• Iraq and Turkey  - Melisa Benli Altunisik
There are equally compelling reasons to believe that this constitution is unlikely to unify the country.

• Iraq's Iranian connection  - Afshin Molavi
Iran likely influenced SCIRI's decision to support a federalist structure in Iraq's constitution.

• Fragmentation and unity  - Waleed Sadi
The political implications of federalism in Iraq could be widespread, but not necessarily in the direction of fragmentation.

Iraq and Turkey
 Melisa Benli Altunisik

The process of writing a constitution in Iraq was closely watched in Turkey, where it was considered as yet another crucial step toward transition to normalization. The constitution that was finally drafted was evaluated according to Turkey's long-defined interests regarding the political process in Iraq. Its provisions were thus judged against the Turkish objective of safeguarding Iraq's territorial integrity.

Seen from this perspective, Turkey's official reaction to the drafting of the constitution was generally positive. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that the text as a whole "takes into consideration Turkey's concerns". It seems that Turkey, which had long dropped its opposition to federalism in Iraq, found the definition of federalism in the constitution not divisive and welcomed the emphasis on protection of the unity of the country. The principle of balanced division of oil revenues based on population was seen as a development that would foster Iraqi unity. The fact that the right to self-determination for Kurds was not mentioned in the constitution was another positive point. Moreover, Ankara was content with the further enhancement of Turkmen rights. Finally, the compromise on the role of Islam was acceptable.

However, Turkey also expressed concern regarding several issues. Particularly sensitive was the future status of Kirkuk, which was left to a referendum to be held in 2007. The Turkish Foreign Ministry underlined the importance of a just settlement of claims and called once again for an enhanced UN role in the process. Turkey also emphasized, as it has been doing since the beginning of the political process, the necessity of inclusion of the Sunni Arabs, a development Ankara seems to think crucial for the success of the transition process and the stability of Iraq.

Thus, in general Turkey's official response to the drafting of the Iraqi constitution was highly positive. In fact, Ankara seemed to overemphasize the positive aspects of the constitution from its perspective and play down the real difficulties the political process in Iraq is facing. Despite Turkey's optimism, the most important issues--federalism and the place of Islam in a future Iraq--are not clearly resolved in the constitution; the implementation process regarding these two issues will be crucially important. Furthermore, failure to reach a national consensus could thwart the entire process. Finally, the continuing exclusion of those Iraqis who refuse to define themselves along ethnic or sectarian lines complicates the process of state and nation-building.

Under these circumstances, there are compelling reasons to believe that this constitution is unlikely to unify the country. However, Ankara seems to choose to focus on the positives. Turkey has been supporting the political process since it began with elections in January, and now hopes that it will be successful. Failure could cause chaos and even division in Iraq, neither of which is seen to be in Turkey's interest. This position is also probably understood to help Turkey's relations with the United States.

More significantly, however, political changes in Iraq have clear implications for developments in Turkey. In fact, the constitutional process in Iraq has been overshadowed in Turkey by the escalation of violence by the PKK and the discussions on Turkey's own Kurdish problem. As has been the case since 1990, developments in Iraq continue to loom large over these issues. As the PKK stepped up its attacks and the political process progressed in Iraq, Turkey once again began to intensely debate how to solve its Kurdish issue. The transformation of Iraq into a federal state, with Iraqi Kurds having extensive rights, gives further urgency to this discussion, which seems to be going on both among decision-makers and in the public.

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took a bold step by meeting with a group of intellectuals to discuss the Kurdish issue and then visiting Diyarbak?r, the main provincial city in southeastern Turkey, with a major Kurdish population. On both occasions he defined the problem as "the Kurdish issue", admitted to past mistakes on the part of the state, and promised to resolve all problems with more democracy, civil rights, and prosperity. His initiative received support from some civil society organizations.

However, there also was criticism on the part of some political parties and part of the public. Turkey, at both the state and public levels, is clearly divided on this issue. Increasing skepticism about EU membership, declining trust in the US--particularly due to its reneging on commitments to confront the PKK in Iraq--and increasing PKK attacks, are all feeding into the rise of Turkish nationalism. The failure of Kurdish leaders to distance themselves from the PKK, whether for reasons of ideology or fear, further strangles a democratic debate on these issues.

The transformation in Iraq is closely related to these discussions. If the transformation is successful, this would in general be in Turkey's interest, though it still would not solve the problem of the attraction of the Iraqi experience for Turkey's Kurds. If Iraq fails, however, there are grave consequences. Although ultimately it would be the domestic responses to these challenges that matter most, it would also be erroneous to think that domestic struggles and debates take place in a vacuum.- Published 15/9/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Melisa Benli Altunisik is associate professor of international relations at Middle East Technical University, Ankara.

