• Palestinian parliamentary elections are pivotal  - an interview withGeorge Giacaman
Once you have elections, you create an opening for change. Those who don't run will not be able to speak with any degree of legitimacy

• Egypt: dynamics of regime and opposition  - Amr Hamzawy
A vibrant pluralist political scene is emerging, yet one that is devoid of substantial reforms and most significantly of constituencies.

• Democracy in the Arab world: an assessment  - Rami G. Khouri
The mechanics of democratic practices are increasingly common throughout the Arab world

• The birth pangs of democracy in Lebanon  - Habib C. Malik
Parliament should quickly pass a new electoral law that is more suitable for a mixed society like Lebanon's

Palestinian parliamentary elections are pivotal
an interview with George Giacaman

BI: One of the stated aims of US Middle East policy is to engender democracy in the region. How do you see this as progressing?

Giacaman: It's generally well known that the policies of the US are based on interests rather than any lofty ideals or values. Witness the case of Libya. Once the matter was settled financially and politically, the regime remained in place and it is no more democratic.

We have to decode phrases like reform or democracy, and I think these must be understood as country specific. US policy depends on whether we are talking about Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or Palestine.

BI: You mention three countries there. Can you give us a little brief on each?

Giacaman: In Saudi Arabia, US efforts are focused on trying to stabilize the regime by opening it up for some participation of the elite. This has begun with holding elections at the municipal level and even though women are not participating, it is considered a step forward. I think probably the Americans came to the conclusion that the sustainability of the regime as is--meaning one ruling family with no participation whatsoever on the part of the population--is not realistic. This is a gradual process that might take several years but at least might co-opt some of the elites by allowing some power sharing.

For the past 30-40 years Saudi Arabia has been sending students to study in Europe or the United States. These have since populated the bureaucracy. I am almost certain this sector is eager to have a larger say in the Saudi decision-making process.

In Egypt the situation is slightly different. This US administration has tried to stabilize the situation in Egypt by including what they call moderate Islamists in the government. The multi-candidate presidential elections is one small step forward, but the real issue will be parliamentary elections, where it is expected that the Islamist groups, specifically the Muslim brotherhood, will take a larger share of the seats.

BI: Yet, they were not allowed to run for presidential elections.

Giacaman: Yes, this is true, but it may be tolerated that they run and take more seats, even if it is under a different name.

In the case of Palestine, it is again different. Reform, as far as the US administration and Israel is concerned, is primarily control of security in the interest of the Israeli state. In fact, Israel isn't at all keen on Palestinian elections. Witness the recent statements by the prime minister and foreign minister of Israel regarding Hamas running for parliament. They are essentially putting conditions on who is going to run for the forthcoming elections. This is not only a clear case of interference in the internal affairs of Palestinians, but is highly undemocratic. It is a move that will impede the process of democratization in the Palestinian context.

BI: Nevertheless, the US and the Quartet stepped back from endorsing this Israeli position.

Giacaman: This is true. The US made some noise, but I don't think it is very credible because it is not clear the US is able to pressure this Israeli government not to impede the process of parliamentary elections.

BI: Palestine has often been touted as the place most likely to see the emergence of a truly Arab democracy, even under occupation. Why is that?

Giacaman: There has been a long history here spanning almost 40 years of political pluralism. Palestinians are used to that. In addition, any democratic regime requires a multiplicity of power centers within the regime, otherwise it becomes a one-party state. What we have witnessed during the second intifada, however, is that the political decision making process has become fragmented. This has become a huge problem and the political system needs to re-invent itself to gain legitimacy. The only peaceful means are elections. The elections are a solution to an internal problem, which is how to unify political decision-making among Palestinians and also decision-making regarding the conflict with Israel.

