• A Lebanese perspective  - Nizar Abdel-Kader
No doubt, Hamas now brings a new dynamic to the Lebanese internal equation.

• An Egyptian view  - Abdel Monem Said Aly
Hamas' ascent to primacy has contributed to a series of changes in the region from Tehran to Cairo.

• Pragmatic, but uncomfortable  - Omar Karmi
The geo-political and demographic realities of Jordanian-Palestinian relations necessitate good relations between Jordan and the PA, whoever may be at the helm.

• Hamas can set an example  - Khader Khader
A Hamas failure could perhaps send the entire region into another period of political wilderness akin to the era after the failure of the pan-Arabists.

A Lebanese perspective
 Nizar Abdel-Kader

The stunning victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections took everyone by surprise, including Hamas itself.

Western donors, led by the United States, are reconsidering their funding to the Palestinian Authority and pressuring Hamas to follow the path of Yasser Arafat and Fateh in renouncing violence and recognizing Israel's right to exist. Israel says it will withhold the customs tax that it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. Such negative measures will put Hamas and President Mahmoud Abbas under tremendous pressure to find alternative funding to pay the 137,000 people on the government payroll. Requests from Arab donors like Saudi Arabia and Qatar will not be able to make up for the loss.

Hamas has been caught unprepared for such a challenge. It has to reconcile its Islamic political ideology not to recognize the state of Israel with its responsibility as a parliamentary majority preparing to form the Palestinian government. It has to face the reality of dealing with Fateh, which dominates every aspect of governmental activity. Also, Hamas will face a conflict between its responsibility over the security services and the existence of its own military branch. It is still early to speculate how Hamas will react if the Martyrs Brigades of Fateh decide to play the "spoiler" role that Hamas and the Islamic Jihad played under Fateh's government.

Nevertheless, Hamas has been placed through democratic elections at the helm of the Palestinian political system. This reality suggests that the US and the European Union will have to display pragmatism in dealing with Hamas in its role as head of government and peace partner. Recognizing the challenge, Hamas is working hard to draw up a new political plan to address the internal and international concerns. Indeed, this internal dialogue may be the most critical task Hamas undertakes; it may result in either resolving crucial concerns or causing a breakdown in Hamas' ranks.

Hamas is now facing a dilemma over choices. It must decide whether to meet the conditions of stopping the violence, committing itself to all the agreements signed with Israel and recognizing Israel. Such prerequisites would seem impossible for Hamas if one believes the words of its prominent leader Khaled Mishaal: "We shall never recognize the legitimacy of a Zionist state created on our soil."

Hamas must carefully evaluate the risks of the current situation in order to avoid total isolation from the international and Arab sides. Such an event would have very detrimental consequences for the Palestinian economy and bring more suffering upon people who voted for Hamas in the hope of improving their lives. Hamas must also avoid drawing Fateh into direct confrontation by grasping power through strong-armed reform methods that would lead to total instability and possible civil war.


The political situation surrounding Hamas' victory and its accession to power is highly complex. It requires wisdom and consideration on the part of all sides, including western donors and key Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Special effort should be devoted to maintaining this democratic achievement and meeting the expectations of the Palestinian people. Everyone should remember the high cost paid by the Algerian people when democratic elections were thwarted and the Islamic Front was prevented from forming a new government. Repetition of such a situation must be avoided if we are to spare the Palestinian people a civil war. In this context, it is highly advisable for Hamas to reconsider its political path, including its commitment to peace. It should distance itself from the "refusalist" front led by Syria and Iran.

The victory of Hamas was received with mixed emotions in the Beirut media and among the political elite. One of the important questions being asked centers on the extent to which the Hamas victory might strengthen the position of the Palestinian factions falling under Syrian influence in refusing dialogue regarding disarmament of their militias, as called for by the Lebanese government. The outcome of such a dialogue would depend on the extent to which the Hamas leadership in exile can free itself from the influence of President Bashar al-Assad. Another key issue of interest centers on the new relationship between Hamas and Hizballah, once the former accedes to power. No doubt, Hamas now brings a new dynamic to the Lebanese internal equation; it has to deal with the refugees' living conditions in Lebanon without neglecting the value Lebanon attaches to the execution of UNSCR 1559 regarding the disarming of all militias.