Ayatollah Khomeini and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi hardly agreed on anything. The two regimes they led--an authoritarian, western-oriented monarchy and an authoritarian, cleric-dominated Islamic Republic--presented dramatic contrasts. Culturally, politically, economically, socially, the two men could not be further apart. On one issue, however, the two men--and two regimes--agreed: Saddam Hussein's Baathist Iraq was a dangerous, unpredictable threat on Iran's border.

The US defeat of Iraq in 2003 thus eliminated a modern strategic rival of Iran (the earlier defeat of the Taliban eliminated another Tehran foe). This historical context is important to remember as Iran jockeys for influence in post-Saddam Iraq. A gift has been bequeathed to the Shi'ite Iranian state: the defeat of an aggressive Baathist, Sunni-dominated historic rival, and the emergence into power of a network of both religious and secular Shi'ite figures, Kurds, and a smattering of Sunnis with close ties to Iran.

The irony is not lost on many western observers. An oft-heard exchange goes: Q: Who won the US war in Iraq? A: Iran did. Former US ambassador to Croatia and advisor to the Iraqi Kurds Peter W. Galbraith puts it bluntly: "The US now has to recognize that [it] overthrew Saddam Hussein to replace him with a pro-Iranian state."

The federalist system of government envisioned in the new Iraqi constitution, with a weak central government and considerable autonomy granted to regions, marks a partial victory for Iran. In the Shi'ite-dominated south and the Kurdish north, both of which benefit with greater autonomy, Iran retains substantive links to local political leaders. On the down side for Iran, there is a concern that it will allow the Kurds enough wiggle room to break away, which could cause a domino effect among Iranian Kurds.

The Islamic Republic's most important ally in Iraq remains the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which was founded at the behest of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1982 with the aim of leading an Islamic Revolution against Saddam Hussein. The bet paid off, though US forces, not Iraqi Shi'ites, delivered the knock-out blow.

SCIRI, as part of the United Iraqi Alliance slate, swept the board in January's provincial elections. Though its success derived more from the fact that it was thought to have been blessed by Ayatollah Sistani, the revered Iraqi cleric of Iranian origin, it has moved rapidly to take control of the south. SCIRI-linked police officers man the streets, SCIRI mayors sign reconstruction contracts, and SCIRI loyalists man the bureaucracies. Meanwhile, SCIRI's paramilitary wing, the Badr Organization for Development and Reconstruction, is present with some 10,000 men throughout the region.

Iran likely influenced SCIRI's decision to support a federalist structure in Iraq's constitution. The ability to deal directly with a SCIRI-dominated Shi'ite entity in the south rather than a US-influenced central government in Baghdad appeals broadly to Islamic Republic strategists.

Iran's influence does not end with SCIRI. Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari of the Da'wa Shi'ite group visited Iran recently, where he was warmly greeted by, among others, new President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad. During the visit, Jafaari paid homage to Khomeini by visiting his shrine, and signed deals on infrastructure projects. He also received pledges of Iranian aid to build schools, hospitals, and mosques, which reflects the soft power model that Iran uses in its support of groups like Hizballah.

Iran also has strong ties with Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and Kurdish regional governor Masud Barazani. Talabani recently told the Los Angeles Times that he fondly recalls a battle plan he hatched with Ahmadinezhad to defeat Saddam Hussein. No details were given, but it might have taken place when Ahmadinezhad was a commander of the Revolutionary Guards in the late 1980s and Talabani lived in Tehran as a member of the exiled opposition.

Ayatollah Sistani retains close ties to Iranian officials, though he avowedly says he is not interested in an Islamic Republic. His insistence on early elections, however, in the face of US objections, ensured the current Shi'ite dominance.

Iraq's new constitution will pave the way for that trend to continue because it supports majoritarian politics. In the constitution, there is no bill of rights to protect minorities nor any attempt to craft power-sharing agreements, Lebanese style, based on sectarian affiliation. This plays to Iran's strength. After all, the Shi'ites remain a distinct majority in Iraq. As a result, groups like SCIRI might impose their will on the south and influence Baghdad through a mix of Iranian-style patronage politics and populist electioneering.

Iran faces several challenges: the possibility of Sunni-Shi'ite civil war; widespread Sunni Arab, secular Shi'ite, and some Kurdish suspicion of Iranian actions in Iraq; and potentially more aggressive American finger-pointing on allegations that Iran supports the insurgency. Recent unrest in Iran's Kurdish region might also be partially attributed to inspiration from the neighbors in Iraq.

Iran and its Iraqi allies must also avoid overconfidence and remember the lessons of Iran's revolution: Islamic sloganeering is not enough; the state must deliver economically; and basic human rights should be safeguarded. Otherwise, as in Iran, political opposition and anti-clericalism will rise. SCIRI may be popular now, but it won't last unless it delivers results.- Published 15/9/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Afshin Molavi, a journalist and fellow at the Washington DC-based New America Foundation, was a Dubai-based correspondent with Reuters.

The mere thought of introducing a federalist form of government to Iraq has sent shivers across the entire Middle East, for fear that federalism is simply a prescription for partitioning the Middle East into ever more feeble mini-states. The anxiety about partitioning existing states along sectarian or ethnic lines is inspired by the contradiction between such fragmentation and the very essence of Arab nationalism that inspired the Arab peoples before and after World War II.

Arabs have always suspected that Israel, with the US behind it, would like nothing better than to create a more divided Arab nation. This suspicion has acquired a more pronounced conspiratorial connotation ever since the idea of turning Iraq into a federal state was broached. But conspiracies aside, Arab fears are justified when it is understood that some Arab countries have indeed sizable minorities within their borders. Some Arab countries include even "peoples", as indeed is the case in Iraq.

The rule of thumb under international human rights norms, especially as stipulated in the two principal international covenants on civil and political rights on the one hand and on economic, social and cultural rights on the other, is that "peoples" have a right to self-determination. When the right to self-determination is taken to its logical conclusion, it means peoples may secede from the existing political order in any given country by the exercise of this inalienable right. Minorities, however, do not have the same right.

By consensus, a sizable group of people that is socially, culturally and/or linguistically distinct and with historical roots in a certain part of a country or region constitutes a people for the purposes of the right to self-determination. Accordingly, the Kurds of Iraq (and Turkey and Iran) are indeed a people by all recognized standards and are therefore eligible to exercise their right of self-determination.

Minorities, on the other hand, are normally smaller groups of people usually scattered in many parts of any given country. Minorities have no right of self-determination. Under Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, minorities have only linguistic, religious and cultural rights. Of course they may have additional rights that the country in which they happen to live may allow them to exercise.

The political implications of federalism in Iraq could thus be widespread, but not necessarily in the direction of fragmentation. Are the Christian Arabs in Lebanon a distinct people entitled to exercise a right of self-determination? The rule of thumb does not make a people synonymous with a religion. If the Christians of Lebanon are viewed as Arab, then they cannot be regarded as a distinct people. The same goes for the Shi'ites and Sunnis in Iraq. Since both are Arab people, the religious differences between them are not a sufficient basis for viewing them as different peoples.

But what about the Arabs in Israel? There is no doubt that the Arabs of Israel can be recognized as a people entitled to exercise a right of self-determination. They are large in numbers, culturally and socially distinct and live in and trace their roots to a distinct part of Israel, the Galilee. For Israel to maintain its unity it may have to opt for a federal form of government in the long haul.

Another aspect of any federal project in Iraq is that it may also serve as a model for other unions in the region. Take, for instance, the future of Jordanian-Palestinian relations. To all intents and purposes, the international community now accepts and regards the Palestinians as a separate Arab people entitled to their right of self-determination. The option remains open for the Jordanians and Palestinians to exercise the right of self-determination vis-a-vis each other but decide on a federation between them in due course. This idea was floated a long time ago during the reign of the late King Hussein. The idea then was to establish a united kingdom comprising the two peoples. Perhaps it was a slip of the tongue, but King Abdullah II did make a reference to this thought on August 17, when, addressing former Jordanian prime ministers and parliamentarians, he said that, "We in Jordan on both sides of the River Jordan," perhaps suggesting that Jordanians and Palestinian are one people.

But such a scheme is fraught with untold dangers. With the Palestinian house not in order and the extremist elements in the Palestinian territories vying for power with the Palestinian Authority, it would be reckless to open that door yet. Unrehearsed and unprepared unity between the peoples of the two banks of the River Jordan is a prescription for the destabilization of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan where a majority is viewed as having mixed loyalties. The necessary conclusion is that geopolitical conditions in the region are not suitable for any more attempts at federalism for the time being.

Indeed, the countries and peoples of the Middle East may have to watch and see how Iraqi federalism works before jumping to conclusions about their own particular situations. - Published 15/9/2005 © bitterlemons-international.org

Waleed Sadi is a former Jordanian ambassador to Turkey and the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. He is currently a columnist for the Jordan Times and Al Rai newspapers.