So in this case, internal factors are largely to account for the drive for elections as a solution to a specific problem. In this respect we are likely to see a more democratic Palestinian political system, even under occupation, then what we see in most Arab countries. It may seem odd that this should happen under occupation, but it is not happening through the agency of Israel, on the contrary. Given what Israel is doing on the ground, it is happening in spite of what Israel wants.

BI: How important is Hamas' decision, in this context, to run in elections? They chose not to do so last time.

Giacaman: Bear in mind that there haven't been elections since 1996, which is close to ten years ago. So there hasn't been much of an opportunity. Only after the death of President Arafat did it become possible to hold elections, because it became clear to everybody that only through elections could the political system renew its internal legitimacy.

BI: Do you think Hamas is dedicated to the rule of the majority?

Giacaman: All indications suggest that they are willing to play the game by the rules. Aside from how many seats they may get, I think they are keenly aware of two things: the internal mood among Palestinians; and the regional and international context in which they operate.

BI: How important is it that Hamas runs for PLC elections?

Giacaman: It is important, because Hamas right now is operating outside the political order. This is part of the political fragmentation that is posing a problem. You cannot have a politically fragmented society where each decides on his own, both in terms of street action and in terms of political positions, and at the same time achieve the aims Palestinians hope to achieve. The solution is inclusion or at least to make it possible for inclusion, for the political system to include all those that would like to run for elections. Whoever then won't run will be working outside the legitimacy of the system.

Under Arafat, the system was not open to diverse trends or change. Once you have elections, you create an opening for change. Those who enter will enter and those who don't will not be able to speak with any degree of legitimacy on behalf of the Palestinian people. This is the most important shift that will happen if elections will take place on January 25 as planned.

BI: Are you optimistic that if elections take place this will represent progress vis-a-vis democratization?

Giacaman: I think most Palestinians want elections to be held and they understand that this could be a political turning point in the life of Palestinians. The problem, however, is that Israel is in a position to impede this process. The recent arrests of Hamas activists and others have included many of the candidates likely to run in elections, for instance Hasan Yousef and Mohammad Ghazal. Both belong to the political wing of Hamas and neither has been involved in street activities. So Hamas has lost some of its candidates, and these arrests seem to aim at either forcing Hamas not to run or to impede the process so elections will be postponed.

If elections are held and if Hamas runs, this would be a major step in furthering Palestinian democracy. Elections infuse legitimacy into a political system and whatever decisions are then taken will be perceived as legitimate. Those that remain outside the system will lose such legitimacy.- Published 29/9/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

George Giacaman teaches at Birzeit University and contributes political analysis to Arab and international media.

Hosni Mubarak landed a sweeping victory (88.6 percent) in Egypt's first multi-candidate presidential election on September 7. The election represented a step forward toward opening up a persistently autocratic regime. It revitalized the political scene and partially minimized citizens' apathy toward politics. However, to describe the election as a historic breakthrough (the official line) or as a substantial shift toward a new pattern of state-society relationship (pro-Mubarak intellectuals) is misleading. The election was not competitive and its conduct clearly undemocratic.

Opposition parties and movements reacted in different ways to the presidential election and its results. Nine parties, most notably the liberal Wafd and the newly established Tomorrow (al-Ghad), put forth candidates to compete with Mubarak. But the leftist Unionist (al-Tajammu) and the Arab-Nasserite (al-Arabi an-Nasseri) parties as well as new protest groups such as the Egyptian Movement for Change, Enough (Kifaya), chose to boycott the elections. The Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan) called on Egyptians to participate in the election without voicing explicit support for a candidate. Instead, the Brotherhood confined itself to issuing ambiguous statements, which were interpreted as being against a fifth term for Mubarak and in favor of Ayman Nour, Tomorrow's candidate.

The performance of the opposition was poor. Nour came second with only 7.6 percent of the votes, while Noman Gomaa of the Wafd Party won less than three percent. The remaining seven opposition candidates combined won less than one percent of the vote. As much as it demonstrated the limits of regime-led political reforms, September 7 documented the marginal status of opposition parties in Egypt, which failed to challenge the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and were unable to mobilize considerable segments of the population to vote for them. Also, the boycott strategy, which was designed to curtail the peaceful transition to Mubarak's fifth term, yielded no significant results.

