Edition 46 Volume 3 - December 22, 2005
The West, Islam and Islamophobia
A view from France
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Alain Dieckhoff The French strategy of strict control stands in stark contrast with the policy adopted by the UK.
A view from London
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Rosemary Hollis Moderates cannot assimilate radicals unless and until they acknowledge what those radicals are saying.
Stoking the fire -
Zubair Butt Hussain The image projected in the Danish media of Islam has been one of a faith stuck in the middle ages.
A worldwide phenomenon -
an interview with SheikhKamal Khateeb Islamophobia has become a phenomenon and there is a movement rife that defines Islam as its enemy.
The main concern is terrorism -
Thomas R. Pickering We ought to heed the wise counsel of Hippocrates: "First, do no harm".
Why the American reluctance? -
Danielle Pletka The United States government has yet to fathom an approach to radical Islam beyond its borders.
A view from France
Alain Dieckhoff The recent riots in France have often been described, mainly in the foreign media, as being linked with Islam. Some have even spoken of an "intifada of the suburbs" nurtured by radical Islamist groups. In fact, this wave of disturbances was only marginally connected with Islam. No doubt, many youngsters involved in the unrest were sociologically Muslims (descendants from immigrants coming from the Maghreb and Black Africa), but this identity was not at stake in their mobilization. The rioters had no religious claims (for instance, against the French law prohibiting the headscarf in state schools); neither had they, by the way, a political agenda. It was an unorganized outburst of violence that was mainly the outcome of social exclusion and poverty in deprived urban areas where immigrants and their children have been overwhelmingly concentrated for decades.
If the November riots had not much to do with Islam per se, this does not mean, of course, that the enduring presence of Islam does not represent a challenge for the French Republic. In order to cope with it, one important step was the creation in 2002, under the impetus of the Ministry of Interior, of the French Council for the Muslim Faith, whose aim is to federate the various religious trends and give an identifiable interlocutor to the state. This move--which has striking similarities with the creation by Napoleon of the consistory system for the Jews, two centuries ago--was made in the hope that the new institution would be able to exert some sort of control over the Muslim community.
The results have been rather mixed, for two reasons. First, the council has been burdened by on-going divisions, mainly along national lines: two of the major Muslim organizations are linked with Algeria and Morocco. Secondly, as the council's missions are religious (building of mosques, supervision of ritual slaughter, etc.), it is not representative of large groups of French Muslims who are not practicing Muslims and are in the process of a slow but silent integration into French society. The authority of the council over those who are socially marginalized is also quite limited, thus entertaining the fear that some of them may easily become prey for radical Islamist groups.
Thus far this has not been the case; this surely has something to do with the very restrictive policy adopted by the French government toward radical Islamist militants: barring them from entering France and, thus, from proselytizing freely. Of course, this policy could not provide an absolute safeguard against terrorist activities, as proven by the bloody attacks in Paris in summer 1995, perpetrated in the name of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (known by its French acronym, GIA) with the support of a few young Frenchmen of Arab origin.
However, on the whole, this strategy of strict control has surely hindered the creation of well established radical networks. It stands in stark contrast with the policy adopted by the United Kingdom, which hoped to buy peace by granting right of sanctuary to all Islamist leaders persecuted in the Arab world. This strategy seemed to work for a while, but the terrorist attacks in London last summer demonstrated tragically that, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the setting up of trans-national jihadist groups, such an appeasement policy is out of tune. A clear indication of the British reassessment was registered on December 1, after a ten year legal battle, with the extradition from London to Paris of Rashid Ramda, suspected paymaster of the GIA terrorists.
Obviously, faced with political movements that are determined to turn to violence, there is no choice for Europe but to develop cooperation on a large scale. The European Union has gone in this direction with the appointment of a counter-terrorism co-ordinator and the development of judicial and police cooperation. This should increasingly involve the countries of the southern bank of the Mediterranean, as stated at the Euromed Tenth anniversary summit (November 2005).
