• Excerpts from George W. Bush and the World (2035)  - Frederic C. Hof
The effect of American-orchestrated Palestinian-Israeli progress and starving the Iraqi insurgency was to stem a rapidly rising tide of anti-Americanism in the region.

• End of an empire?  - Saad N. Jawad
In failing to come to grips with the Iraqi resistance, Washington's entire project in the Middle East is dying a painful death.

• The "Islamist" challenge  - Omar Karmi
The sooner Washington comes to a less black-and-white understanding of Islamic political movements, the better for all.

• The president is tired  - Danielle Pletka
There is a warning in the air: when the going gets tough, the Americans will waver.

Excerpts from George W. Bush and the World (2035)
 Frederic C. Hof

The Middle East

In contrast to patient pragmatism in Asia, the Bush administration reacted to the attacks of September 11, 2001 by trying to transform a turbulent region featuring illegitimate, autocratic regimes. Proclaiming a "global war on terrorism", President Bush cited the absence of democracy in the Arab world as one of terrorism's key causes.

Nowhere was autocracy worse than in Iraq, where Saddam Hussein tyrannized a repressed, depressed and divided country. Bush feared that Iraq--thought (incorrectly) to have weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--might forge an operational link with al Qaeda. While no linkage existed between Iraq and "9/11", the specter of another "9/11" involving Iraqi-supplied WMD haunted the president and hurtled him toward a showdown with Iraq, which he labeled as part (with Iran and North Korea) of an "axis of evil". The president believed that ousting Saddam would help "drain the swamp" of Arab terrorism by launching a regional march toward democracy. Bush, in contrast to his predecessors, saw the Middle East in terms of wrongs to be righted rather than riddles to be managed.

Still, underpinning principled readiness for war (with or without UN endorsement) was the belief that "regime change" could be had quickly and at minimal cost. Here the role of Iraqi exiles was critical. They assured the administration that the Iraqi people would welcome American forces as liberators and that the transition to democracy would be rapid. These assurances complemented the "transformational" initiative of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to create light, lethal and rapidly deployable expeditionary forces, for which Iraq could provide an early test. The post-Vietnam "Powell Doctrine" of employing "overwhelming force" was set aside. But public confidence in Secretary of State Colin Powell was critical to the president's efforts to persuade Congress and the public that Saddam's WMD posed a gathering threat and that war was the best course of action. In the end, American forces took Baghdad quickly, but without a stabilization plan and without enough troops to impose order.

Unprepared American occupation authorities managed, in the absence of serious prewar civil-military planning, to improvise a transition to Iraqi self-rule, but in the process alienated significant numbers of Iraqis with unpopular decrees and un-restored public services. Soon the US was entangled in an insurgency, as elements of the minority Sunni Arab community rose to oppose the occupation, Shi'ite political ascendancy and Kurdish separatism. Foreign fighters seized upon the specter of Shi'ite majority rule to try to provoke a sectarian civil war they hoped would spread to Sunni populations throughout the Muslim world, enabling the president to say he had been right all along about Iraq being an important front in the global war on terrorism.

Defying mounting domestic opposition to the war and citing "solid political and security progress", President Bush ordered several "strategic redeployments" from Iraq in 2006. A 40 percent reduction of American forces by November 2006 contributed to two developments: sustained Republican majorities in Congress and an insurgency losing steam. A sharply reduced American military profile in an intractable cultural and tribal setting denied the enemy the ability to expand the insurgency by taking advantage of deep cultural fears and resentments, thereby routinely turning tactical setbacks into strategic gains. By reducing and (by October 2008) eliminating this phenomenon (and by imposing strict standards on the handling of Iraqi prisoners) the Bush administration deprived the insurgency of oxygen and enabled Iraqi political interactions that marginalized foreign fighters and averted all-out civil war, allowing the president to take credit for "staying the course" during the 2008 election campaign.

Compared with his predecessor, President Bush exhibited great caution in the Arab-Israel sphere. His reaction to "9/11" fleshed out an instinctive desire to avoid hard, sustained, politically risky mediation. Palestinian resort to terror tactics enabled the president to say that there could be no Palestinian-Israeli political accommodation absent new, nonviolent, democratic Palestinian leadership. Bush allowed his secretary of state to float a "roadmap" for Israeli-Palestinian progress, but it was the passing of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and the leadership of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that permitted Israel to leave the Gaza Strip. A new secretary of state and her key aide for public diplomacy, both Bush confidantes, convinced the president that rising anti-Americanism in the region mandated "visible American mediation" to spur ongoing Israeli-Palestinian confidence-building. US diplomacy facilitated the creation of a Palestinian state and a series of interim arrangements culminating in the Palestine-Israel treaty of peace implemented as this volume went to print.

