• King Abdullah and the Royal Saudi Court  - John R. Bradley
Prince Turki's posting to Washington marked the opening shots of the king's intensely private campaign to wrest control of the royal court.

• Saudi succession  - Simon Henderson
Senior Saudis sneer at any concern by outsiders about successions.

• Abdullah emerges as a reformist  - Afshin Molavi
The Saudi ship is quietly but firmly shifting course now and the captain, King Abdullah, is fully in control.

• Security turnaround  - an interview withNawaf Obaid
When the US leaves Iraq, there will be a complete break-up.

• The virtuous king  - Adel al-Toraifi
Tremendous reforms are still needed in order to transform Saudi Arabia into a democratic state.

King Abdullah and the Royal Saudi Court
 John R. Bradley

Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah is adopting a far more cautious approach to reform than many had predicted would be the case before he ascended the throne last August, following the long-anticipated death of his half-brother King Fahd. It is not difficult to see why, given the short-term stability afforded the regime by a buoyant economy and a highly reduced domestic terror threat. There is simply little pressure on the king to introduce a radical agenda.

For a start, the government is flush with oil money. And most al-Qaeda-linked Saudi terror cells have been eradicated in a series of clashes with the security forces. The chaos in Iraq, meanwhile, has sidetracked those in Washington pushing for democratic change in the wider Middle East. More good news: Following more than a decade of negotiations, the green light has finally been given for Saudi accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

The royal decrees King Abdullah has issued so far help to consolidate his image as a man of the people, but have achieved little else. The most widely publicized is one that discourages subjects from kissing his hand when they petition him over personal grievances. The problem, argue critics of the regime, is precisely the arbitrary nature of royal rule that such petitioning represents, in the absence of the institutions and mechanisms of a civil society.

Behind the scenes, however, the king is quietly addressing a number of complex domestic challenges. Perhaps the most difficult of them for him to achieve, and for outside observers to document: asserting his personal authority over the vast royal court.

A week before Abdullah became king, Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to Washington for 22 years, was replaced by Prince Turki al-Faisal. Prince Turki is a brother of the foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal. And Prince Saud is King Abdullah's closest ally.

Prince Turki's posting to Washington, then, marked the opening shots of the king's intensely private campaign to wrest control of the royal court by appointing his own people to important positions. Saudi observers have long argued that there is a rift between the reform-minded king, who was a half-brother of the late King Fahd, and more conservative full brothers of the late king, such as Interior Minister Prince Naif and Defense Minister Prince Sultan.

In a move that also suggests the king's desire to post allies to key positions, in December he announced the appointment of his own half-brother, Prince Miqrin, as head of the General Intelligence Department (GID), the Saudi equivalent of the Central Intelligence Agency. He meanwhile accepted the resignation of Prince Saud bin Fahd, a son of the late King Fahd, as the deputy head of the GID. A week earlier, the Saudi National Security Council (SNSC) had been established, with the former envoy to Washington, Prince Bandar, named as its secretary-general.

The SNSC can declare war as well as investigate security agencies if they are negligent or become involved in acts that threaten public security. Although Prince Bandar is the son of Defense Minister Prince Sultan, the two are not close; and he is said to have bad relations, too, with Interior Minister Prince Naif. As head of the kingdom's security forces, Prince Naif--a reactionary and the king's main rival--could, therefore, view Prince Bandar's appointment as head of the SNSC as a challenge to his own authority.

Moreover, the conservative full brothers are close to the ultra-conservative Wahhabi religious establishment, whose ranks are made up primarily of the descendants of the 18th-century religious reformer Mohammed bin Abdul Wahhab. They are known as the al-Asheikh family, and they have ruled in effective partnership with the House of Saud since the founding of the kingdom. Both the current justice minister, Abdullah al-Asheikh, and the grand mufti, Sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Asheikh are descendants of Abdul Wahhab.

Limiting the role and influence of the al-Asheikh family must be part and parcel of moves to curb extremism and promote reforms. In that context, it is perhaps significant that one of the king's first moves after ascending the throne was to sack Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Alsheikh from his post as Chief of Royal Protocol, replacing him with commoner Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Tibaishi.

However, a dark blot on the otherwise intricate landscape of King Abdullah's appointments is the fact that all of the about 50 of them hail from al-Najd, the central region that is the historic power base of both the House of Saud and the House of al-Asheikh. There has not been a single reported appointment from outside the al-Najd region. Shiites, women, Hijazis, southerners and northerners--groups that have historically felt marginalized and discriminated against--have been totally excluded. They have no reason, thus far, to believe anything King Abdullah may do will change their lot.- Published 19/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org


John R. Bradley is the author of "Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink of a Revolution" (2008) and, most recently, "After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts" (2012).

