• A South Korean withdrawal  - Sawsan Assaf
Any "withdrawal" would be illusory, because the US would operate and retain large military bases in the country.

• In an unenviable position  - Hassan A. Barari
If the Americans decide to withdraw hastily, one of Jordan's concerns is growing Iranian influence within Iraq.

• The bloody cost of hugging "good intentions"  - Alastair Crooke
We are largely engaged in preparing the Peshmerga and the Shi'ite militia for the confrontation with the Sunnis.

• The Russian perspective  - Konstantin von Eggert
The exercise of western might in Iraq in 2003 serves Moscow as a constant reminder of Russia's relative insignificance in global affairs.

• Finishing the job  - Frederick W. Kagan
It would be the height of folly to allow al-Qaeda to trade a poverty-stricken base for one that floats on one of the world's richest seas of oil.

A South Korean withdrawal
 Sawsan Assaf

The possibility and timing of any US withdrawal from Iraq is contingent on the US achieving its strategic aims for the country.

The aim of the war on Iraq waged by the US-led coalition forces was clear before it even broke out. Most importantly, the war was fought in the service of US and British military superiority in the region, and initially this was achieved faster than even most military or strategic analysts predicted.

In addition to overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his regime and meeting the objectives of the Iraqi opposition, the war was aimed at entrenching US and allied countries' economic and geo-strategic control of the Middle East while building up a deterrent power in the heart of the region. These strategic aims were coupled with the claim that allied forces were in the process of reconstructing Iraq politically, socially and economically into a prototype for democracy and freedom in this vital part of the world.

As such, a comparison with Japan after World War II was often mooted, where an almost completely destroyed state was rebuilt and remolded by the US. But the American ability to turn its military victory into a political victory has been stunted by the armed resistance against the occupation, an occupation that in its practices and arrogance belittled the values and traditions of Iraqi society and thus encouraged support for the resistance from all quarters.

Thus was created the multifaceted resistance we see today; the religious Sunni Iraqi bloc, religious Sunni foreign bloc (al-Qaeda), religious Shi'ite bloc (Sidr movement), religious Salafi Kurdish bloc (Ansar al-Salam), the political bloc affiliated with the former regime, the political bloc affiliated with the Syrian-backed Baath party (al-Qawmiyoun), not to mention the mercenary forces (we will fight in exchange for benefits at any given place and time).

Thus too, the conditions for a US withdrawal changed. Rather than pursue the grandiose Japan model, South Korea is now seen as the model to follow. In line with overall strategy, any "withdrawal" would in any case be illusory, because the US would operate and retain large military bases in the country. Before any such "withdrawal", however, the US must first try to calm the situation on the ground to avoid being seen as having been embroiled in a Vietnam-like situation, where the US has effectively lost control.

The way to do so is not straightforward. If Washington wants to implement a South Korea model in Iraq, it must first make the country militarily and politically dependent on the US. According to the political realities of Iraq, such a model would necessitate, 1) an unprotected Iraqi federation--i.e., support for the effective division of Iraq and a dissipation of national unity between Sunnis, Shi'ites, Kurds, Turkmans, etc., coupled with a military force with capabilities insufficient for protecting Iraqi security as we see today--and, 2) the creation of an illusory enemy that has the ability and intent to deny any Iraqi identity if the United States is not deterring it. Iran and its extensions in Iraq serve this role well.

In the short term, Washington must convince the world that the departure of American troops from Iraq would lead to a civil war on the one hand and a return of dictatorship on the other. This necessitates a focus on the slogan that "we must remain at the will and need of the people." Meanwhile, the US will work to achieve economic prosperity in some parts of Iraq to lay the foundations of a federation, as it is already doing in the southern part of the country in Basra, al-Amara, etc.

The policy of shaking up internal factors as well as external factors is directed at frustrating any form of national unity from emerging; that is, to move people away from seeking the liberation of Iraq as long as putting the Iraqi house in order is still a long way off. This will mean a continuation of the prevailing social conditions (violence, Abu Musab Zarqawi, military militias, etc), economic deterioration, struggle over seats and the division of booty to divert any attention away from creating unified determination and a united Iraqi state.

