• The Jordanian option for solving the Iraq case  - Ghassan Atiyyah
If Iraq is divided, the Jordanian role becomes imperative, since the west of Iraq could be annexed to Jordan.

• Common goals or different directions?  - Sa'ad F. Hariz
It has been clear to Iraqis that public opinion in Jordan has long been guided in the wrong direction.

• The US angle  - Scott Lasensky
The main story is one of cooperation--between the US, Jordan and the new Iraq.

• Post-Saddam Iraq and the threats facing Jordan  - Oraib Al-Rantawi
Jordanian authorities have initiated a campaign to "reorganize the Iraqi presence" in Jordan.

The Jordanian option for solving the Iraq case
 Ghassan Atiyyah

It has often been noted that Jordan's lot is to be sandwiched between two unenviable neighbors, Iraq to the east and Israel/Palestine to the west. Despite this, Jordan has been able to coexist with both and even prosper in a very difficult atmosphere.

Jordan has to some extent benefited from the mistakes of its neighbors, something that could not have been achieved without the astuteness of its Hashemite leadership, which was able to make itself the common denominator between the various sectors of the Jordanian people including those of Palestinian origin. The Hashemite leadership rode out the Nasserite approach and later the Palestinian revolution, which it was even able to absorb to the point where Jordan became a political refuge for some of those involved. The leadership also understood how to incorporate the Islamic trend in Jordan--the Islamic forces entered the Jordanian parliament long ago, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The Hashemite leadership was also able to make itself vital to the West as a buffer and a bridge between the West (the United States in particular) and the Arab region. Amman was the meeting point, due to its status as a trade route linking the West to Iraq, during the rule of Saddam Hussein, especially during the years of economic sanctions. At the same time, Amman was also an intelligence headquarters for the West in confronting Saddam Hussein. The latter's need for Amman as an economic outlet forced it to accept this other face of Amman.

The November 9 bombings brought the spotlight onto the relationship between Jordan and Iraq. With the exception of Black September, violence was never used in Jordan either by the ruling party or the opposition to push a political agenda. This offered Jordan's political opposition an enviable margin of maneuver compared to other opposition movements in neighboring Arab countries.

The November 9 bombings and the previous bombings in Aqaba on April 12 thus represent a new development for Jordan. The fact that the perpetrators were non-Jordanian does not rule out the possibility of cooperation from Jordanian parties. Al-Qaeda in Iraq's claim of responsibility for both bombings raises the question of the motives behind these bombings, especially since the position of the Jordanian leadership has been sympathetic with the Iraqi Sunnis to the point that it warned them and others of the dangers of a "Shi'ite crescent". Amman has also become a shelter both for elements of the former regime and for a number of residents of the western areas of Iraq, areas subjected to American military strikes.

What makes this question even more urgent is that the victims of the hotel bombings were almost all residents of Jordan and mostly Palestinian. While the Aqaba bombings targeted US battleships, the hotel bombings cost al-Qaeda leader Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi a lot of sympathy in those Jordanian circles that had previously viewed his operations in Iraq as legitimate resistance to the US occupation.

Zarqawi's motives may lie in his fear of a Jordanian role, particularly that of the Hashemites, in appealing to Iraqi Sunnis, whom he considers his social and political base in Iraq. Zarqawi has been striking at Shi'ite civilians in Iraq with the apparent aim of provoking them into attacking Sunnis, widening the gap between the two communities, and, he seems to believe, making Sunnis gravitate toward him.

The reality of Iraq is that Sunnis have been made the weaker party in the Iraqi political equation. Their traditional leadership role is associated with the former regime. In addition, their taking up arms has made them an enemy to the Americans and the focus of US military efforts. Their introduction into the political process in the absence of any regional or international support will only reinforce this weakness and cement the reality of their status as a minority. Hence, the Sunni community offers fertile ground for those wishing to recruit for violent, even terrorist operations.

Here lies the importance of the Jordanian role. If Jordan assumes a support role for Iraqi Sunnis akin to that enjoyed by the Shi'ite community from Iran or the Kurds from their many years of US-supported de facto independence, it would enable them to better participate in the political process. Any success Jordan has in attracting Iraqi Sunnis will weaken the platform for extremists and empower moderates to carry out a role in the political process.

But the Iraqi reality reflects a dark picture of sectarian and ethnic division. If the parliamentary elections fail in creating common ground for a political settlement, it will be difficult for the parties in the struggle to come to a peaceful understanding without help or outside pressure. At the regional and international level, the United States and Iran are the two major players and if they fail to reach an understanding on a mutual formula, Iraq will be turned into a battlefield, making its "Balkanization" a likely and even acceptable possibility. If this happens, then where are the Sunnis?

Will it be acceptable to the United States or even Iran if an Arab, Iraqi Sunni district is established under the control of an extremist Islamic Jihad force? If Iraq is divided, the Jordanian role becomes imperative, since the west of Iraq could be annexed to Jordan.

Such a development would restructure Jordan in terms of the demographic balance between its Palestinian majority and Jordanian minority and reinforce Hashemite rule as the security valve for all communities. It could be America's face-saving way out of Iraq.

It is also what the extremist Jihad forces, represented by al-Qaeda in Iraq, fear the most. Hence, striking at Jordanian civilian targets is an extension of their strikes at civilian targets in Iraq, and is also aimed at terrorizing and weakening the state and its institutions.

The appropriate response to this strategy should not be through tightening security. On the contrary, a successful response lies in the Hashemite regime's ability to reinforce national unity through greater openness and more reform. This is especially true because the popular response to the bombings showed widespread national support for the monarchy, the guarantee of Jordanian stability and national unity.

There are Jordanian parties who will fiercely oppose such a role, considering it a risk to Jordan's stability. However, the reality is that there is no choice. The alternative is civil war in Iraq, the ramifications of which Jordan cannot escape.- Published 15/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org



Ghassan Atiyyah is the director of the Baghdad-based Iraqi Foundation for Development and Democracy, which he founded in August 2003.

Iraqi-Jordanian relations have a long and deeply intertwined history, starting with the twin monarchy established by the British in the early part of last century. Hashemite rule in Iraq was toppled 48 years ago when King Faisal, a cousin of the late King Hussein, was killed at the hands of those who overthrew him.

The Iraqi army played an important role in the 1967 Arab-Israel war, and the defeat of the Arab forces led to the coup in 1968 that brought the Baathists to power in Baghdad. They, in turn, played a dangerous game in Jordan with the Palestinians that eventually led to Black September.

Iraqi-Jordanian relations came to a head then, and did not improve until 1981 when King Hussein provided logistical support for Saddam Hussein during the bloody Iran-Iraq war. Jordan then hosted Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil, who eventually flew back of his own will to face his destiny in Baghdad. In addition, Jordan undoubtedly hosted all kinds of Iraqi opposition groups at the same time as being Iraq's only economic outlet during the recent period of internationally-imposed sanctions.

Following "Operation Iraqi Freedom", Iraqi-Jordanian relations have entered a new phase. Several factors are of importance in this era:
* The strategic policy of the US in the region;
* The Arab-Israel conflict;
* Public perception in Jordan that the situation in Iraq is one of occupation that should be resisted by a national struggle, an attitude especially prevalent among Jordanians of Palestinian origin;
* Religious fanatics who operate relatively freely in Jordan to support their Iraqi counterparts in every possible way, a situation that led to tragic terrorist attacks in Amman last month;
* Members of the former Iraqi regime who have found a safe haven in Jordan, where they have started dominating the commercial sector.

From an Iraqi perspective, support of Iraq is not just a national priority; it is a global one. Thus, Jordan must take all the required action to assist in the stabilization of Iraq. How to deal with the Iraq issue, from the perspective of Iraq's neighbors, must also be considered one of the most important long-term policy challenges for each country, and it is here that Jordan most clearly stands apart from others. Economically, it would appear to be very much in Jordan's favor to re-activate its role in rebuilding Iraq, before other investors get there. All indications suggest that Amman is in the prime position to make itself the address for Iraqi-foreign economic activity.

In the longer term, many of the changes that are taking place in the new Iraq are directed at changing public attitudes toward normalizing relations throughout the region, very much in harmony with Jordanian government policy.

Security and counterterrorism issues remain, however, the top priority. The role religious fundamentalists play in Jordan is crucial. It has been clear to Iraqis that public opinion in Jordan has long been guided in the wrong direction concerning the so-called Iraqi resistance. Even official statements, such as King Abdullah's remarks regarding the Shi'ite crescent, were in many Iraqi circles considered an infringement upon territory reserved for the legitimate and elected Iraqi government. Sunni fundamentalists in Jordan considered this statement a green light for supporting the jihadists in occupied Iraq, an interpretation Shi'ites in Iraq concurred with.

The tragic bombings in Amman have, it must be admitted, made the Jordanian government as well as the Jordanian people realize, as most Iraqi people realized long ago, that the Islamic resistance is no such thing, it is terrorism pure and simple. That has been the consistent message from Baghdad to Amman, especially after the Hilla incident. It went unheeded, because Iraq's neighbors continue to consider the legitimate Iraqi government as only a mouthpiece for the US.

It can only be hoped that the bombings in Amman will serve as a wake-up call to Jordanian officials and citizens alike to consider the situation in Iraq in a new light. The danger of complacency in this respect could have dramatic consequences for Jordan rivaling those of Black September, with the important difference that this time, the enemy is hidden.- Published 15/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Sa'ad F. Hariz is media advisor to the multinational forces in north-central Iraq.

Jordan has made positive if modest contributions to the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. The United States, lacking cooperation from most of Iraq's neighbors, turned to the kingdom early on. Despite King Abdullah's public criticism of the war, Washington found a willing if behind-the-scenes partner. Amman has a major stake in the future stability and territorial integrity of Iraq and in the success of US actions there. In terms of core objectives--a stable, free and unified Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors, an Iraq free from Islamist terror groups, and an Iraq that maintains a free market and safeguards Sunni rights--the US and Jordan are in agreement.

Still, there are a growing number of sore spots between Amman, Washington and Baghdad. The Hashemites are uneasy about the new reality of a Shi'ite-majority, constitutional democracy on its border. Democracy in Iraq increases pressure on Jordan to reform. At the same time, post-Saddam Iraq raises larger Sunni-Shi'ite tensions that go beyond Jordan's borders. Jordan, like other Sunni regimes, is nervously watching as Iran increases its influence in the new Iraq.

Early on, the king raised these anxieties in public, which did not build goodwill with Iraq's new leaders. But recently Jordan has adjusted its rhetoric and has been playing a more positive role, including its efforts to promote greater cooperation among Iraq's neighbors and build bridges between them and Washington. Unfortunately, the unease within the Jordanian monarchy is mirrored in Iraq, where anti-Jordan feelings have run high among Shi'ites, who have not forgotten the kingdom's close ties with Saddam. The November hotel bombings in Amman, and the earlier rocket attack in Aqaba, may foretell further tension as Jordan's internal security becomes increasingly imperiled as a result of US intervention in Iraq.

Still, the main story is one of cooperation--between the United States, Jordan and the new Iraq. For Jordan, cooperation has brought many positive economic benefits, including oil subsidies from Gulf states, substantial new American aid, a booming real estate sector, and a growing Iraq-related trade and transport account. Jordan serves as a gateway to Iraq for businesses, diplomats, journalists and NGOs. The gateway role is a major asset for Jordan (though ironically it is an outgrowth of continuing instability in Iraq). The myriad material benefits of maintaining a close relationship with Saddam have largely been replaced, and in some cases exceeded, in the post-Saddam era.

But for the US, cooperation has come with trade-offs. Political space in Jordan has been constrained and reform efforts have slowed down. Moreover, there is a widening credibility gap between the governing elite and the governed. The war in Iraq, Jordanians say, has united the opposition as never before (although the Amman bombings have partly reversed this trend, at least in the short term). Furthermore, the situation in Iraq has exacerbated the already high level of Jordanian public disfavor with United States policy.

What accounts for Jordan's continuing alignment with the US over Iraq? There are five inter-related factors at play. First, for King Abdullah, Jordan's strategic relationship with the US remains a centerpiece of Jordan's national security strategy. Even the Amman bombings have not shaken the regime's fundamental strategic choice to align with Washington. Second, a weak, perennially insecure state, Jordan has a long tradition of trend-spotting and watching which way the wind blows. After King Abdullah decided the momentum was working against Saddam, he refrained from opposing Washington. Third, Jordanian leaders have been unwilling to bear the regional costs of sitting on the sidelines, as in 1990-91, when the kingdom alienated GCC states and suffered huge economic dislocations. Fourth, there is the Palestinian dimension and Jordan's hope (since diminished) that cooperation with the US on Iraq would lead to more engagement by Washington in the peace process. Fifth, the US fashioned an effective inducements package that provides political cover, reassures Jordanian leaders, and offsets real costs associated with the war.