It is hard to predict Hamas' political choices, but it is important for all parties concerned to recognize their responsibilities and coordinate their efforts, so as to ensure the success of this democratic leap forward in Palestine and the Middle East.- Published 9/2/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Nizar Abdel-Kader is a political analyst/columnist at Ad-Diyar newspaper in Beirut. He has authored four books on Lebanon and regional political and strategic issues.

I am not one of those who were totally surprised by the impressive victory of Hamas. In fact, in an article published in Al-Sharq al-Awsat on January 11, 2006, entitled "After the disappearance of Sharon", I predicted not only Hamas' victory, but also that it would lead to the victory of the Likud in Israel's elections, thereby opening a new chapter of confrontation. Now that the first part of the prediction has come true, I am no longer totally sure about the second. But one prediction is guaranteed: the success of Hamas will boost the fortunes of the right in Israel, and the gulf between Palestinians and Israelis will widen.

A continuation of the present uneasy truce is not totally excluded in view of regional and international interventions, but the level of tension will certainly be higher. All will depend on how Hamas and Fateh resolve the contradictions between the mandate given to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to seek a peaceful two-state solution to the Palestinian cause, and the new mandate given to Hamas to liberate Palestine from the river to the sea and guarantee the return of six million Palestinian refugees to the homes they left in 1948. The Islamic Jihad fundamentalist group will do its best to test both mandates violently, and with every test the Likud Party will get a helping hand.

But tension on the Palestinian-Israeli front is only one small part of the much deeper strategic transformation that is taking shape in the Middle East, of which the Hamas victory is only one manifestation. In fact, Hamas' ascent to primacy in the Palestinian Legislative Council has contributed to a series of similar changes in the region that extends from Tehran to Cairo.

It began in Iran when Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad won the Iranian presidential elections and completed the conservative fundamentalist hold on Iranian institutions and politics. Not much later the Muslim Brothers in Egypt achieved an impressive electoral and political victory in the 2005 parliamentary elections. The Brothers gained 88 seats, or 19.81 percent of all elected seats, up from 17 seats or 3.82 percent in 2000. In a way, the rise of the Muslim Brothers reflected a steady dynamic in Egyptian politics: the Brothers gained only eight seats in the 1984 elections and 36 in the 1987 elections. An informal legalization of the Brothers has taken place, and a sharp rise in their public stature has given them a permanent presence in the Egyptian and pan-Arab media. And by December 2005, the Iraqi elections witnessed the rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups in Shi'ite and Sunni parties.

In the Iranian, Egyptian, Palestinian and Iraqi cases the change was through democratic means and at the expense of secular, liberal, and establishment political parties. Similar developments are taking place in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, where Hizballah and versions of the Muslim Brotherhood are politically consolidating their status on the ground or underground.

The reasons for this state of affairs are not under investigation here. Most likely they can be found in prolonged historical trends, along with developments among concerned countries in the post 9/11 era. What is important, however, is to record the strategic trend that is taking root in the region and most probably is going to redefine all regional issues. It is different from the radical and violent trend that produced organizations and groups like al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups. It involves much more established and organized social groups that are inspired by a religious and political ethos.

For these groups, the goal of the polity is salvation, the protection of the faith, and the implementation of God's word: the Sharia. Accordingly, they are seeking to seize the state machinery and use its powers to achieve long term strategic goals that include restoring historical rights and correcting national and religious injustices. Iran is a good example, whereby a mixture of conservative internal politics and flamboyant external politics is coupled with a strong urge to obtain weapons of mass destruction. In time, Iran will seek to build the new front of Momanaa--a modern-day copy of the Rejection and Steadfastness Front of the 1980s, but this time in religious garb and featuring aggressive policies.