The net effect of American-orchestrated Palestinian-Israeli progress and starving the Iraqi insurgency was to stem a rapidly rising tide of anti-Americanism in the region and allow democracy movements to grow in an atmosphere of receding sectarian and Arab-Israel tensions, both great victories in the global war on terrorism. These developments were recently cited by the 89-year-old former president as "a complete validation of my strategic vision".

Finally, concerning Iran, President Bush bequeathed to his successor a multilateral diplomatic forum modeled on the successful approach to North Korea (see pp. 279-282 above). Ironically, the eventual willingness of the administration to engage Iran diplomatically after having assigned it to the "axis of evil" and after having considered military action against it met with intense resistance by Iranian hardliners who persisted in demonizing the US as the "Great Satan" despite (or perhaps because of) the popularity of the US within Iran. It was not, however, until the advent of the Cheney administration that [end of excerpt].- Published 6/10/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Frederic C. Hof is the CEO of AALC, an Arlington, VA international business consulting firm. He headed the "Mitchell Committee" staff in 2001 and has written extensively on Lebanon, Syria and Israel.

US involvement in the Middle East is a fairly new phenomenon, but has been growing sharply in the past 20-30 years. It has now reached a critical point and stands at the brink of spectacular failure.

Washington's policies in the region began to take shape in earnest immediately following World War II--and particularly during the Suez Canal crisis, when the US effectively replaced the old European powers as the main player in the region--and were informed by three main interests: oil, Cold War considerations and a political dedication to the Zionist project in Palestine.

Oil led the drive to appease and stabilize ruling regimes in the Arabian Peninsula, as well as in Iraq and Iran. Alliances with the latter two, alongside Turkey, were also prime policy objectives in the attempt to isolate the Soviet Union, a policy that also led to alliances with smaller regimes in Jordan and Morocco and eventually and crucially with Egypt after Nasser died. Throughout, there remained a commitment, driven more by internal politics than anything else, to the Zionist project in Palestine that saw unprecedented levels of military and financial aid being offered the Jewish state, tipping the scales in the regional balance of power.

The Iranian revolution, the break-up of the Soviet Union, the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf war and peace treaties between Israel and some of its neighbors as well as the peace process with the PLO, all in their own ways forced Washington to rethink policy for the region.

Specifically, the military power of Iraq was identified as a growing threat to US interests and Israeli regional hegemony. The US was concerned about the security of its oil interests and Israel was concerned about the balance of power in the region. Many have argued that since 1991, US policy makers have directed their regional thinking accordingly.

Democratization and economic liberalization became the catch-words behind which lay an agenda to replace various autocratic regimes, impose US will and thus preserve US interests. But the neither-here-nor-there policies of the Clinton administration were seen by the present administration as a failure, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 signaled the beginning of the direct and undisguised attempt by the US to impose its ideas on the Middle East that dominates US thinking now.

It seems the invasion and occupation of Iraq were only the first part of a major plan that included the following: the replacement of autocratic regimes in Iran and Syria, by military action if necessary; the establishment of a mini-Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip; and the replacement of the old and traditional ruling political classes or personalities in the Gulf by a younger generation of leaders.

The initial victory in Iraq gave the US administration the impression that it could proceed with relative ease with the rest of its plan. But the impression proved wrong, indeed has worked in contradiction to the theory. The Iraqi resistance preempted any US plans to invade Syria, Iran or both. In fact, the Iraqi quagmire even emboldened Iran to defy US dictates, especially regarding nuclear power. Dependent on the Shi'ite community in Iraq, Washington has left itself in thrall to Tehran. With the US tied up in Baghdad, Damascus is safe, at least for the moment. Gulf leaders, meanwhile, are using Washington's own "war on terror" to strengthen rather than weaken themselves, with US aid.

In addition, US reluctance to pressure regimes already friendly to it to implement greater political openness and liberalization has disillusioned people in those countries who now see US talk of respect for human rights as mere rhetoric. Finally, the failure to create a Palestinian state acceptable to Palestinians has simply completed the erosion of any credibility the US might once have had.

Iraq remains the main battleground for the time being. In failing to come to grips with the resistance and in failing to come up with any sustainable means for either staying in or leaving, Washington's entire project in the Middle East is dying a painful death. And just like the Suez crisis presaged the end of the British empire, Iraq could prove the beginning of the end of the American, at least in the Middle East.- Published 6/10/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Saad N. Jawad is a professor of political science at Baghdad University.