Thus, in the short term, the US must create the opposite conditions to lay the foundations for a South Korean model that in the long-term will enable it to "withdraw" by endorsing the principles of dictatorship that Washington will bring back, only this time in "new clothes".- Published 26/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


Sawsan Assaf is a lecturer at the Center for International Studies at the University of Baghdad.

Undoubtedly, Jordan had no choice but to support the American endeavor to overthrow Saddam's regime in Iraq. However, the persistence of the American occupation of Iraq has created unprecedented instability there that has the potential of engulfing neighboring countries such as Jordan. Seen from this perspective, one can make the case that Jordan's position vis-a-vis the situation in Iraq directly correlates with Jordan's vital interest in security and stability in the region as a whole.

The deteriorating security situation in Iraq has raised the cost of occupation for all parties concerned, thus creating a momentum that calls for American withdrawal from Iraq. Jordan's position on this issue is complex. Jordanian officials believe that American policies such as the exclusion of the Sunni Iraqis, politically coupled with the occupation, have led to extremism, resistance, and terrorism. Yet Jordan does not call for immediate American withdrawal lest this further aggravate the security situation, rekindle the deep-seated sectarian divisions, and create a civil war.

Time and again, Jordan has expressed support for Iraqis' right to independence. Yet Jordan has voiced concerns regarding a possible flare-up and, in an extreme case, civil war, in the aftermath of American occupation. Therefore, Jordan is in an unenviable position: for domestic political reasons, it cannot call for the continuation of the American troop presence in Iraq; but equally important, for strategic reasons, Jordan cannot call for an immediate American withdrawal, particularly when the Iraqis themselves are divided over this issue.

If the Americans decide to withdraw hastily, one of Jordan's concerns is growing Iranian influence within Iraq. Jordan has gone on record warning of the strategic threat of an Iranian-controlled Shi'ite Iraq and its effect on the stability of the region. King Abdullah II talked about the risk of the emergence of a Shi'ite crescent that includes Iran, Shi'ite Iraq, Syria, and Hizballah. His statements provoked anti-Jordanian activities in Iraq and incitement by Iran. Jordan paid dearly for these statements, and consequently had to back down. The recent visit of the new Iranian president to Syria and the emergence of a solid Syrian-Hizballah alliance have shown that the king's earlier warning was strategically far-sighted.

Ideally, Jordan would have liked to see an end to the American occupation. But challenges and uncertainties lie ahead. The Jordanian ambassador in Paris reportedly said that America should not withdraw from Iraq. This statement, which was denied by the government, has elicited severe criticism in Jordan. Needless to say, the majority of the Jordanian public has taken a strong position against the presence of American troops in Iraq. Many in Jordan have drawn a link between the American presence in Iraq and the terrible terrorist bombings in Amman last November. A clear majority of Jordanians used to express sympathy and support for al-Qaeda activities in Iraq; it took the November bombings in Amman to reverse their support.

All in all, despite popular opposition in Jordan to the American presence in Iraq, the government of Jordan is not keen on a hasty American withdrawal lest this create grave strategic and security consequences. For this reason, Jordan has worked diligently with the Americans and the Iraqis themselves in order to ensure that the American withdrawal leads only to the stability and integrity of Iraq's territories. Jordan invested great effort to convince the Sunni Iraqis to take part in elections in order to preempt the possible political exclusion of this important sect in Iraq. It also facilitated participation among Iraqis in Jordan in the last election.

If America does withdraw, Jordan prefers United Nations involvement to help stabilize the situation and defuse sectarian tension.- Published 26/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org



Hassan A. Barari is professor of Middle Eastern politics at the University of Jordan and the author of "Israelism: Arab Scholarship on Israel, a Critical Assessment" (London: Ithaca, 2009).

Having recently participated in two public debates on the issue of whether the United States should withdraw now from Iraq or stay the course, I understand only too well that western audiences are not listening to the arguments. It is not cool rationality that sways the audience, but the play upon their anxieties that gives the outcome. Yes, they are worried about what is happening--otherwise it is hardly likely that 750 persons would turn out on a cold London night to listen--but they are there mainly to have their anxieties allayed.

In this conflict of feelings, the warm embrace of that presumption of western "good intentions" always will trump the argument that leaving as soon as possible actually might improve the prospects for a political solution. They hear; but they want assurances--assurances you can touch--that a better outcome can be guaranteed by leaving early.

The truth is that both courses of action carry risk, and both, almost certainly, would be accompanied by a level of violence. The question is, what level of violence? Western audiences wriggle at this point, and sink into the embrace of the mantra that "surely the US and the UK presence must be beneficial?" The intentions are good; but they cannot accept that intentions are not enough; that even such a well-intentioned western presence might in itself inhibit or prevent any prospect of an early solution.

In some ways, as is also claimed for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, we can all see the shape of the likely long-term arrangement. The key internal parties--meaning those who have real influence on the ground, the Sunni resistance leaders and the Shi'ite leadership--will need to sit with the others who hold influence in Iraq, the Kurds, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia, to find a power-sharing outcome. This outcome is likely to provide a form of governance that gives more weight to Sunni interests than is available under the present dispensation. Many in Iraq now believe that any political solution, however, must be preceded by some trial of strength between the parties. The hope is that this will not escalate into civil war, but who can offer such assurances?

The US presence prevents such a solution: all in the region are aware that the US, slowly or less slowly, is on its way out. We can all observe too that the election outcome has shifted the locus of influence over the internal political process from Washington to Tehran. The problem is that that such a solution cannot begin to emerge until the occupiers go. The longer they continue with their military suppression of mainly Sunni central Iraq, the more it aggravates sectarian tensions and the greater the prospect for civil war.

The US occupation, in its focus on militarily suppressing central Iraq, itself gives rise to large numbers of Iraqi civilian and innocent casualties. This creates the atmosphere of Sunni victimhood that the small minority "Zarqawi" and Takfiri groups exploit in order to try to create the civil tensions that might lead to a true revolutionary process. The overwhelming majority of Sunni insurgents are fighting for a seat at the table of power--they are not fighting to create a new revolution.

The US domestic imperative to have an exit strategy in time for the mid-term congressional elections means that, politically, the US is in a jam in Iraq: the elections have given the Shi'ite parties a dominant position, and these parties are warning the US that the elections are over, that they won, and that the US must stop trying to appease the Sunnis or risk the Shi'ites turning on the US. For the Sunnis, the elections yielded zero in terms of real political clout. They are angry and alienated. The Americans now risk both communities turning on them: their ultimate dread. At the same time, they can neither address the political impasse nor correct the sectarian flaws in the make-up of the security forces without returning them both to the drawing board. And that would terminate their exit strategy just in the run up to congressional elections.

In the face of diminishing US room for maneuver, what can staying achieve? No one in the US seriously advocates getting in the middle of sectarian conflict; and if the object is to strengthen the militia-based security forces, then we are largely engaged in preparing the Peshmerga and the Shi'ite militia for the confrontation with the Sunnis. Is that what we want? As matters stand, without US fire and airpower the Shi'ites would probably have little option but to negotiate with the Sunnis. But if we stay to build up further the strength of the Kurdish and Shi'ite militias within the so-called "national" security forces, we will only prolong and intensify the ensuing struggle.

These options may make western audiences who yearn for a "democratic" solution queasy; but this is the reality. The US should go, the sooner the better, and allow a real political process--one that will involve those to whom the US will not speak--to sort out an accommodation.- Published 26/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org



Alastair Crooke is a director of Conflicts Forum.