This shift in regional politics is most likely going to open far-reaching possibilities for regional realignments. The voting in the IAEA for transferring the Iranian file to the Security Council might provide an early indicator of the new trends: Syria opposed the motion, Egypt supported it and Libya abstained--early signs of a more intense differentiation of alignments in a tenuous and ever-changing region. Attempts to couple regional issues with the Arab-Israel conflict will be confronted with efforts to decouple them.

For those who wish to live in interesting times, as the Chinese proverb says, they will get their wish!- Published 9/2/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Abdel Monem Said Aly is a writer and political analyst at Al Ahram newspaper in Cairo.

As is usually the case when events west of the Jordan River take a dramatic turn, Jordan is the country in the region that will feel the most immediate and potentially far-reaching consequences.

Hamas' sweeping victory in landmark elections last month is no exception. Jordan has been notably cautious in reacting to the Islamic Resistance Movement's victory, unlike Egypt, which almost immediately repeated calls by western donor countries for Hamas to recognize Israel, disarm and uphold all previous agreements between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Jordan, for its part, simply urged all parties to maintain the calm and work for peace.

There are good reasons for Jordan to take careful stock of the situation. Hamas, while originally founded in the Gaza Strip as an outgrowth of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, has maintained very close ties to Jordan's Islamists, and for a long time Hamas' leadership in exile was based in Amman. In addition, the general geo-political and demographic realities of Jordanian-Palestinian relations make close ties between Palestinians of all political stripes in both Jordan and Palestine inevitable and necessitate good relations between Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, whoever may be at the helm.

But Jordan's relationship with its own Islamists has been uneasy in recent years. Traditionally, the Hashemites, unique among ruling regimes in the region, maintained close relations with Jordan's Muslim Brotherhood. The political arm of the Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front, has been allowed to maintain its dominance of the country's professional associations and has had a fair shot at parliament, where the IAF currently makes up the single largest opposition bloc with 17 out of 110 seats. Jordanian governments also usually include one or two portfolios set aside for independents close to the IAF.

The late King Hussein was not about to let his good relations with the Brotherhood get in the way of what he saw as the overriding importance of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, and greater democratic openness enacted in 1988 was abrogated to ensure no parliamentary opposition to the treaty in the new parliament in 1993. Nevertheless, he clearly valued the relations, even though the Muslim Brotherhood remained, and continue to remain, implacably opposed to the 1994 peace treaty.

Israel's attempted assassination of current Hamas leader Khaled Mishaal in 1996 was therefore taken as a personal affront to the king and interpreted as an attempt by Israel to jeopardize Hashemite relations with both Hamas and Jordan's Islamists. King Hussein wasted no time in exacting the maximum political price he could from Israel in return, including the release from prison of Hamas' spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.

His son, King Abdullah, however, has taken a more confrontational approach with Hamas and Jordan's Islamists. In 1999, only six months into his reign, commercial offices in Amman registered under the names of Hamas leaders were shut down, Hamas activists were detained, and arrest warrants were issued against five Hamas leaders: Mishaal, politburo members Musa Abu Marzouq, Sami Khater, Izzat Rasheq, and spokesperson Ibrahim Ghosheh.

Jordan insisted it would no longer tolerate that "Jordanian citizens work for a non-Jordanian organization from Jordanian territory," and the five, who were on a visit to Iran at the time, were charged with membership in an illegal organization, possession and stockpiling of illegal weapons, illegal fundraising, armed activities, and use of forged documents. Upon their return to Amman, Mishaal and his colleagues were arrested at the airport and eventually all deported.

Internally, the regime most recently confronted the IAF with the government's attempt to include a clause in Jordan's political parties' law that would make it illegal for a political party to base itself exclusively on religious foundations. Ostensibly, the clause is meant as a safeguard for minorities, but the IAF sees it as a direct attempt at curbing its potential for growth and greater influence.