While the negative impact on the opposition of the NDP's continued entrenchment in state institutions must be acknowledged, along with the overall semi-authoritarian conditions, opposition actors are also partly to blame for their poor performance. Major parties lack internal democracy and in most cases dynamic leadership. They have yet to articulate clear visions of the reforms needed in Egypt or to present concrete implementation programs that are essential in ensuring the support of the Egyptian electorate. Therefore, the opposition's ability to reach out to popular constituencies is minimal.

The parties that boycotted the presidential election belied their raison d'etre as organized groups that must seek to participate in the political process even under the worst of semi-authoritarian conditions. The experience of gradual democratic transition in different countries suggests that opposition participation unleashes new dynamics and helps subject autocratic rulers to increasing popular pressures.

In contrast to the boycotting parties, those that ran candidates in the election, especially Wafd and Tomorrow, demonstrated a higher degree of political maturity. They utilized the relatively expanded public space afforded to them by the presidential election and capitalized on heavy media attention to mobilize support. However, the ambivalent nature of their electoral platforms resulted in their failure to generate popular trust. Liberal Wafd's candidate, Gomaa, confused voters with contradictory statements on the state's role in the economic realm and did not offer more than generalities on political reform, whereas Ayman Nour appeared primarily preoccupied with attacking the government and neglected to inform an interested public how to move beyond Mubarak's legacy.

Yet the Muslim Brotherhood and Enough Movement gained from their strategies in the lead-up to September 7. The Brotherhood's pro-vote recommendation clearly proved its willingness to play by the rules, even those that exclude it from the sphere of political action. Although the low voter turnout calls into question al-Ikhwan's perceived popularity, the movement still managed to underline its pragmatism to suspicious domestic and international actors. Kifaya, on the other side, although unsuccessful in staging widespread protests against Mubarak's fifth term, triggered an unprecedented dynamism on the Egyptian scene. It capitalized on discontent in urban centers among intellectuals and civil society activists and advanced the public debate on reform by breaking existing taboos around Gamal Mubarak's future role and bridging the secular-religious divide in its political platform. Kifaya heterogeneous membership--liberals, Islamists, and leftists, as well as nationalists--conferred a degree of public credibility on its calls for a unified opposition camp against the Mubarak regime. But in spite of its relative success, Kifaya remains, like all other opposition forces, unable to generate popular support for its platform.

In post-presidential election Egypt, both regime and opposition are trapped, albeit in different ways. A vibrant pluralist political scene is emerging, yet one that is devoid of substantial reforms and most significantly of constituencies.- Published 29/9/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Amr Hamzawy is research director and senior associate at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut.

Much as it has been for the past century, the Arab world remains caught, and nearly politically immobilized, between three forces that define and confound it: the self-interested interventions of foreign powers, the self-preservation instincts of its small ruling elites, and the frustrated self-expression yearnings of its own citizens. In the past few years, though, due to the convergence of domestic and global factors, all three parties have started to speak of democratic reforms as the answer to the aspirations of all three groups.

While no Arab state has made any seriously credible move toward true democratic governance, all Arab states have been speaking the rhetoric of democracy and applying limited forms of citizen enfranchisement, in the spheres of the press, political parties, civil society, and elections. The mechanics and rhetoric of democracy are more prevalent in Arab lands, but its substance remains elusive. A decade after most other autocracies and dictatorships on earth moved toward democratic rule, the Arab world remains apart. It is the only region of the world that is plagued by the stultifying combination of persistent occupations and interventions by foreign armies and power that is heavily centralized in the hands of small, unelected, unaccountable elites, often based on families, tribes, or ethnic groups.

The recent rhetoric of democratic reform, however, probably marks the beginning of the Arab world's slow transition out of the legacy of political autocracy and dominant state security rule that has defined it for the past half a century or so. Four main reasons explain this important new development.

First, all other mass ideologies or governance systems (including socialism, Arab nationalism, Islamism, Baathism, monarchism, and narrow state-centered chauvinism) attempted in that period have not responded to the full material and political rights of the Arab people or their basic security and development. Second, foreign pressures and inducements for political and economic reforms, especially since 9/11, have started to converge with indigenous Arab democracy activists who had long been marginalized or co-opted by their states.

Third, the single most credible and powerful populist force in the Arab world--political Islamism, represented by diverse groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hizbullah--has recently recognized that democratic elections offer the most legitimate and efficient route to gaining power; this is evidenced by recent local and parliamentary election results in several Arab countries, and also by the important example of Turkey's ruling party with its Islamist foundations. Fourth, Arab governments and private sectors now recognize that they must promote democratic good governance, liberal economies, and the rule of law if they wish to attract the foreign and domestic private investments that are their only hope of creating jobs and wealth, and alleviating the destabilizing trends of high poverty and unemployment rates and low competitiveness in the global economy.

The convergence of these four powerful forces has made the rhetoric of democratic reform the only game in town for most Arab countries. Implementation has been slow and erratic, and there are huge question marks about the sincerity of reform-speaking leaders such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt or Zein Al Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. Other countries like Syria, Libya, and Sudan continue to practice governance that keeps all power in the hands of the centralized security state. Small and large monarchies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain have made some real steps forward toward greater citizen equality and political participation, including for women, but remain distant from the democratic principles of governance by majority rule, legitimate rather than gerrymandered representation, and the consent of the governed.

Nevertheless, the region as a whole shows signs of acknowledging the inevitability of adopting democratic norms, including parliamentary elections of varying credibility in the past decade in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Palestine, Yemen, Morocco and a few other countries (the Iraqi elections were a consequence of American-led regime change, so their true historical meaning cannot be assessed yet while the political system remains under the aegis and protection of the US army); the first ever multi-candidate Egyptian presidential election, but with built-in controls to ensure the victory of the incumbent; Islamist parties participating formally or in disguise in all countries where elections have been held; greater freedoms allowing opposition groups to form political parties and publish newspapers; a much wider, richer political debate on regional television and radio stations; and novel municipal elections in Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

The mechanics of democratic practices are increasingly common throughout the Arab world, but the substance of power remains firmly in the hands of small ruling elites. Of the three keys to power that controls entire societies--guns, money, and knowledge--the state's ruling elites still dominate the security-military systems and the national budgets that in turn define economic interests and distribution of wealth. Only the control of information through the mass media has been largely pried out of the hands of the state, due to the impact of regional satellite television, FM radio services, region-wide newspapers, and the internet.

The real test of democratic rule will be when legitimately representative civilian bodies oversee and hold accountable those in the government who decide on national budget expenditures and security-military policies. That has not happened in any Arab country, but serious agitation in that direction is now evident in several countries, including most notably in Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, Bahrain, and Morocco.

A balance sheet of democracy in the Arab world would show that serious talk and some activism toward that end are now common throughout much of the region, but breakthroughs to success have yet to be achieved. When one Arab country does succeed in achieving democratic governance (probably with a strong Islamist tinge to it, like Turkey or Iraq), the impact throughout the region is likely to be electric, with other countries moving more quickly toward the same goal.- Published 29/9/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Rami G. Khouri is director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, and a book author and syndicated columnist.

With the lifting from Lebanon of 29 years of occupation has come hope for the country's return to democratic life. Such a reemerging democracy in Lebanon, however, has been stumbling through a minefield of turbulence on the security front. Several assassinations and assassination attempts have targeted mainly Christian politicians and media personalities, and there have been explosions in Christian areas aimed at causing physical damage, psychological terror, and perhaps a revival of sectarian strife. Meanwhile, the country holds its breath awaiting the final report of the UN team investigating the killing last February of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

In order for Lebanon to undergo a successful transition during this perilous period--from the smothering of political freedoms to the rebirth of true democracy--Lebanese of all political and religious stripes have to accept a set of principles and undertake related concrete measures that would help make the democratic dream more of a reality. To begin with, all must cooperate on the vital issue of communal security. A win-win attitude with respect to security must replace the familiar zero-sum tendency that says that setbacks to other groups help advance my sect, or my party, or my personal fortunes. Security is a seamless domain and everyone without exception ultimately suffers from its breakdown.

Next there comes the question of electoral reform. Everyone knows the June parliamentary elections, while a tangible improvement over their farcical predecessor exercises throughout the 1990s, remained deeply flawed because of an electoral law retained from the previous era and combined with other irregularities. Parliament should quickly pass a new electoral law that is more suitable for a mixed society like Lebanon's and that rests on the small or medium-sized electoral district so as to reflect more fairly and accurately the political and communal layout of the Lebanese mosaic. Incidentally, for future Lebanese parliaments to be truly democratic as their counterparts are in France, Britain, Japan, and elsewhere, there needs to exist a way to dissolve parliament and call for early elections--something that is unfortunately absent from Lebanon's system and that requires a constitutional amendment.

Despite the unmistakable and healthy resumption of pluralist politics, Lebanon currently displays an odd alliance between Saad Hariri's Future Movement and maverick Druze leader Walid Jumblat. The latter, representing less than three percent of the Lebanese population and hardly ever "democratic" in his political behavior, has traditionally thrived on a permanent crisis atmosphere born of sectarian tensions and upheavals. Moreover, he is a staunch supporter of Hizballah, which makes Hariri's position in this strange combination untenable. By contrast, the entire Hariri animus is oriented toward securing calm and political stability that are conducive to economic prosperity. Jumblat parasitically rode the Hariri anti-Syrian wave after years of being a pivotal fixture in Syria's camp, where he received protection, riches, and access to power.

General Michel Aoun, who is the uncontested most popular Christian leader today in Lebanon, represents a far more influential constituency on the ground than Jumblat. Since last May, when Aoun returned to Lebanon after 15 years of forced exile, he has reemerged on the political scene as a force for stability and reform. For the sake of a coherent, robust, and democratic fresh start, Hariri ought to extend a sincere hand of cooperation to Aoun, and together with moderate Shiites and Druze they can constitute the face of a powerful political consensus for a new Lebanon. Benevolent friends of Lebanon around the world should encourage such a coalition between moderate Muslims and free Christians, because it is no longer democracy if anyone is permitted to reduce Lebanon to his own fiefdom, even if it be Hariristan.

Equally important, Lebanon's democracy cannot function in the present climate of corruption, which is the legacy of decades of entrenched cronyism that has transformed whole sectors of government and the economy into private rackets at the disposal of leading figures in Lebanon's kleptocracy. The disastrous result has been a runaway government debt of some $40 billion and counting. For any of this to begin to be reversed, a credible and all-encompassing anti-corruption campaign needs to be launched in Lebanon, with the cooperation of international bodies and renowned financial establishments, in order to root out and hold accountable the principal culprits. Only those with clean hands can bring this about. In attention, urgent attention must be given to Lebanon's compromised judiciary with the aim of beginning to restore a semblance of the rule of law, and hence a mechanism of accountability.

True national unity is required to navigate the shoals of transition toward democracy. The pressing first task for achieving such unity is genuine reassurance by Mr. Hariri directed at the Christians, who are now in the crosshairs of a vicious terror campaign intended to alienate them further from rapprochement with their fellow Muslim citizens for building the Lebanon of tomorrow.- Published 29/9/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Habib C. Malik is associate professor of history at the Lebanese American University (Byblos campus).