US Middle East policy appears challenged on so many fronts that it is hard to identify what should be isolated for special attention and focus if Washington wants to restore any hint of regional credibility. Chaos prevails in Iraq, where a never-ending and apparently growing insurgency has tied American and remaining allied forces in knots. Bogged down in Baghdad, any greater plans this US administration might have had for further intervention elsewhere appear to have gone by the wayside, nowhere better illustrated than Iran thumbing its nose at the international community regarding its pursuit of nuclear power.

Anti-American sentiments in the region have never been higher, even among those who might have sought US support for their agendas, especially those who took Washington seriously on its pledge to bring greater political and economic liberalization to the region. Repeated frustration at the slow pace of reform in countries already allied with Washington and seeming US reluctance to rock the boat any further by pressuring such friendly regimes to do more has disillusioned many pro-democracy activists in the region. Perhaps worse for Washington, the US invasion of Iraq and the continued failure to pressure Israel to accept even the minimum demands of Palestinians have left such activists embarrassed and wary of any overt US support.

It is in Palestine, Israeli protestations notwithstanding, that the US would seem to stand the best chance of making inroads in restoring its credibility in the short term and thus any chance of fulfilling its regional policy objectives in the long term.

Indeed, Palestine offers Washington a chance to kill two birds with one stone. The problem for this administration is that the key lies with Hamas, and that Washington is currently making all the wrong moves.

Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, the prevailing calm and upcoming Palestinian Authority parliamentary elections all constitute opportunities to create a positive momentum. Indeed, events last week in Gaza aside, so it has proved. But this momentum is entirely dependent on two things: an Israeli willingness to abandon unilateralism; and order on the Palestinian side. Washington can play a crucial role on both issues.

Israel is so far resisting outside pressure to enter into meaningful negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Indeed, it is conditioning any such thing on the PA clamping down on armed opposition factions. In this it appears to be supported by the US. The PA, however, is wary of clamping down for a number of reasons. Most importantly, of course, is the fear of civil war. Hamas is armed and while remarkably disciplined when it comes to internal confrontations, its patience is clearly fraying and worrying confrontations have already taken place. A civil war, while in the short-term interest of Israel, will ultimately serve no one.

And although the growing popularity of Hamas poses a serious problem for the dominant Fateh faction, Fateh itself is split and offers no clear direction for the PA. The most sensible move for the PA leadership would appear to be to include Hamas within itself via democratic elections. That would ensure for the leadership greater leverage over Hamas, greater credibility vis-a-vis its own population and greater legitimacy in any negotiations with Israel. Hamas has signaled its readiness for such a move and parliamentary elections offer the ideal opportunity. One postponement notwithstanding, that was the direction the PA appeared to be following up until recently.

But Israel dug in its heels. At the recent UN summit in New York, first Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and then the foreign minister, Silvan Shalom, expressed Israel's unequivocal opposition to Hamas' participation in elections. At first, the US appeared to brush Israel aside. A nuanced statement after a meeting of the Quartet members on the sidelines of the UN summit acknowledged Israeli concerns but also cautioned respect for a "Palestinian political process".

That tune has since changed and internal skirmishes between Hamas and the PA are suddenly making the specter of civil war loom very large indeed. Recent suggestions that parliamentary elections may again be postponed and a state of emergency declared, in addition to the Israeli clampdown on Hamas via a sweeping arrest campaign in the West Bank and direct military action in the Gaza Strip, has left the Islamist movement smarting and backed into a corner.

The US, meanwhile, is missing an opportunity. It cannot back down from the rhetoric created by its "war on terror", but it can acknowledge that the mere desire by Hamas to become part of a body created by the Oslo Accords constitutes a serious moderation, even if implicit, of the group's position on the conflict. If Washington wants to implement a two-state solution, it needs to strengthen this moderate stream rather than alienate it.

While it may not be able to actively support Hamas running for elections, Washington could at least apply pressure behind the scenes on Israel to allow for the possibility. Including Hamas in the PA's body politic will stabilize the internal Palestinian situation, strengthen Hamas' commitment to the legitimacy of the PA and ensure, for the time being, a prolonged commitment to a ceasefire. Washington can then, with greater leeway, apply overt pressure on Israel to abandon a unilateralism that by its very nature dooms any political settlement.