That political parties' law has also been the subject of some criticism from Washington, where Jordan so far has managed to stay under the US administration's radar for greater democratization. With Hamas' victory, US pressure is liable to diminish. But Jordan is facing a new dilemma: a successful Hamas will increase the popularity of Jordan's Islamists and render it more difficult to curb their influence. A failed Hamas potentially poses an even more serious problem, particularly if Hamas fails because of external pressure and the PA itself collapses or a civil war breaks out.

The records of Hamas and Jordan suggest that both sides will take highly pragmatic, if slightly uncomfortable, positions vis-a-vis each other. Each is aware of its importance to the other, and while no outright thaw in relations is likely in the near future, some warming can be expected. - Published 9/2/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Omar Karmi is a Jordan Times correspondent based in Jerusalem.

Perhaps the single most important aspect of Hamas' overwhelming victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections last month is that it was the first time in the contemporary history of the Middle East that democracy was exercised for real without any direct external or internal interference. The ramifications of such free elections may well reverberate around the region for years to come and might mark a new phase in the geopolitical map of the Middle East.

This, however, was not the first time an Islamic political party showed its popularity at the ballot box. Algeria's Islamic Front appeared headed to certain victory in elections in the mid-1990s before external intervention on the part of the "democratic" West and its allies in Algiers nipped that experience in the bud. In Algeria, the result of burying democracy has been an extremely bloody conflict that still drags on, much to the embarrassment of western countries, which prefer not to comment. For the ordinary citizen in the Arab world, it was an experience that only added to the sense of oppression and frustration felt in every corner of the region.

Thus Hamas' electoral victory has sparked widespread hope among the Arab masses that they have another chance to find out if an Islamic party can rule better than the current regimes in the Arab world. Hamas, in this sense, carries the hopes of millions of Arabs and Muslims all over the world.

But with such expectations comes a time fraught with danger. Hamas and the way it runs matters in the Palestinian territories can set a very interesting example: if it succeeds; if it proves it can run Palestinian affairs more transparently and to the benefit of more ordinary Palestinians than previously, while at the same time managing tough negotiations with Israel, the experience will encourage other Islamic movements in the Arab world to use it as an example to convince their citizens that Islamic political movements are a viable alternative.

But if Hamas fails in its difficult and challenging task, the setback will strike a devastating blow to all Islamic movements and parties in the region. A Hamas failure could perhaps send the entire region into another period of political wilderness akin to the era after the failure of the pan-Arabists.

Thus, Hamas in power is an interesting and illuminating phenomenon, and one that will be followed closely by all concerned parties. According to a leading Hamas figure in Khan Yunis, Dr. Younis al-Astal, the International Muslim Brotherhood has already expressed its readiness to assist Hamas with all the needed expertise to make it succeed in its mission. The Brotherhood will of course be the principal benefactor of any Hamas success.

By the same token, however, the West may feel itself forced now to exert all possible efforts to make Hamas fail even if the movement proves successful in meeting the needs of the people. The issue in question here is not how efficient a government is but how loyal a government shows itself to be to the West. This is the measure the West has generally used to assess the Middle East, where billions of US dollars have been spent on keeping Arab regimes "moderate and realistic", especially in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

There is a curious parallel to the Cold War now in the dynamic that is developing between the West and the Muslim world. During the Cold War, the West was confident that democracy would bring the Eastern Bloc to its knees and forcefully spread the message that individual freedom and the right to vote were human rights par excellence.

Now, however, that same message is likely to backfire on the West. If real elections were held in Egypt and Jordan, it is highly likely that Muslim Brotherhood movements would come to power and cast into doubt the peace treaties between those countries and Israel, in which the West has invested so much effort.

Everyone knows that democracy comes at a cost in the Middle East. Is the world ready to engage in this game? The key is likely to be the success or otherwise of Hamas, which is operating under extremely adverse conditions. Arabs and Muslims across the region, so often let down by political promise from various quarters, may well be disappointed again. But in the meantime their hopes are with a political movement that is posing the first serious challenge in decades to Arab regimes everywhere. - Published 9/2/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Khader Khader is a media analyst with the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center.