Isolating the radical Islamist trends that are prone to use violent means--without of course infringing on fundamental freedoms--is a winning strategy for everybody, both in Europe and in the Arab world. It has to go hand in hand with a forceful promotion of social mobility among children of Muslim migrants in order that they feel they are indeed completely part of the national and European fabric. Otherwise, what was avoided this time, i.e., an encounter between social dissatisfaction and the "jihadist" version of politicized Islam, could well become a dreadful reality.- Published 22/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Alain Dieckhoff is senior research fellow at the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (Sciences-Po, Paris).
A view from London
Rosemary HollisBritish Prime Minister Tony Blair tried to frame Britain's response to Islam after the July 7 bombings in London by depicting the bombers as deviants, operating according to a warped interpretation of the Islamic faith. Blair's intention, it seems, was to head off any possibility of a debate between the government and the citizenry over UK policy toward the Muslim world in general and Iraq in particular. This, he implied, was not the issue. Rather, the bombers' interpretation of their religion was the problem.
Given that the British prime minister was himself ill-equipped to engage in a detailed discussion of the tenets of the Muslim faith, he placed the onus on those whom the press dubbed "the leaders of the British Muslim community" to engage the wayward youth in their midst and steer them toward moderation. The effect was to open up a debate about the place of British Muslims in the wider community. But it soon emerged that there is no such thing as a British Muslim community or a group of elders who command the respect of British Muslim youth.
There are some first and second generation immigrants from the Arab world, the Indian sub-continent, Africa and the Far East who not only espouse the Muslim faith but also expect to exercise authority within the extended family much in the way they would have done, by tradition, in their countries of origin. A few have made it into parliament, local government and other positions of responsibility. But their age and jobs do not necessarily equip them to offer an interpretation of Islam to rival that of the extremists. That role is adopted by preachers, imams and scholars, some radical, some not, who are more likely to communicate through the internet than from positions in the British establishment.
Bernard Haykel has researched what they are saying on the web and discovered that some of the very preachers the British government now wants to send into exile were quick to condemn the July 7 bombings and warn against indiscriminate attacks on civilians of all faiths. Other experts on the subject of radical Islam point out that disaffected Muslim youth in the West are more likely to pay attention to those who offer a radical critique of western policies toward the Muslim world than they are to listen to a select group of older men applauded for their "moderate" Muslim views by the British government.
Additional research reveals the existence of second and third generation immigrants, educated in the British school system, speaking perfect English with a variety of local accents, who share the same aspirations for jobs and material well-being as other British youngsters. But because of the color of their skin or style of dress many have experienced discrimination, fuelled by the Islamophobia that has increased since 9/11.
For some, the answer is to become more assertive about both their British and their Muslim identity. In the process they and their faith become more politicized. Yet the Muslim critique of western values, lifestyle and policies is not accorded a place in the exchange of ideas that informs any vibrant civil society. The multiculturalism of Britain is not yet recognized as a fact of life in all its ramifications.
Meanwhile, the government is determined to continue to defend its policies in Iraq, Afghanistan and other parts of the Muslim world as a well-intentioned attempt to replace dictatorships with democracy. Some criticism of the execution of these policies is countenanced in government circles, but the correctness of the goal is considered unassailable.
Hence Britain, along with the rest of Europe and the United States, is wedded to the reform agenda embodied in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Program, Europe's Neighborhood Policy and the G8's Wider Middle East initiative. This is, in many senses, the West's response to Islam. It was informed by the findings of the UNDP's Human Development Reports that call for a radical overhaul of Arab economies and polities.
The model, in Europe at least, is the transformation of the former Soviet satellite states of eastern Europe into capitalist democracies anchored into the European Union. But when it comes to the question of Turkish accession to the EU, Europeans are divided. Opponents of Turkey's inclusion have voiced the opinion that Europe's identity and values are informed by its Christian heritage. Somehow, even a secular Muslim state would not fit, they suggest.
So Islam is "the other" and the West's response, evident even in Britain which has championed Turkish accession to the EU, is to urge Muslim societies to become more like their secular, non-Muslim neighbors in the West and Muslim minorities in the West, and keep their religion to themselves. Yet on all fronts, western governments are discovering that moderates cannot assimilate radicals unless and until they acknowledge what those radicals are saying.- Published 22/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Rosemary Hollis is professor of Middle East Policy Studies at City University London. Stoking the fire Zubair Butt HussainSince September 30, the debate in Denmark over 12 published drawings of the Prophet Muhammad has yet to abate. These caricatures, as they are better described, caused anger among Muslims and non-Muslims both in and out of Denmark, where the news has slowly spread.
The project behind the drawings was, ostensibly, inspired by the intimidation some artists felt vis-a-vis Islam, and the feeling that, as a result, freedom of expression was under threat. In the subsequent controversy, many opinion-shapers have spoken of their bemusement over the reaction of Muslims and why they should be so sensitive over something that poked fun at religious figures. There was even a not-so-hidden wonderment that Muslims didn't find the derision and laughter directed at their religion somehow edifying.
But long before these drawings came into the public domain, there was widespread apprehension among Danish Muslims over the way they and their religious affiliation were presented in the media. The image projected in the Danish media of Islam has been one of a faith that did not undergo a reformation and renaissance similar to Christianity and is thus stuck in the middle ages. The drawings are simply a culmination of several years of media persecution of the Muslim minority in Denmark.
Even worse is the role elected politicians have played in stoking this fire. It is not unusual for certain politicians to make the ill-willed and mistaken but common equation that Muslims are immigrants, and immigrants are badly integrated and therefore the root of all evil in Danish society. Beyond the prejudice against immigrants in general this belies, it also contradicts the fact that most Muslims in Denmark have been here for 30-40 years and many are born here. But if that is pointed out, they are simply called second or third generation immigrants. Even ethnic Danish Muslim converts are described by the derogatory "ersatz-immigrants"; one politician has gone so far as to compare these converts to Nazis, and, in all seriousness, advocate that they be placed under surveillance as they constitute a threat to society. A politician from the same party described Muslims as a spreading cancer, while others have suggested criminals of non-Danish ethnic background should be interned or exiled with their closest family.
The fact that elected politicians can make such statements and at the same time claim to be standard bearers for democracy, freedom of expression and human rights is a serious indictment of the degeneration of public morals.
Just as in any other community, Danish Muslims have their share of bad apples. But only for the Muslim community is it seen fit to mention a religious affiliation when someone is suspected or convicted of any criminal or unseemly behavior. This amounts to blaming the community as a whole and demonizing Islam. The stigmatization and general lack of acceptance of Muslims in Denmark as equals has as a consequence led especially the younger generation to create an identity in opposition to their surroundings.
The persecution of Muslims in public fora serves only to dig trenches in society and lessens the chance of conducting any constructive dialogue. I personally predict that Danish Muslims will eventually emigrate to other European countries where attitudes are less harsh--some well-educated members of the community have already left and others are ready to follow if presented with the opportunity. Of course, those who leave will be those with the qualifications and necessary economic ballast, and Denmark will be left with those from the lower socio-economic strata. That in turn will reinforce the perception of Muslims as simply constituting a drain on the welfare system.
Just as it is now so in the future our responsibility is to make this multi-ethnic society function. In this context, a lack of sensitivity in the way we Danes express ourselves in public constitutes a threat to peaceful co-existence. I hope that in the future we will be able to frame our public debate on this issue in a less divisive manner to avoid further polarization.
The right of freedom of expression comes with a burden of responsibility.- Published 22/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Zubair Butt Hussain is a regular commentator in Danish media. A worldwide phenomenon an interview with Sheikh Kamal KhateebBI: Is it your impression that Islamophobia is on the rise in the world?
Khateeb: What we see happening is certainly beyond individual acts or statements. I believe that Islamophobia has become a phenomenon in the world and that there is a movement rife that defines Islam as its enemy. The discourse of this movement deals with Muslims in generalizations. Actions that were once attributed to extremist individuals or groups are now often spoken of in terms of fundamentalist or extremist Islam. This is a very negative attitude that ultimately points the finger at every individual Muslim.