Indeed, zooming out for a second, reaching out to moderate Islamists--who across the region remain the only viable opposition force, not only to existing regimes but also to more radical streams--ought to be a guiding policy if the US hopes to attain any of its regional objectives (assuming that these are indeed the stated objectives of democratization and political liberalization). Doing so with Hamas moderates would send the signal that the American understanding of democracy in the region is not restricted to the participation of those Washington finds acceptable. It is also crucial to getting anywhere in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The greatest long-term challenge for US policy in the region is not in dealing with specific instances in Iraq and Palestine, crucial as these are. The greatest challenge is how Washington decides to come to terms with "Islamists", a moniker that has been thrown around too lightly for too long. The sooner Washington comes to a less black-and-white understanding of Islamic political movements, the better for all.- Published 6/10/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org


Omar Karmi is a Jordan Times correspondent based in Jerusalem.

Second terms, it is said, are characterized by a loss of energy. But most supporters of this president and vice president disagreed vigorously when presented with prognostications of early lame duckery for George W. Bush. This president, they argued, has a vision born after 9/11 and hued to consistently for the last four years. He is a revolutionary, in his way, and revolutionaries do not limp or quack.

But we were wrong. The Bush revolution has indeed lost its energy. The evidence is widespread and disturbing. Whether on the question of Iranian nuclear proliferation, Iraqi constitution-building, or Libyan dictatorship, the rhetoric retains its ring, but it does not resonate through the Department of State, let alone through the region.

To be fair, Iran has been a thorny problem from the outset. Despite stirring rhetoric from the president, his administration has been strangely reluctant to do more than talk about the evils of the mullahs. When the president decided to lean on the soft diplomacy of the so-called EU-3 (France, Germany and the UK), some were perplexed. But given the distractions of Iraq, perhaps it was the path of least resistance.

At least the administration did not sell itself cheap: in exchange for solid support of the EU-3 desire for dialogue and deal-making, the United States insisted that when Iran violated the terms of its deal to cease uranium enrichment (as even the Europeans allowed they would), the Europeans would stand firm in the IAEA Board of Governors (BOG) and refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council.

As we now know, that did not happen. On the contrary, the United States and the EU-3 succeeded in rounding up a majority in the BOG for a referral. But in the face of Russian and Chinese opposition, and weak knees in certain European capitals (Berlin), the US agreed to merely threaten Iran with referral in the September vote.

The lesson to Iran is clear: there will be no serious consequences to your violation of nuclear safeguards. As Syria, Egypt and others in the Arab world contemplate Iran's fate, they have not missed the message that they too can pursue nuclear weapons with impunity.

The problem in Iraq is more subtle. Because of the ongoing violence, and an increasingly obvious desire to exit Iraq, Bush administration officials have urged Iraqis to move forward with their political process in the face of confusion and disarray. The Iraqi constitution, arguably one of the most important documents for the future of the Middle East, was hustled along. Attempts by Iraqi drafters to slow deliberations and wrangle through problems were nixed by interfering US Embassy officials.

The constitution itself is a flawed document, leaving unresolved vital questions of power-sharing that are evident in both its definition of federalism and the structure of the government. So murky are the things left "to be defined by law" that the foundation is laid for a one-party state if someone emerges with the mandate to exploit it.

Short shrift has been given to the necessary process of educating Iraqis about their rights. When the Iraqi people vote on October 15, most will have no clue how the new constitution differs from the old.

The lesson from Iraq is clear: the United States' staying power is waning, and the commitment to setting in place the fundamental building blocks of democracy is weak. For Syrians who hate their regime, for Egyptians who consider how to proceed in loosening their president's tight grip on power, there is a warning in the air. When the going gets tough, the Americans will waver.

One of the starkest betrayals of the ideals of the Bush doctrine is in Libya. In the wake of the Iraq war, Libyan dictator Muammar Qadhafi calculated that the surest way to elude American gunsights would be to rid himself of the nuclear, missile and chemical weapons programs that had seemed to get Saddam Hussein in so much trouble. This he did, and in an admirably thorough fashion. And it was all he did.

Despite frequent protestations from Washington that the United States cares not only for security but also about the well-being of the Libyan people, in fact the opposite is manifest. Qadhafi has systematically suppressed opposition, torturing and imprisoning critics. This disgraceful behavior has excited barely a murmur from the administration, and senior officials visit regularly and dispense US assistance. Such affirmation of Qadhafi's draconian rule casts a shadow over the idealistic utterances of the president.

Perhaps the president of the United States is tired. He has good reason to be; but if fatigue results in the dilution of the central tenets of what is now known as the Bush doctrine, then one must question why it was that Bush so desired reelection in 2004. Mixed signals and weakness from the United States throughout the 1990s encouraged al Qaeda in its attacks. We should not fool ourselves that this time will be different.- Published 6/10/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Danielle Pletka is vice president of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute.