• Syria must choose pragmatism over isolation  - Rime Allaf
After the Syrian regime's clumsy handling of affairs in Lebanon in the last year, relations have entered another dimension.

• Who rules in Damascus?  - Bassma Kodmani
Bashar has maintained the evil methods but lacks the political skills of his father.

• Fallout of the Mehlis report: some legal considerations  - Chibli Mallat
In light of the Mehlis findings, the current Lebanese president sits in violation of international law.

• An adventurous course  - Mustapha Kamal al Sayyid
It is very difficult for Middle East observers not to wonder at the great risks taken by Assad in his reaction to the Mehlis report.

Syria must choose pragmatism over isolation
 Rime Allaf

For years, Syrian-Lebanese relations functioned in a distinct dimension: no matter how Syria fared with other countries, Lebanon was an exclusive domain where third party interference was never really efficient. But after the Syrian regime's clumsy handling of affairs in Lebanon in the last year, relations have entered another dimension which actually defines Syria's standing on the international scale, where Syria's cooperation--or lack thereof--on all things Lebanese will now delineate its position with the big powers.

This realization should have rendered the Syrian regime more pliant, if only for its own survival, but some habits are apparently hard to break. The clock is ticking, and still the notion of time escapes it as it continues to look for an emergency exit out of an inescapable bottleneck. Perhaps it plans to finally acquiesce with some minor UN demand mere days before Detlev Mehlis' December 15 deadline, only to scream about unfair treatment when it will inevitably be accused of not cooperating? After all, this is exactly how it behaved before and after UNSC Resolution 1636, which turned out to be a much stronger (and unanimous) indictment of Syria's attitude than it initially feared. Indeed, by campaigning for a text that didn't include the threat of sanctions (an unnecessary endeavor since any resolution under Chapter VII comes with a default "or else" implication), Syria merely ensured a unanimous vote without even lessening the increasing potential of future action.

Ominously, observers experienced an uneasy sense of deja vu at the UN, Algeria's position being a stark reminder of Syria's own vote in 2002 for Resolution 1441 on Iraq. There is a major difference between the two situations, of course: at the time, most people were still not convinced that Iraq had hidden WMDs, whereas today many more are persuaded that Syria is hiding something about Hariri's assassination.

The regime continues to react amateurishly and incompetently to the Mehlis report and its derivatives, as if it is taken aback by their content. Discrediting Mehlis has become Syria's raison d'etre, and this is the biggest flaw in its behavior; by now, it really hardly matters whether hard proof of a Syrian contribution to Rafiq Hariri's murder is found, since Syrian non-cooperation is in itself easily punishable.

That this discrediting is done in parallel to a vague promise of cooperation (up to a certain point) might indicate that Syria has finally awoken to the dangers it faces, but it has been an awkward cooperation. The Syrian commission set up to conduct its own investigation has thus far only manifested itself by conveniently slapping a travel ban on the six Syrian officials Mehlis wants for questioning in Lebanon, a location deemed "sensitive" and categorically rejected by Syria.

The regime seems determined to protect itself regardless of the consequences this could have on the country; in fact, it is clearly betting on a showdown with the Security Council, and is preparing several risky campaigns to face it. One, targeting Syrians, attempts to nationalize the issue by convincing the population that the country (and not the regime) is under attack for its noble Arabist stance. Judging by the panicked buying of dollars and consequent weakening of the Syrian pound, and by the relatively sparse turnout at various organized demonstrations, most Syrians remain skeptical that the regime can handle the heat and that this is purely about nationalism.

In fact, Syrians are wondering whether the regime shouldn't at the very least offer some compensation in return for the sacrifices it demands of them. As it warns people of possible sanctions and cautions them about criticizing the regime, it inexplicably refuses to budge on urgent political and economic reforms which could make a big difference in the national mood, especially when most Syrians believe that American plans indeed go beyond finding the truth over Hariri. Still, the Syrian people are far less keen than the regime on a confrontation.

Even more ill advised is the concerted effort to provoke Lebanon into rebellion. Strangely, the regime has opted to insult the ruling parties and lecture the Lebanese on Arabism; in the last installment of attempted Syrian interference, the regime tried to exploit genuine Lebanese fears of a harsh winter and sky-high fuel prices by encouraging the overthrow of the government. Needless to say, this is not the best way to win friends or influence people--whether in Lebanon or elsewhere--and will probably backfire on the regime.

It is nevertheless interesting to note that Lebanese enthusiasm for the humiliation of the Syrian regime seems to have abated somewhat, now that the extent of the stakes becomes clearer, and that more people realize Lebanon wouldn't survive unscathed from chaos in Syria. Like the Syrian people, the Lebanese may get stuck in the unenviable position of preferring a bad status quo to a worse scenario of foreign intervention. Relying on this popular fear, however, will not save the Syrian regime from long-term resentment on both sides of the border.

Such Syrian campaigns, especially in the total absence of foreign support, are not an adequate response to Resolution 1636 and do not even delay the inevitable. Perhaps the regime's biggest loss has been the pragmatism which for so long defined the very essence of its policy, including in Lebanon; without this pragmatism, and as long as it refuses to deal rationally with Resolution 1636, there seems little hope that the regime can escape isolation--and not only from the Security Council.- Published 17/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org


Rime Allaf is an associate fellow at Chatham House in London.

When he died in summer 2000, Hafez al-Assad's arrangements for his succession were carefully planned. Once it was clear that his will would be respected, the power structure after his death was not in danger of disintegrating abruptly. But acceptance of Bashar al-Assad by the orphaned ruling elite implied guarantees to several parties: that the old guard would not be dismissed, and that the Assad family at large would have a say in decision-making.

After the death of Hafez's elder son and chosen successor Basil, there was no compelling reason why Bashar should rule as opposed to Hafez's other children Maher or Bushra, other than the fact that Maher is younger and Bushra a woman. Skills, or indeed the ambition to exercise power, were not a decisive factor. Bashar was faced with the choice of either relying on the old guard and becoming captive to it, or relying on his family circle and becoming hostage to it. He chose not to choose and ended up under dual control. Hafez's successor is not Bashar alone. It is the Assad extended family and an entourage of ambitious or greedy individuals.

Bashar has been running on the steam of his father's policies for five years without making any strategic choices of his own. Does he want to engage in economic reforms? After he called on senior Syrian experts from the World Bank and the diaspora to initiate the process, it soon became clear that no serious economic changes could be engaged without affecting the private interests of powerful individuals, and the process came to a halt. Did he envisage meaningful political reforms at any stage? On a dozen different occasions he ordered the release of political prisoners and allowed civil society groups to hold meetings in major Syrian cities. But he also ordered the closure of those same political forums and the arrest or re-arrest of hundreds of activists.

Bashar runs to Cairo or Riyadh to talk to Washington's closest allies every time he is concerned, but doesn't say he is choosing to be one of them. Does he want to build a strategic partnership with the EU? Negotiations were interrupted on the association agreement, which remains suspended. Does he want to see the Palestinian Hamas and Jihad movements succeed in thwarting an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement (if there is any chance for one)? Is he seeking to re-engage Syria in a bilateral peace process with Israel? What type of relations does Syria want with the US? Is Syria's support for the Iraqi resistance an ideological choice based on Baathist solidarity (since there is no Sunni connection to speculate on)? And did Syria think through the implications of meddling in the Iraqi situation and whether it could afford to defy the Bush administration on such a vital issue for the US as the pacification of Iraq? On all of these issues, we have seen a choice, then its reversal soon after.

Hafez al-Assad had carefully chosen the members of his inner circle and he trusted them to guarantee domestic stability. But strategic thinking about Syria's regional role, choice of allies, support for political and military factions, and relations with the US, Europe and Russia was a solitary exercise, and the men involved in foreign policy were mere implementers of his decisions. He left them some leeway in Lebanon, but all was done under close monitoring and constant fine-tuning by him personally. He managed to prevent unity of the Lebanese against Syria every time the risk emerged. He resorted to assassinations when he could not do otherwise, but manipulation and political tactics were the basis of his approach. From an Arab nationalist perspective, this policy was evil but smart. Bashar has maintained the evil methods but lacks the political skills of his father. The cynical equilibrium tactics of Hafez have turned into sheer inconsistency.

In the course of three years after his accession to power, Bashar succeeded in uniting the Lebanese against Syrian occupation. Now he is denouncing a united international front against his country. Following Detlev Mehlis' request to interrogate senior figures from the Syrian regime for their suspected involvement in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Bashar declared in a recent speech--the tone of which was a mix of provocation, paranoia and suicidal behavior--that Syria was offered the choice between "killing itself or being killed".

While it is true that the international consensus on the need to punish Syria if it is proven guilty is strong, there are important nuances between the approaches of the United States and Europe, particularly France, on the appropriate strategy. Paris is opposed to a strategy of isolation leading to a countdown for the overthrow of the Assad regime, whether by military means or slow suffocation through sanctions. The Syrian domestic situation is no less complex than the Iraqi one, no outside force has a recipe for successful regime change, and most importantly, there are opposition forces inside Syria who are able to make their voices heard.