"The king is dead. God save the king!" is not quite how they say it in Saudi Arabia. But the Arabic and Islamic equivalent is going to be heard more often in the next few years. King Fahd was 84 when he died last summer. King Abdullah, who replaced him, is 83 this year. Crown Prince Sultan, the designated next-in-line, is 82. Although modern medical science means the al-Sauds are living longer (Fahd's longevity set a record), a rapid series of successions seems inevitable.

Is this important for the world? Yes. Saudi Arabia is a leader (along with Egypt) of the Arab world. It also sees itself as the leader of the Islamic world because of its "custodianship" of the two holy places, Mecca and Medina. And, of course, it has the world's largest oil reserves, reputedly a quarter of the world's total, and is the world's largest oil exporter. Whoever is king of Saudi Arabia--or acts in his name, as Abdullah did for nearly ten years while Fahd was unwell--is an immensely important decision-maker.

Saudi Arabia is much more than Kuwait, where the ruler died this month, even though the northern Gulf emirate has ten percent of the world's oil and is a significant exporter. It is certainly more than Dubai, whose ruler has also just died, the comparatively oil-less sheikhdom and traditional port which is transforming itself into a world-class, albeit a trifle too hot for most, vacation resort. But the successions in these places illustrate some of the problems of hereditary feudal quasi-monarchies: the new Kuwaiti emir is older than his deceased cousin and already incapacitated. The new ruler of Dubai is reputedly more able than his nominal superior, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, the senior and certainly richest statelet of the United Arab Emirates federation.

Senior Saudis sneer at any concern by outsiders about successions. The members of the House of Saud don't exactly say they have a plan. Instead, they call it a system. Succession might go to the next-in-line, provided he is healthy and has the relevant administrative experience. But if this is going to throw up the wrong person, then the senior princes will get into a huddle and tell the contender that the rules have just changed. This would seem to be what is going on now in the kingdom. The probable next in line after Sultan is generally considered to be Nayef, the interior minister. But Nayef is considered mercurial. (A survey in The Economist this month described him as "moody, abrasive, capricious and prone to intrigue." Presumably, if Nayef has been told what was written, one could now add "paranoid" as well.)

When Fahd died, Nayef was not made second deputy prime minister, the slot that has existed since 1968 for the crown prince-in-waiting. Indeed, nobody was given the title although, arguably, such a job is needed even more now than previously. There are indications that Nayef bid for the job in the last few days of Fahd's life. Indeed, the announcement of Fahd's death might have been delayed a few days while a deal was being sought. The July 28 statement from the Interior Ministry spokesman that Fahd's health had "improved" is possibly noteworthy. (Fahd's death was announced on August 1, two months after he was taken into hospital with pneumonia.) Although Nayef's bid to become second deputy prime minister was clearly unsuccessful, it wasn't a complete failure since the post is left vacant.

In Saudi terms, the absence of a decision means no agreement or consensus was reached. The informed belief is that a compromise candidate such as Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh province, will eventually emerge. Born in 1936, so a comparatively youthful 70 this year, he has the experience and respect. His major weakness is a question mark about his heart--two of his sons have already died of coronary failure.

Although in public and semi-public comments western ambassadors profess optimism that the Saudi system of succession can cope, in private they can be more candid. Their views are worth listening to as their access to the House of Saud is greater than most. One recently explained his view that the real challenge would emerge in ten years time. This is when the reservoir of the sons of King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the kingdom in 1932, effectively dries up. After that the king will have to be chosen from the next generation, Abdul Aziz's grandsons. But which line will be chosen? Even among the Sudairis--Fahd, Sultan, Nayef and Salman all had the same mother--the competition will be intense.

Ten years hence is also when the flood of young Saudis produced by one of the highest birth rates in the world will bring about unprecedented strains on the higher education and employment market. Even if oil prices remain high, the budgetary strain will be immense. It will concern us all.- Published 19/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Simon Henderson is the Baker fellow and director of the Gulf and Energy Policy Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is a former BBC and Financial Times correspondent based in Islamabad, Pakistan.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad stole the headlines last month during the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) summit with his incendiary remarks calling for Israel to be "wiped off the map." As a result, an event that might have showcased the new king of Saudi Arabia--a moderate, pan-Islamic, reform-minded modernizer--on an international stage, deteriorated into a media circus that raised questions about Muslim radicalism and presented exactly the opposite image than that which King Abdullah sought to cultivate.

King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, the sixth head of the modern Saudi state, saw the Mecca summit as the first step in his ambitious plan to trigger a Muslim world renaissance to jolt the world's more than one billion Muslims away from what he described as "political, economic, and social underdevelopment that has evolved into a major crisis." In a stinging rebuke of Islamic extremists, he lashed out at al-Qaeda, describing its followers in Islamically-loaded terminology as "corrupters of the earth"--a charge tantamount to blasphemy. He also called on fellow Muslim leaders to create a poverty fund and a natural disaster relief fund for the Islamic world. It was an impressive performance and was meant to be, as one Saudi analyst said, "King Abdullah's coming out party," a chance for him to shine on a world stage.

Instead, he was overshadowed by Ahmadinezhad, whose comments reflected the worst of the Muslim world. But shadows are not new to King Abdullah who, for nearly a quarter century, waited in the shadows as crown prince, though he served as de facto ruler for ten of those years after a stroke incapacitated then King Fahd. As nominal ruler, Abdullah retained considerable powers, but the shadow of Fahd, his sons and their princely allies constrained him from implementing fully his nationalist, integrative, reformist vision at home and his moderate, pan-Islamic foreign policy abroad. As a consequence, Abdullah, it seemed at times, served as first mate on a drifting ship, plugging holes and generally guiding it in the right direction, but unable to shift course dramatically.

The Saudi ship is quietly but firmly shifting course now and the captain, King Abdullah, is fully in control. This is good news for global stability, for oil markets, for the war on terror and the future of the Muslim world. In his first six months in power unencumbered by the shadow of Fahd, Abdullah has already taken several dramatic steps, including releasing liberal dissidents from jail, reaching out to the Shi'ite minority, promising greater rights for women, shining an internal light on princely corruption, and tolerating a degree of press freedom unknown in Saudi history. Meanwhile, Saudi civil society is bursting with new energy, structural economic reforms and high oil prices have paved the way for what is shaping up to be a sustained boom, and the domestic terror threat is waning.

Though opinion polls are not common in Saudi Arabia, anecdotal evidence suggests King Abdullah is a popular figure at home. In my travels to four cities across the kingdom last month, I was struck by the diverse range of people who praised Abdullah, from marginalized Shi'ite young men in the Eastern Province to cosmopolitan Jeddah intellectuals wary of al-Saud rule. Many, especially Shi'ites, spoke approvingly of Abdullah's integrative vision, others praised his personal piety or his vigorous support for Palestinian self-determination but, mostly, ordinary Saudis expressed satisfaction at his clean hands. Tired of princely corruption and worried by high un- and under-employment despite record oil prices, many ordinary Saudis have grown to resent the perks and privileges of the some 7,000 princes in the kingdom. "King Abdullah and his sons are clean," one young man told me, "and that is worth more than you can imagine."

The king's domestic popularity will allow him to tackle some tough problems, including the reform of an entrenched Wahabi religious establishment that continues to purvey a largely intolerant brand of Islam. Unlike Fahd, whose personal religious credentials were shaky owing to his playboy past, Abdullah has the gravitas to face down the religious establishment as an equal: a pious man of faith interested in reform. He has already done so in the crucial battleground of education. While Saudi schools still have far too many radically anti-western teachers sympathetic to Osama bin Laden, many students told me that the new, recently-trained teachers express more moderate and tolerant views.

King Abdullah's religious credentials will also be useful as he seeks to fill the gaping leadership vacuum in the Muslim world, a world that has dramatically failed to live up to the enormous potential of its people and now faces a precarious moment of rising Shi'ite-Sunni tension related to events in Iraq. King Abdullah's recent meeting with fiery Iraqi Shi'ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr, his groundbreaking public meetings with Saudi Shi'ites, televised live, and his behind-the-scenes diplomacy with Iran on the Iraq issue reflect his desire to reduce Shi'ite-Sunni tensions.

At this perilous moment, King Abdullah has the potential to be one of the most important Muslim leaders of the twenty first century and a positive force for the future of the Islamic world. As the king of Saudi Arabia, home of the two holiest mosques, and ruler of a nation with the world's largest oil reserves, the king has both the ideological and economic might to make a lasting imprint on the Muslim world. Over the past three decades Saudi Arabia's imprint has largely been negative, using its money and prestige to spread Wahabism globally, fund (or turn a blind eye to the funding of) radical madrassahs, cultivate a religious ethos of intolerance at home that poisoned young minds, and support retrograde regimes like the Taliban.

In one of the great "what might have been" questions of history, Saudi Arabia squandered an extraordinary opportunity to help build a modern, economically dynamic, socially tolerant Muslim world. Instead, it significantly contributed to "the crisis" that Abdullah describes today.

A new oil boom and a cautiously reform-minded king now have the opportunity to erase some of those wrongs. King Abdullah seems to be on the right track. His success will not be defined by great speeches or chest-thumping tirades. It will be defined by quiet acts of diplomacy that prevent conflict, the creation of new institutions that bolster Muslim world economies (reorganization and modernization of the Islamic Development Bank should be a top priority), and the spreading of an Islam that tolerates diversity and welcomes change. Though the path remains long and the obstacles large, the first six months of his rule suggest that King Abdullah and Saudi Arabia have taken the right initial steps.- Published 19/1/2006 © bitterlemons-international.org

Afshin Molavi, a journalist and fellow at the Washington DC-based New America Foundation, was a Dubai-based correspondent with Reuters.