BI: Can you give an example of this kind of discourse?
Khateeb: Violent actions carried out by Muslims are often designated as "Islamic terrorism". In contrast, Serbian violence in the former Yugoslavia was never described as "Orthodox Christian violence". In India, Hindu violence against Muslims is not referred to as "Hindu terrorism", nor in Ireland does anyone talk of "Protestant terrorism".
Some believe this attitude came as a reaction to 9/11. I think that the beginning came much earlier, when the US adopted Samuel Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations. In my opinion, the former president Bush long ago adopted this theory--that there is a conflict between Islamic civilization and the West, a conflict between good and evil where the evil is Islam. This attitude simply gained rapid currency after 9/11.
The current President Bush made a very firm affirmation of this outlook in his speech after 9/11 where he spoke of a crusade. He also talked, and continues to talk, of being on a mission from God, indicating that he sees US policy in religious terms. In other words, US policy regarding Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the unswerving American support of Israeli policies and practices against the Palestinian people, is motivated by religious and cultural considerations.
For example, I think US support of Israel has a religious as well as a political motivation. There is a religious-ideological element behind the policy that holds that supporting Israel is a means to realizing the prophecy of the second coming of Christ.
BI: Do you feel that Muslims in Israel suffer from hostility and racism?
Khateeb: We don't only feel it, we have been living it for years. Look at the violation of our sacred places. Take for example the Red Mosque in Safed, which is today being used as a movie studio. A mosque in Caesaria was turned into a bar, and there's a mosque in the demolished village of Hitteen that is used as a barn.
Can you imagine anything more offensive than writing the name of the Prophet Muhammad on a pig's head and throwing it into the Hasan Bek Mosque in Tel Aviv? This particular mosque has been attacked three times in the last year by Jewish fundamentalists and the Israeli police have done nothing to put an end to these racist actions. Another example is what happened two weeks ago to a Muslim student at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where guards refused to allow her entrance just because she was wearing Jelbab and Hijab, and refused to take her Hijab off for a security check.
BI: How do you think the Israeli media deals with Islam?
Khateeb: The media works in the service of the government's Zionist policy, which is hostile to Islam. When the Islamic movement in Israel was warning of a possible attack on the Haram al-Sharif, we were accused by the media of incitement. But this threat later turned out to be real, when the Revava group tried to attack the Aqsa Mosque.
When Sheikh Raed Salah, the head of the Northern Islamic Movement in Israel, was arrested, the media portrayed him as a terrorist and our movement as one that supports terrorist acts. He was convicted in public before he was even brought to trial. When all charges against him were subsequently dropped, his acquittal was practically ignored.
BI: Is the Northern Islamic Movement working to address these issues?
Khateeb: We work on two levels, the legal and the popular level. Unfortunately, the legal system in Israel is biased and affected by political agendas. On the popular level, we organize demonstrations and rallies hoping to affect Israeli public opinion by sending the message that prejudice is an obstacle toward achieving peace, internally with Israel's Arab citizens, and externally with the Palestinians. Internally, this conflict is not national; it's a state of hostility against us for being Muslims, not for being Palestinian.
BI: To what extent do you think that the actions of extremists in the Arab and Muslim world have created this Islamophobia?
Khateeb: What is happening in the Islamic world is a reaction to the foreign military aggression against the Arab nation, as well as the bias toward the West of many Arab regimes. This is not to say that we agree with the violence done by Muslim against Muslim in Jordan and Saudi Arabia or the targeting of civilians in Iraq. We must distinguish between legitimate resistance and such indiscriminate violence.
We are against attacking civilians and against exporting conflict to other countries. Islam is not the property of anyone. We refuse to be implicated in such actions just because we are Muslims.- Published 22/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Sheikh Kamal Khateeb is the deputy head of the Northern Islamic Movement in Israel. The main concern is terrorism Thomas R. PickeringIt requires no particular genius to know that Islam has become of special interest to many in the West. From tourists and travelers worried about their safety to senior leaders of government, in religious denominations, among academics and in the press, the issue is a hot-button topic.
What does the West, in this case particularly the United States where I live and work, think about Islam? How can the issues be managed?
The main source of concern relates to terrorism. The major focus, from Bali to Baghdad and from Madrid to Mazar-e-Sharif, has been on the intimate linkage between Islamic fundamentalists and the use of the terror tactic. So much so, that events like Oklahoma City (where American extremists were tried and found guilty) and the fateful assassination of Yitzhak Rabin (involving Jewish extremists) are almost passed over or ignored.
A second dimension in this doleful analysis of course extends beyond Islamic fundamentalists to Islam as a whole. While President Bush seems careful, after having made his "crusade" allusion several years ago, to distinguish between Islam and terrorism, others are not. Some readings of parts of the US press can certainly lead to the malign and in my view badly mistaken conclusion that the war on terrorism has become a war on Islam. That would be an unparalleled tragedy and one probably sought by our enemies, the progenitors of terrorism, coming from groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates and supporters around the world. In this struggle, as in any other serious effort in life, we ought to heed the wise counsel of Hippocrates to the medical profession: "First, do no harm".
Elsewhere, others are taking a different and somewhat more sophisticated approach. It remains, however, sequestered for the moment among academics who have studied Islam, diplomats who have sought understanding and cooperation with our friends in the Arab and Muslim world, and groups of religious leaders seeking reconciliation, cooperation where possible, and mutual understanding as a basis for avoiding the calamities of mindless confrontation. Their success so far has been limited and sporadic, but they continue to work at the task.
To some extent, those bent on understanding and reconciliation in the United States face not only their own limitations in influence noted earlier, but those of their colleagues and friends within the circle of Islam. Leadership there seems to have been hijacked by the extremists; the press regularly dotes on their confrontational public declarations to the pleasure, I am sure, of those who seek wider confrontation. Here, those working to build bridges often express the need for "a little help from their friends", but what they receive comes often on a personal basis and in conferences behind closed doors and blinded windows.
Nor, on the western side, is all necessarily well in the religion department. There are, as we all know, some among the Christian right who seek their own form of association with the Middle East and the issues of the religious divide. Often mesmerized by the words "Judeo-Christian heritage", they seek to find common cause with the Jewish presence in the Holy Land and champion it because of their belief that postulates a pre-messianic presence of Israel in the Holy Land.
What happens after that is more problematic. However, the present expressions of these views give rise, on the one hand, to unquestioning support for the settlements in the "territories" and, on the other and in a diametrically opposed fashion, the creation of antagonism and animosity toward Islam. For example, there is a rejection among some in this community of the commonality among the three Abrahamic--or, for the sake of balance, "Ibrahimic"--faiths, of belief in a single, common deity, and a denial that the Allah of Islam is the shared common God of all three faiths.
It is not easy to know how to respond. Many who have analyzed the growing divide insist that the heat and emotion of the present will subside over time. Others, more activist in their course, seek the leaders, the understanding, and the dialogue with Islam that can help to temper the confrontation and relieve the apparently growing divisions. The latter course seems only right under the circumstances. The world as seen from East and West is too interconnected, too interdependent, and now too closely related to be torn apart by eleventh century-style religious controversy. One has only to look at the decades of history when Islam and the West coexisted to understand the value and the necessity of this wiser course.- Published 22/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Thomas R. Pickering's long career at the US State Department included postings as ambassador at the UN, the Russian Federation, India, Israel and Jordan, and culminated in the position of under secretary of state for political affairs.
Why the American reluctance? Danielle PletkaIn London, shops are burned. In Paris, there are riots. In Sydney there are more riots. But what about America? Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian cleric who is currently serving a life sentence for conspiring to bomb several New York City landmarks, exhorted: "Oh, you Muslims everywhere, sever the ties of their nation, tear them apart, ruin their economy, instigate against their corporations, destroy their embassies, attack their interests, sink their ships, and shoot down their airplanes. Kill them in land, at sea, and in the air, kill them wherever you find them."