The Syrian opposition is diverse and fragmented but has chosen a mature and cautious strategy. It engaged a large array of political forces in an inclusive coalition, including the Muslim Brothers, and produced a joint "Damascus Declaration" calling for dialogue with the government. While it is certainly emboldened by outside attacks on the regime, it explicitly rejects foreign support and presents itself as a patriotic force seeking peaceful change through a dialogue with the regime. It is nonetheless calling for reforms that imply transformation of the security-based regime into a political and civil state. Assuming that the present regime is reformable--an open question--it would take a particularly enlightened political leader at its head to carry out the process. It clearly does not have one at the moment.- Published 17/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Bassma Kodmani is executive director of the Arab Reform Initiative.

The UN's "Mehlis report" on the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri on February 14, 2005 was released on the night of October 20-21, Beirut time. While doubly provisional, it was nonetheless immediately dramatic.

The report is provisional because Detlev Mehlis' task was extended until mid-December, so one should expect the investigation to continue until then, probably in some other form or by way of extension, and another report to result around that time. Technically also, the report is bound to be provisional. While a prosecutor by profession, Mehlis has acted chiefly as an international criminal investigator in the absence of an international tribunal that could act upon his findings. Indictments and arrests are not technically within his power, although he has "suggested" that the Lebanese judiciary arrest a number of suspects, most notably four generals who were in charge of security services at the time of the assassination. More arrests followed. More dramatically, several top Syrian leaders were called in to appear before him in his headquarters in Lebanon. It is not clear whether the Syrian government will oblige: a tug of war is developing with the Mehlis team, and beyond, with the UN Security Council, which, under chapter VII, unanimously approved Resolution 1636 requesting full Syrian cooperation.

The report is severe regarding Syria's leaders: "There is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top-ranked Syrian security officials and could not have been further organized without the collusion of their counterparts in the Lebanese security services."

Equally dramatic is the evidence pointing to the personal involvement of the Syrian president through his threats to the former prime minister. These threats had been reported by the former UN investigator, Irish police commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, but long quotes, including from Syrian officials, confirm the dramatic scene of the last brief encounter between Hariri and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on August 26, 2004. This is the political crux of the report, which results from Assad's decision to force Hariri and other Lebanese MPs to extend the term of the Lebanese president despite Security Council Resolution 1559, which was passed a day before. That extension was carried out on September 3, 2004.

We have just argued in an address held at the UN press association (New York, Nov.17) that the extension of Lahoud's presidency not only violated the Lebanese constitution (Art.49) and basic principles of democracy, but that, in the light of the Mehlis findings about the meeting of August 26, 2004, the current Lebanese president sits in violation of international law, specifically of two clauses in Resolution 1559 that required upcoming elections to be free from foreign intervention or influence.

Even the Syrian foreign minister does not seem to deny the fact. In a letter to the UN, he wrote that the meeting between Assad and Hariri discussed "the possible extension of the mandate of Emile Lahoud, the president of Lebanon, in view of the troubled regional conditions and based on the mutual interest in maintaining stability in Lebanon". In Mehlis' report this is also an occasion to underline the Syrian foreign minister's inconsistencies: "While the Syrian authorities, after initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limited degree with the Commission, several interviewees tried to mislead the investigation by giving false or inaccurate statements. The letter addressed to the Commission by the foreign minister of the Syrian Arab Republic proved to contain false information." On top of the doubts cast on the Syrian leadership's role in the assassination, both the Syrian foreign minister and his aide were accused of tampering with the investigation.

On the purely criminal level, Mehlis partly uncovered the web of deceit carried out by the conspirators, and his most remarkable advances are based on the trail left by telephone calls, leading to the naming of over 20 individuals busy tracking down the itinerary of Hariri in the month preceding his murder, with the intensity increasing the last day. For the Lebanese president, who has tried to survive the arrest of his top four aides, most troubling is the connection made with one Lebanese extremist uncovered by the report, who "made a call [nine] minutes before the blast, at 12:47 hrs, to the mobile phone of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud". Lahoud was further interrogated for six hours last week by the investigators.

These findings might take some more time to sink in. Their political impact depends on a highly volatile situation inside Lebanon, as well as in Syria since the suicide of the minister of interior the week preceding the report. Legally, the report offers two clear invitations: the follow-up on various leads it has uncovered, and the pursuit of a trial with the active involvement of the UN.

The Security Council will have to decide whether an international tribunal should take on the case. Against the resistance of some Security Council members, including the US government, to establish yet another ad hoc tribunal, we have suggested that the structural inadequacy of the Lebanese judiciary before such a daunting task should be carefully weighed. A compromise between the caution expressed within the UNSC and the insistence of the Hariri bloc and its allies, especially Walid Jumblatt, to have an international tribunal, could take the shape of a mixed tribunal a la Sierra Leone.

Whatever the shape of the trial to come, any investigation will need to remain strongly anchored internationally, if only to reach beyond the Lebanese borders, as is evident from the evidence uncovered.- Published 17/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Chibli Mallat is EU Jean Monnet Professor at Saint Joseph's University in Beirut and a Lebanese presidential candidate.