The Russian position regarding any US withdrawal from Iraq is not at all clear. Indeed, Russia's policy vis-a-vis Iraq, so active prior to the March 2003 operation by the US and allied forces, today is pretty much invisible. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website search engine produces 146 mentions of Iraq in different contexts by Russian officials and parliamentarians since that date. This is not much for nearly three years. Ever since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Russian interest in Iraq has waned. There are several reasons for this.

One is a sharp change in Russia's economic perspectives in Iraq. No one expects things to get back to the level of 2001-2002 any time soon. At the time, estimates put trade turnover between the two countries at $2 billion. Half of it was revenue from sales of Iraqi oil by Russian middlemen, the other from supplies of Russian goods to Baghdad under the "oil-for-food" program. Companies like LUKOIL expected Iraqis to land them substantive deals, like developing the massive Western Qurna-2 oilfield. Talks on these contracts continue with the new Iraqi authorities, but are still very far from completion. To quote Yelena Suponina, one of Russia's most eminent analysts of the Middle East, "the good thing, from the point of view of Moscow, is that the talks go on at all."

Another reason is Russia's--and Vladimir Putin's--painful memories of policy failure on the eve of the invasion. Moscow's opposition--together with Paris and Berlin--to the American-led operation nearly led to serious crisis in its relations with Washington. It was prevented only because George W. Bush and his administration chose to "forgive" Russia. From that moment on, Russia had to face the inevitable loss of its assets in Iraq to those of coalition partners.

The third reason has a lot to do with psychology. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia's political class (and a large chunk of the population) craving for at least some kind of return to the Soviet-era imperial might and projection of influence. Hence the Russian insistence on the UN's exclusive role in global affairs, and its instinctive anti-Americanism. In these circumstances, any ally was seen by Moscow as an asset.

Dictators like Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein used this to the full, playing on ideological weakness and corruption in Russia's political class. The Volker commission report showed that Moscow's advocacy of Saddam was strengthened by kickbacks from Iraqi oil sales to several Russian public figures. Saddam Hussein successfully used Moscow as his international advocate. The lightning speed with which Saddam's regime collapsed and American military technology and prowess stunned the Russian political and military elites, which as late as March 20, 2003, predicted, in the words of Russian military intelligence analysts that, "Baghdad will become the Iraqi Stalingrad". After these predictions turned out wrong, Putin decided to adopt a low profile on Iraqi matters.

Today, official Moscow limits itself to calls for an increased role for the UN in Iraq (which the organisation hardly wants for itself) as well as expressing concern that the Sunnis are not getting a fair deal in the new Iraq. However, foreign ministry officials recently took to publicly calling Iraqi insurgents "terrorists", and Russian state TV, which generally does not dedicate much time to Iraq, scaled down the use of the expression "resistance fighters", a sign that the Kremlin does not want to irritate the US any more than necessary.

Nevertheless, the invasion is invoked by Russians every time talk turns to possible future developments in the Middle East, especially Iran. "We know the record of sanctions against Iraq. We know what this led to. And we still have to deal with the effects of the situation Iraq has found itself in", Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov wrote on December 28 last year in an article on the MFA's website.

The exercise of western might in Iraq in 2003 (like NATO's Kosovo operation in 1999) serves Moscow as a constant reminder of Russia's relative insignificance in global affairs. These events are also reflected in the psyche of ordinary Russians as threatening proof of America's "evil intentions" toward Russia itself. In this respect, hardly anybody here mentions the atrocities committed by Saddam Hussein's regime or his occupation of Kuwait in 1990. The emphasis is always on the fact that Iraqi sovereignty was violated and that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, which served as a pretext for invasion, were not found. Russia still lives in a Westphalian world where sovereignty is queen. In a way, Moscow's attitude to Iraq reflects Russian feelings of insecurity, both external and domestic, and their deep suspicions of the West.- Published 26/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Konstantin von Eggert, MBE, is the Moscow Bureau Editor of the BBC Russian Service.