Jordan has given an important though modest boost to the twin projects of reconstruction and stabilization in Iraq. The kingdom has cooperated by quietly allowing the staging of US forces, training thousands of Iraqi security personnel, tightening border controls, and maintaining robust intelligence-sharing with the US and the new Iraqi government. The kingdom has also been a leader in humanitarian assistance, including medical aid. And Jordan has reached out to the Iraqi Sunni community to encourage its participation in the political process, though it is unclear how much influence the kingdom can exert on this question.

What are the implications for US policy? Over the short term, the US should continue to address Jordan's economic and security needs, and also continue to encourage other key regional actors to do the same--especially on energy security. But as Jordan looks for further supplemental aid, seeks to continue oil subsidies and tries to obtain new US weapons systems, Washington should be selective and should carefully consider the architecture of its aid programs.

Over the long-term, if the situation in Iraq stabilizes, energy prices fall and Jordan's economy continues to grow, some direct assistance to Jordan (currently at an all-time high) could be curtailed. At a minimum, the architecture of US assistance should be reconsidered to make a broader impact on larger segments of society, rather than channeling so much assistance through the government. The Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) and the Free Trade Agreement represent a positive and sustainable move in this direction.

Whether or not the US failed to develop an adequate strategy to deal with Iraq's neighbors before the war, or if these differences were simply unavoidable given conflicting interests and ambitions, Washington now recognizes it needs greater cooperation from the neighbors if the situation in Iraq is to improve. Relying on the smaller neighbors, like Jordan, is necessary but far from sufficient. For its part, Jordan will remain a steadfast partner in efforts to improve cooperation among Iraq's neighbors. Its interest in doing so is strong, although its ability to influence events in Iraq--not to mention the policies of neighboring states--remains modest.- Published 15/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Scott Lasensky currently directs the "Iraq and its Neighbors" project at the United States Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, and is conducting the project's study on Jordan-Iraq relations. He is a researcher in the institute's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. These views are his own.

The November 9 terrorist attacks on three hotels in Amman perpetrated by al-Qaeda in Iraq put the focus on Iraqi-Jordanian relations. Historically, Iraq in the era of the Baath and military coups was a source of concern for Jordan. This was the case even during the period when Iraqi-Jordanian relations were at their best. Yet since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, Iraq has become a strategic security concern for decision-makers in Jordan. Jordanian diplomacy has handled this concern with great caution, albeit nervously.

Jordan sees both challenges and threats in post-Saddam Iraq. First, Iraq is increasingly being transformed into an arena of Iranian influence and power. Jordanian officials are watching with concern the Iranian double game in Iraq. On the one hand, Tehran supports the current political process there because it will bring a partisan Shi'ite majority to power in Baghdad. But on the other, it supports fundamentalist elements and armed groups in the Sunni areas with the aim of confusing and threatening the American military presence in Iraq.

In this context, Jordan has warned of the danger of the rise of a "Shi'ite crescent" controlled by Tehran, which can extend from south Beirut and Lebanon through Damascus and Baghdad into Shi'ite areas in some of the Gulf countries. The last thing Jordan probably wishes for is to find itself surrounded one day from the east and the north by boundaries with "Iran": small, divided countries and regimes under the control of "the governance of the jurisprudent".

Secondly, to confront this threat some Jordanian politicians and decision-makers have suggested building a "Sunni Arab wall" in Baghdad and some areas in western Iraq to block the extension of Iranian influence and power. Other Arab countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia are also quietly discussing such an approach. This was behind the recent initiative of the Arab League to sponsor reconciliation and unity among Iraqis. This is also the approach that has pushed several Arab capitals to court the representatives of the Sunni Arabs in Iraq and even to open communications channels with the "resistance movement" in Iraq.

But the theory of "building the Sunni Arab bloc" under the diplomatic slogan "the Arabism of Iraq" clashes with the absence of an effective Iraqi Sunni partner. Sunni political representation in Iraq is distributed among dozens of parties and tribes, alongside individuals and power centers. Most of the influential actors belong to fundamentalist or Baathist movements unacceptable to Jordan, who often accuse Amman of offering aid and facilities to the United States and Britain in their war against Iraq.

If the Jordanian warnings regarding the danger of the rise of a Shi'ite crescent have produced tough responses among the Shi'ites of Iraq despite Jordan's serious efforts to contain them, the strategic nature of American-Jordanian relations has not helped Amman win the confidence and support of broad sectors of Sunni Arabs dispersed among extremist fundamentalist and nationalist movements.

The third threat/challenge from Iraq faced by Jordan is terrorism. As a result of a "constructive chaos" policy, Iraq has become a stronghold and a vanguard of international terrorism that spreads "destructive chaos" and seeks to export terror to neighboring countries, particularly Israel and Palestine. This is a new strategy that al-Qaeda adopted shortly after the war in Afghanistan. From its point of view, Jordan is an appropriate testing ground for the strategy.

Moreover, as the leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq was transferred to the Jordanian Ahmad Fadeel Nazal al-Khalila, known as Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda developed its own reasons to focus its attacks on Jordan. According to the Jordanian security services, Zarqawi is seeking "personal revenge" against Jordan, in addition of course to the "general mandate" given him by al-Qaeda.

Since the fall of the Iraqi Baathist regime 33 months ago, tens of terrorist cells have been discovered in Jordan--more than a cell a month. Jordanian courts are busy trying to handle tens of suspects and dozens of stacked interrogation files. True, most of these cells were discovered during the preparation stage before attacks were perpetrated, but they also succeeded in less than a year in carrying out major attacks in Aqaba and in the Amman hotels. Before that, they assassinated the American diplomat, Lawrence Foley.

It is evident that most, if not all, of these terrorist attempts and attacks were planned in Iraq. Notably, the "successful" al-Qaeda operations against Jordanian or western targets in Jordan were performed by non-Jordanian actors. Foley was assassinated by a Libyan terrorist; the Aqaba operation was performed by Syrian and Iraqi terrorists; and the three hotels were targeted by a terrorist cell comprising Iraqi elements. This indicates that al-Qaeda is now resorting to using non-Jordanians who are abundant in Iraq, and about whom the Jordanian security services do not have enough information.

This leads us to the fourth threat or challenge facing Jordan from post-war Iraq. The military operations there and the spread of security chaos, alongside a bad economic situation, have forced many Iraqis to emigrate to Jordan, joining the hundreds of thousands who had arrived since the 1990s. There are no accurate official figures on the size of the Iraqi community in Jordan, but estimates range between 500,000 and 800,000, with some putting the figure as high as one million. Sources in the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq say that the Jordanian Interior Ministry estimated that Iraqi citizens in Jordan who are entitled to vote range between 300,000 and 500,000. The commission itself reckons that the real number of Iraqis in Jordan entitled to vote is much higher.

In the absence of accurate information on these individuals' backgrounds and areas of residence, given that the vast majority are in Jordan illegally, and recognizing the terrorist organizations' growing dependence on these Iraqi elements in targeting Jordan, the increasing numbers of Iraqis in Jordan have become a real security problem. They also cause socio-economic problems by placing increasingly high demands on resources and generating unemployment among Jordanians.

Hence Jordanian authorities have initiated a campaign to "reorganize the Iraqi presence" in Jordan. They are allowing those who wish to, to leave the country without paying any fines, and expelling those who break the laws. There is also an effort to limit the number of Iraqis allowed to enter the country to 100 persons per day.

Post-Saddam Hussein Iraq has become a threat to Jordan's security and stability. This is why Jordanian diplomacy strongly supports the current political process in Iraq. It hopes that this process will maintain Iraqi unity, so that Jordan does not find itself confronting an "extremist Sunni province" in western Iraq, on its eastern borders. Jordan also hopes Iraq will protect its Arabism vis-a-vis non-Arabic elements and not surrender to Iranian power. It seeks to restore stability and security so that Iraq does not turn into a destructive source of violence and terrorism in the region, and to build Iraq's institutions on the basis of the participation of all Iraqis, without exclusion or elimination. - Published 15/12/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org



Oraib Al-Rantawi is director of Al-Quds Center for Political Studies, Amman.