sublime goal that the Prophet left to his companions". Hence, in the absence of that ultimate caliphate, belief in the neo-fundamentalist message demands huddling together with one's fellow believers and accepting a sect-like existence within a loose, transnationally stratified brotherhood of ultimate truth.

The sect-like existence of neo-fundamentalist groupings such as al-Qaeda does not, however, divorce them from the determinations of political competition. To the contrary: without any control over state bureaucracies and national media outlets, organizing people to remain or to become sectarians demands maximizing both media exposure and, interdependently, political violence. Many al-Qaeda attacks on coalition forces in Iraq are filmed, sometimes from a variety of different angles, annotated, set to music and posted on internet sides or sent to Arabic satellite channels such as al-Jazeera. Revealingly, in the correspondence between al-Zarqawi and al-Zawahiri mentioned above, the latter criticized filming the practice of beheading hostages. "We are in a battle," Zarqawi argued, "and more than half of it is taking place in the battlefield of the media."

The preceding paragraphs share a common concern: Does the electoral success of Islamically-legitimated movements in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Iran (and, yes, the recruitment success of al-Qaeda type organizations) not point to the fact that "Islam" continues to be the cultural space of contestation in the Muslim worlds? If secularization refers to the process by which sectors of society remove themselves from the determinations of religious ordinances, how useful is the concept for understanding the realities of contemporary Muslim societies? Is not "Islamization," i.e., the process by which Islamic ordinances are mediated to us through a variety of channels (the Imam, mullah, mufti, Ayatollah, party, etc.), a powerful reality of political life in West Asia?

I think that in contemporary Muslim societies, the radically transcendent Allah and the radically immanent human world have not left an empirical reality in which "God is dead", as Nietzsche so famously alluded to. Contemporary Muslim societies (and non-Muslim societies for that matter) do not confront Islam with a fundamental refusal. On the contrary, the Islamic enterprises in Palestine, Iraq, Iran and elsewhere put into operation an entire machinery for producing political, artistic, cultural and socio-economic discourses concerning it. Not only are we compelled to speak of Islam as an all-encompassing reality, rather than a spiritual retreat, we are also confronted with a whole set of "Islamic pop symbols" from Hamas baseball hats in Palestine to Zam Zam Cola in Iran. And so, in this differentiated, pluralistic Islamic space, a fundamental political process manifests itself: we demand that "Islams" function; not only in the mosques, but also in the public spheres.- Published 9/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam teaches at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London and is author of "A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilizations" (Hurst & Columbia U. Press).

Turkey is cool nowadays. Istanbul bustles with designer high-rises, fusion restaurants in the gentrifying Beyoglu neighborhood, and a Picasso exhibit in the Sabanci museum on the Bosphorus. The city's new museum of modern art overlooking the Ottoman Topkapi Palace teems with visitors. Istanbul has all the signs of a city that is coming of age as a world-class metropolis.

What is more, an air of confidence is palpable across the country. After three decades of chronic high inflation, price increases in Turkey are now in the single digits. With the exception of persistent high unemployment, most economic indicators are positive. Low inflation has ushered in a sense of stability, leading to a powerful economic boost: since 2001, the Turkish economy has grown by more than 30 percent. Thanks to these developments, "mortgage" is now a word in Turkish, and middle-class Turks are within easy reach of their first homes. The start of accession talks with the European Union has further added to Turkey's sense of strength. Istanbul's hotels are full of foreign businessmen searching for investment opportunities.

Yet beneath this air of cosmopolitanism and economic stability, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Ankara seems intent on making Turkey a bit more "halal". On November 10, 2005, the Turkish daily Milliyet reported that the AKP had started a process of designating foods and meats halal, or religiously edible for Muslims.

The AKP has instructed Turk Standartlari Enstitusu (the Turkish Institute for Standards, or TSE), a government body responsible for setting up standards for the consumer market, to issue an official standard designating halal foods. The TSE is now working on a halal standard, which is to go into effect in fall 2006, legally reshaping the consumer market.

"What is wrong with designating all foods as halal?" asked an AKP deputy when I inquired about the pending standard. "After all, we are all Muslims, and we all eat only halal foods anyway," he added. Indeed, at first glance, the halal standard initiative seems benign. Nothing appears wrong with it until, of course, one remembers that Turkey is a secular country, and in secular countries, governments do not tell their citizens what they can eat on religious grounds.

In secular societies markets regulate food behavior, and this is the case in Turkey. Turkish companies already sell halal food because that is what the consumers want. Representatives of Turkey's meat and poultry industries confirmed this fact in interviews. Small poultry shops such as Kumes Caddebostan in Istanbul, as well as large poultry and meat processing firms, including Beypilic, Erpilic, and Pinar Et, repeat the same answer: "Our products are halal." A Pinar Et representative adds that in order to satisfy the customers' expectations for halal food, the company receives a document from the mufti in Kemalpasa, where Pinar Et's slaughterhouse is located, certifying that all the company's meats are halal.

None of this is surprising: 99.98 percent of Turkey's population is nominally Muslim and around 90 percent of Turks practice Islam at some level. This means most Turks demand halal food, which the market provides. Indeed, with pork being available only at a few fancy restaurants and a number of grocery stores in districts with Christian or expatriate populations, the chances of accidentally running into non-halal food in Turkey are almost nil.

If all food is already halal, why does the AKP want to set up a state halal food designation? The AKP's explanation is that this would help exports. Pointing at Malaysia, which already has a halal designation, TSE chief Kenan Malatyali told Milliyet on November 10, 2005 that if Turkey also had a halal designation, this "would help increase exports". At first, this analogy seems fine, except Turkey is a secular country and Malaysia is not. And if the aim is to satisfy foreign companies, why not simply attach a halal designation to exports on request?

Another problem with the halal standard is that Muslims have differing definitions of what constitutes halal. Clerics in Turkey suggest a very straightforward, Turkish definition of halal. Ismail Isi, a representative of Diyanet (Turkish higher body for religious affairs), says, "So long as it does not mix with pork or other non-permissible animal products, all food is halal." He adds, "To be halal, an animal has to be slaughtered following a certain Muslim ritual," involving the citation of the besmele (a short prayer) and other rules of conduct, such as not torturing the animal during the slaughter.

It is this simple and direct in Turkey. In Malaysia, on the other hand, the Malaysian Islamic Development Department (JAKIM) has a detailed, seven-page explanation of what constitutes halal. JAKIM says that food that comes in touch with najis (filthy) things, including alcohol, "during its preparation, processing, packing, storage and transportation" is not halal.

If certain foods were labeled non-halal, people would stop buying them even if such foods are technically halal. Sooner or later, merchants would realize that in order to stay in business they would need to keep a "halal" designation, for which they would have to stop selling non-halal food, and also avoid serving and marketing alcohol.

I had my suspicions confirmed at a small butcher shop in Istanbul, a neighborhood mom-and-pop operation. "The opposite of the word halal is not non-halal" says my butcher. "It is haram. And haram does not just mean non-halal; it is what you wish to your enemy if you see them choke." Asked how customers would respond if he offered two kinds of meat, both halal, but one carrying an official halal label, my butcher replies, "If I offered them halal and haram meat? Everyone would buy only halal and I would go bankrupt if I continued to sell meat not labeled halal."

A halal standard would shape Turkish market behavior right away. Regardless of how un-Turkish the standard's characterization of halal is, once published, the AKP text would redefine halal in Turkey. That makes the actual wording of the standard critical. The TSE is mum on this issue: its personnel refused to be interviewed on the halal standard, which is being drafted away from public scrutiny.

What is more, the halal standard would be the death knoll for Turkey's long and peaceful tradition of drinking. After the standard began to be enforced, alcohol would disappear from stores and restaurants. Drinking would be relegated from the social shores of the Bosphorus to the social underground. What is even more worrisome, the standard would create a faultline between those who eat and drink "halal" and those who dare to eat and drink "haram."

Perhaps the AKP means well by following the Malaysian example. However, what is good for Malaysia is not necessarily good for Turkey. Malaysia is a multireligious society. Muslims, who constitute 50 percent of the country's population, live among large numbers of Hindus, Buddhists, Taoists, Christians, Shamanists and Sikhs, and have to watch what they eat in order not to accidentally consume the non-halal foods of other religious communities. Such a risk does not exist in uniformly Muslim Turkey.

The halal standard is a step that would not only make Turkey look less like itself, but also turn life's simple pleasures of eating and especially drinking into combustive social issues. Turkey needs to use its newfound confidence to promote itself, not to emulate others.- Published 9/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an Ertegun Professor at Princeton University, and chair of the Turkey Program at the State Department's Foreign Service Institute. Duden Yegenoglu was a 2005-06 a research assistant at the Washington Institute.

During the past ten years, there have been several attempts to amend laws related to women's rights in Jordan in order to enhance their status and social and economic role and protect them from violations and violence, including what are known as "honor crimes".

A number of political actors and civil society institutions have been involved in these campaigns, which were supported by the royal family and successive Jordanian governments. Yet these efforts have registered very limited progress; they have met strong resistance from traditional and religious actors who control the Jordanian Parliament and impose their cultural and behavioral practices upon wide sectors of Jordanian society. These campaigns have also encountered political obstacles that can be traced in part to Jordan's demographic structure.

Continuous efforts by Jordanian women's organizations, supported by human rights activists and the Jordanian political leadership, have produced some amendments to marriage and divorce laws in Jordan. The legal minimum age for the marriage of girls was raised to 18 years, and women obtained the right of divorce or kholu, by which they could now start divorce procedures based on certain conditions such as restitution of all dowry money.

However this amendment, which was greatly criticized by conservatives, has not maintained women's rights during the marriage itself. The legislators disregarded the "added value" of a woman's contribution in building up the family and providing its needs, whether by working outside the home or as a housewife.

During the past few years, several attempts to amend Article 340 of the Penal Code have failed. This article sometimes provides a "lawful" excuse for criminals who assault women or murder them to protect "family honor". The murderer in an honor crime, usually one of the victim's closest relatives, receives a commuted sentence or several months' imprisonment. The result is that 15-25 women continue to be murdered annually in Jordan. Despite civil and religious campaigns against such crimes, Jordanian society, yielding to traditional and religious influence, continues to sympathize with honor crime murderers and find excuses and justifications for their act.

There can be no doubt that the spread of Islamization in Jordanian society over the past two or three decades has contributed to the formation of a sociopolitical front opposing legislative initiatives by Jordanian civil society and its active women's organizations. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan has grown stronger and has come to control a large number of active NGOs such as professional unions and student councils. Its broad infrastructure of educational, service, cultural and social institutions extends to the entire public, including the poorest areas.

The past 20 years have also witnessed an increase in the influence of a Salafi movement that takes a radical approach toward social, civil and cultural issues. The various trends of this movement are concentrated among the native Jordanian population, while the Muslim Brotherhood focuses on the Palestinian camps and neighborhoods of Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

In seeking to contain the impact of the escalating power of religion, successive Jordanian governments have since 1993 adopted a "One Vote Law" and distributed parliamentary seats among governorates and electorates with the aim of achieving two connected objectives: first, to prevent the Islamic trend from reaching too deeply into Parliament and obtaining a majority; and second, to guarantee the "Jordanian identity" of Parliament and contain the representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin within certain limits.

Yet the outcome of this policy in the social, cultural and civil spheres has totally contradicted the intent of the regime. The One Vote Law has produced three successive parliaments controlled by conservative and traditional pro-government political actors who have allied themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood and related religious trends, thereby rendering it difficult to enact legislation awarding women equal rights.

The latest attempt at such legislation was by Her Majesty Queen Rania al-Abdullah, who sought to amend the Jordanian Nationality Law so as to give Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians the right to obtain Jordanian nationality for their children. This effort faced strong resistance by conservative Jordanians who feared the ramifications of such an amendment on the sensitive demographics of the country: some sources believed the proposed amendment would grant immediate Jordanian nationality to more than 50,000 Palestinians. In the end the Cabinet was authorized to grant nationality to children of Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, but only on a case-by-case basis.

Here we see all the elements of the issue at hand: the campaign to grant Jordanian women their rights as guaranteed by international charters; political, social and cultural complications related to the development of religious and socially conservative trends; and the demographic issues peculiar to Jordan.- Published 9/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Oraib Al-Rantawi is director of Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, Amman.

Hamas was founded on the premise that Islam is a way of life that can provide a solution to any problem faced by humankind. Hamas does not seek to impose this perspective by force. Rather, the group's position is that such an understanding comes only through conviction and after a long-term and gradual process. We believe in the comprehensiveness of Islam and that one part of it cannot be separated from another. All the components of a dignified life are provided for in Islam and this includes political, security, economic and social rights.

Hence, the creation of a truly Islamic state does not come about abruptly or spontaneously but after a long process of work and action.

That process has been evident in the gradual emergence of Hamas. Over the years Hamas succeeded in raising a generation that has taken in the meaning and values of Islam through an ongoing educational process. Hamas started out focusing on social and institutional work through its charitable societies and organizations. The movement also participated in the resistance against the Israeli occupation. Finally, the movement joined the formal political life of the nation. Having gained the trust of the people, it emerged from elections victorious. Thus, Islam in Palestine today--as values and action--is represented in mosques, charitable and social institutions, municipalities, universities and now in the parliament as well.

Islam is not merely the enactment of laws but is preceded by a large-scale process of mobilization and education. Furthermore, sharia, or Islamic, law cannot be realized unless an independent and sovereign state is established, which is not the case at present. Therefore, we in Hamas are first concerned with completing the liberation of Palestinian land.

But once this is accomplished, we will leave it to the people to choose the political system they want. We believe that if Islam is implemented, it will be the reference for values of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights. That is, we seek to build a civilized civil society where everyone enjoys rights and equality. This society will not be unjust or ignorant, as some have tried to portray it. The main goals that Islam aims to achieve are represented in the preservation of five pillars: religion, intellect, self, money and progeny.

For example, we believe in all women's rights in terms of education, work, choice in marriage and political participation. These are guaranteed by preserving the status of women and their privacy and not allowing them to be exploited or harmed. We do not seek forcefully to restrict her to a certain dress code but try and guide her to that which will preserve her wholesomeness.

We also believe that before punitive measures are carried out, the basic necessities of life must be provided. We cannot talk about cutting off the hand of a thief if we have not provided a good economic life for the people. We are also concerned with internal social relationships, especially as regards minorities and safeguarding their rights, allowing them freedom of belief without harassment or persecution.

As for the political system, there is no specific model to be followed. It depends on the nature of interests at certain stages. The ruler may set up alliances or become involved in international organizations if it serves the public. Islam is far from extremism or radicalism; it is a religion of tolerance and openness. Islam is not fearful of others; the coming together of peoples to communicate and exchange experiences and cultures is a tenet of the religion. Islam works hard to move mankind away from war and to defuse conflicts with dialogue. Always, people are urged to adhere to their innate humanity.

An Islamic state must develop gradually. However, we must strive for agreement between our laws and the way of Islam. One thing made clear by the Palestinian vote for Hamas is a definite desire for change through an Islamic approach. Those who voted for Hamas have complete faith that Islam represents a way out of the crises that surround them.- Published 9/3/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Yehya Mousa is a Hamas legislator from Khan Younis in the Gaza Strip.