There is no doubt that Middle East observers are finding it very hard to understand the reasoning that informs the decisions of the Syrian government under President Bashar al-Assad. Many people would have disagreed with the policies of his father, the late Hafez al-Assad, but they would not hesitate to concede that he was a master of the art of diplomacy and political realism. When he felt that the days of the Soviet Union were numbered, he did not hesitate to shift his policies in the region to ally himself with the US, as it formed an international coalition to force Iraqi troops out of Kuwait in the summer of 1990. His son, however, has only succeeded in putting himself in major trouble of his own making, and at a time when he certainly had less risky options.

Take for example Assad's decision to support the extension of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's term in violation of the Lebanese constitution and against the wishes of most Lebanese political forces, including that of the late Rafiq Hariri, at the time Lebanon's prime minister and a close ally of Syria. The Syrian president could have found another Lebanese leader, well disposed toward his country, to succeed Lahoud. Such a decision would have been met with support, even enthusiasm, from Lebanese political parties and religious institutions. Instead, he supported Lahoud and presumably threatened Lebanese political leaders who were opposed to the president, including both Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader. This decision ultimately led to UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called on Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and to end its interference in internal Lebanese affairs.

Another example of the ambiguous reasoning of the Syrian president is the rejection of the demands of Detlev Mehlis, head of the UN commission investigating the assassination of Hariri.

The German investigator has asked the Syrian government to order six of its senior security officials to travel to Beirut for questioning with regard to their possible involvement in the assassination. Mehlis is acting according to the terms of UN Security Council Resolution1636, which was modified at the last moment to drop a reference to possible sanctions to be imposed on Syria if the Syrian government does not cooperate fully with the Mehlis commission. The amendment of the draft resolution was necessary to ensure unanimous adoption by all 15 members of the Security Council including the Russian Federation, China and Algeria.

The difficulties Assad faces regarding Mehlis' demand are quite well known. The security officials on the UN commission's list include senior members of the inner government in Syria, one of them the brother-in-law of the president, who reportedly married his sister even against the wishes of her father Hafez al-Assad. The Syrian officials have declared that they were not involved in Hariri's assassination, and though the UN commission did not indicate in its published report that it has hard evidence against those officials, any indictment following questioning would not only embarrass the Syrian president, but could possibly subject Syria to sanctions by the UN Security Council, or new demands even more humiliating to the Syrian regime.

It is likely, however, that continued refusal by Syria to cooperate with the UN commission would provide both the US administration and France, which claims special responsibility for protecting Lebanon, with an opportunity to go back to the Security Council to ask for sanctions on Syria.

Perhaps Assad is hoping that either the Russian Federation or China will use their veto to prevent the Security Council from adopting such a resolution. But the US administration, which is accusing Syria of supporting the armed rebellion in Iraq, would find in the Syrian behavior a good excuse to escalate its pressure on the country regardless of the Security Council. Washington's war in Iraq, fought without UN Security Council approval, serves as a precedent in this regard. Arab newspapers have recently suggested that Ali Abdallah Saleh, the president of Yemen who is traveling to Washington this week, is going to convey a message from Assad to the US president. But what does the Syrian president have to say to dissuade Washington from escalating pressure on his regime and country?

It does not seem the Syrian president has accepted the advice presumably given him by both Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Amr Musa, the secretary general of the Arab League, both known for their preference to work with the UN and their concern to avoid any confrontation with the United States. Both have met the Syrian president recently, and their advice was probably backed by Saudi Arabia as well. The Syrian government instead seems to prefer to play the role of troublemaker in the region, hoping perhaps that such a posture would improve its bargaining position with the US.

That posture was verbalized in a recent speech Assad delivered at Damascus University, where the Syrian president attacked the Lebanese prime minister. A few days later, Tishreen, the semi-official Syrian newspaper, called on the Lebanese people to engage in civil disobedience against their government to protest the high cost of living, including high prices of petroleum. Pro-Syrian Lebanese political parties supported this call, as did both the Syrian Social National Party and the Arab Socialist Baath Party. Even Hizballah was not opposed to the call, despite it forming a part of the Lebanese government. In addition, the Syrian government favors complete freedom for Palestinian organizations operating in refugee camps in Lebanon, contrary to the wishes of the Lebanese government to disarm them or to keep their arms inside the camps.

It is very difficult for Middle East observers not to wonder at the great risks taken by Assad in his reaction to the Mehlis report. The writer would have hoped that the Syrian president chart a less adventurous course.- Published 17/11/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Mustapha Kamal al Sayyid is director of the Center for the Study of Developing Societies at Cairo University.