Abdel Rahman's ringing call to action (echoed by Osama bin Laden and other lesser luminaries of Islamic extremism) has certainly reverberated throughout the Islamic world. Anti-Americanism has been on the upswing, though the last year has seen some decline in its rabidity. But what about American Muslims? Living here in the heart of darkness, American Muslims could, in theory, be the spearhead of the movement to destroy the United States. In Australia, Great Britain, France and Germany there are growing suspicions that naturalized and native-born Muslims will form the core of terror groups targeting those nations. But such is not the case in the United States.
The socio-economic statistics are impressive: Arab-Americans (not to be confused with Muslim Americans, a much larger group) have a median household income of $52,000, according to the 2000 census. A 2004 survey by Zogby International found that 59 percent of American Muslims have an undergraduate degree, more than double the nation-wide statistic of about 25 percent. The Wall Street Journal cites a study of mosque attendance in Detroit which finds the average mosque-goer is a stalwart of the middle class: married, with children, holding a college degree and earning in the range of $74,000 a year.
Should the rest of America heave a sigh of relief that we, unlike the British, French, and others, will not grow our own terrorists? Absolutely not. The middle class has generated its fair share of killers (think Mohammed Atta), but a tivo, a mortgage, membership in the PTA and a level of integration that does the American hallmark proud should diminish that likelihood significantly. Finsbury Park-style mosques and radical imams are far from the norm.
And it's a two way street. According to the FBI's 2004 statistics, religion accounts for only 16.4 percent of hate crimes in America (versus race, for example, which accounts for 53.9 percent). Of those, the overwhelming mass of the 1480 hate crimes reported were anti-Jewish (67.8 percent), while only 13 percent (or about 192) were anti-Islamic. Compare that to France (with 20 percent of the US population), where 2004 saw 482 anti-Arab/Muslim hate crimes and threats (there are some apple/orange problems with the statistics, but even with vast over-correction, it is clear that the French Muslim problem dwarfs that of the US).
In fact, the numbers confirm what most Americans know already: The United States is a good place to live, the melting pot still works, and Americans are among the most tolerant of the world's people. That is the good news.
The bad news is that the United States government has yet to fathom an approach to radical Islam beyond its borders. Indeed, for some years after 9/11, much of the US government was reluctant to mention the words "radical Islam". There has been an evolution of late, but one barely sufficient to the problem at hand. In a recent speech to the National Endowment for Democracy, President George W. Bush said, "Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Islamo-fascism .... Some might be tempted to dismiss these goals as fanatical or extreme. Well, they are fanatical and extreme--and they should not be dismissed. Our enemy is utterly committed."
Yet the commitment of the enemy is hardly matched by the commitment of the United States to counter him. True, the US is engaged in Iraq. Yes, an unprecedented effort has gone into public diplomacy. But how does the West combat Islamic extremism? US officials confronted with the question hem and haw uncomfortably. They mention the "freedom agenda" and the spread of democracy; and while democracy is indeed the long-term solution to the problem of radical Islam and the appeal of Islamic extremist groups, the problem faces us now. A short-term solution is needed to partner with the long term one.
The United States remains oddly reluctant to fight Islamic extremism at one of its most important sources: Saudi Arabia. The Saudis continue to export hatred in Korans and curricula, interfering in education systems and infiltrating mosques wherever possible. In addition, most officials are afraid to challenge "authentic" Islamic political parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Indeed, there are pressures to open dialogue with terror groups such as Hizballah and Hamas because they are "authentic" outgrowths of the political process.
Instead, US officials should set aside their squeamishness and do their best to promote political maturity in the Middle East. It is possible for genuine, issue-oriented political parties to make strides. But they won't for as long as the United States government continues to believe that the best political party springs from the mosque or the tribe. After all, if Muslims in America are indeed Americans in every sense (and they are), why is it that Muslims everywhere cannot embrace political and economic freedom? The answer is that, if given a chance, they can.- Published 22/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org
Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
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