America has an obligation to remain in Iraq until it has helped establish a peaceful, stable democracy there. The rest of the civilized world, especially the Muslim world, has a vital interest in supporting this endeavor. The wise consideration of the US military presence in Iraq can only take place on the basis of these two facts. Such a consideration reveals the extreme dangers that will result from a premature withdrawal of American forces from Iraq and from the establishment of any artificial time-line for such a withdrawal.

The debate over the American presence in Iraq has been clouded for too long by the debate over President Geroge W. Bush's decision to invade Iraq in the first place. Resentment of that decision has too easily flowed into resentment of the continued US presence and therefore into unreflective demands for an immediate US withdrawal. This phenomenon has taken place within the US and around the world.

But evaluating the decision to invade Iraq cannot inform the discussion about when to leave. The nascent Iraqi democracy is under severe attack from internal and external forces. Its own troops are not yet ready to assume responsibility for defending it, and will not be ready to do so for some time. Were America to withdraw its forces prematurely, there is a great danger that the Iraqi government would succumb to these attacks in one of several ways.

By far the most likely manner of collapse would be a civil war among Iraq's major ethnic and sectarian groups: Sunni Arab against Shi'ite Arab in the first instance, possibly expanding into a struggle that involves the Kurds as well. This is a scenario that no Muslim could wish for, still less any non-Muslim. Civil war among Arabs is an intolerable prospect--as is civil war within any people. The possibility that Iraq's neighbors might involve themselves in such a struggle is even more intolerable, raising as it does the specter of an intra-Arab or even Arab-Turkish-Persian conflict on a much larger scale. Rather than demanding an action that would make such strife more likely, the Muslim world should unite in demanding that the US remain as long as necessary in order to prevent it.

The non-Muslim world has at least as great an interest in preventing such a disaster. Apart from the humanitarian consideration that such a conflict must be defused rather than courted, the collapse of Iraq's infant government would almost certainly create the sort of chaos in which al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations thrive. America drove the radical Taliban regime from power in Afghanistan to deny al-Qaeda the resources of that impoverished and war-wracked land. It would be the height of folly to allow al-Qaeda to trade a poverty-stricken desolate base for one that floats on one of the world's largest seas of oil. It is in the interest of no one outside of al-Qaeda and its allies for such a thing to happen.

A more reasonable argument for the immediate or rapid withdrawal of US forces from Iraq is that those forces are themselves the problem. The proud Iraqi people, it is said, naturally resent the presence of foreign troops on their soil. If only those troops were removed, so this logic goes, the violence would subside and Iraq would be at peace. Alas, it is not so.

It is not merely that there is no proof to support this assertion; there is actually clear proof to the contrary. Iraq has been most peaceful when there were more American troops in the country rather than fewer, as during the election cycles. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, has openly declared his intention of starting a sectarian war between Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs in order to "awaken" the Sunnis. His stated method to accomplish this goal has been to attack Shi'ite Arabs in Iraq indiscriminately. He and his supporters have done so on many occasions, targeting Shi'ite Arab leaders and common people with car bombs, suicide bombs and other attacks. Moreover, it is clear that such tactics are not confined to al-Qaeda in Iraq. Sunni Arab rejectionists have attacked Sunni Arabs who participate in the political process. Radical Shi'ite Arab organizations and individuals have retaliated with attacks against Sunni Arabs in Iraq.

There is absolutely no reason to imagine that this violence would cease when the Americans leave. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that a premature withdrawal would increase the scope and scale of these sectarian attacks, the prevention of which has been a significant objective of the US presence all along.

There are other reasons for a speedy American withdrawal, having to do with pressures on the American military and the possibility of waning domestic support for this conflict. We must all hope that these pressures abate or are contained. American forces should withdraw from Iraq only when they have accomplished their goal: the establishment of a peaceful, stable, and democratic Iraqi state. No one who wishes well to the Iraqi people, the Arab and Muslim communities, and the peoples of the Middle East in general should wish for any other outcome.- Published 26/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC.