BI: How would you describe the Israeli conditions and expectations regarding the agreement with Egypt over the Sinai-Gaza border?

Gilad: The agreement was achieved after 15 months of negotiation. The mission is to prevent terror and the smuggling of weapons. The equipment of the force is in keeping with the mission, and there are no violations of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty annex. This force will not create any military threat to Israel. It accords with the Egyptian effort to prevent terror from Egypt. The war on terror is paramount.

A second aspect [of the agreement] is to aid the Palestinians to become a viable political entity ready for peace talks based on the roadmap. The most important phase now is dismantling the terrorist organizations; unfortunately the PA is not doing this.

BI: How does the agreement fit into the broader framework of Egyptian-Israeli relations?

Gilad: Relations between the two countries have improved. Our agreement about the deployment of 750 Egyptian troops on the Sinai-Gaza border is not only military, but speaks about security and terror. Secondly, we have the presence of Egyptian experts in Gaza to assist; this is unprecedented. We have the QIZs and the natural gas deal, and the atmosphere is much better. Both countries understand that the most important issue now is stability in the Middle East and coping with terror. There are areas of disagreement, of course, it's no secret, but at this time the factors uniting us are more powerful than those weakening our cooperation. These negotiations included an intensive dialogue with Egypt at the highest strategic level. There is no alternative to this cooperation in order to further peace in the region.

BI: To what extent does the new agreement deal with security in Sinai and on the Egyptian-Israeli border?

Gilad: Not at all. This agreement between Israel and Egypt is focused on a small part of the border, 13 km from the Mediterranean to Kerem Shalom. After we evacuate the philadelphi strip, the border will be between Egyptians and Palestinians. Most of the Israeli-Egyptian border, around 206 km, will stay without any change. Egypt can cope and prevent smuggling there if they want to. The profile of terror in Egypt is very low because of the Egyptian success. Sinai experienced terrible terror, first against us and then against the Egyptians themselves. But the Egyptian government is determined to destroy the terrorists.

BI: How will the Rafah crossing controversy be solved? Leaving aside the economic issues, can Israel now accept Egyptian controls regarding people and goods entering Gaza from Sinai?

Gilad: What we need are guarantees that al-Qaeda and Hizballah and other known terrorists won't enter Gaza. The issue is under discussion and I hope some agreement will be worked out. It's a difficult issue because until now our presence prevented the entry of terrorists. We need guarantees that any new arrangement will work.

BI: So you're still negotiating this issue with Egypt?

Gilad: Yes. The agreement with Egypt on the deployment of the border guards is concluded and approved by the government of Israel, the Knesset, and Egypt, and signed by both sides. We are still discussing issues regarding border passage with both Egypt and the Palestinians.

BI: What is the mission of the Multinational Force and Observers regarding the Sinai-Gaza border agreement between Israel and Egypt?

Gilad: The MFO monitors the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and prevents violations. The new agreement is bilateral between Egypt and Israel and the MFO has no specific role. But since their mission is to monitor the peace treaty, they will monitor this additional agreement within the framework of the peace treaty.- Published 8/9/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Major General (res.) Amos Gilad is head of political military policy in the Israel Ministry of Defense. He negotiated the Sinai-Gaza border agreement on behalf of Israel.

After 38 years, Israel's soldiers are due within the coming days to begin withdrawing from their heavily fortified positions along Gaza's frontier with Egypt, handing over responsibility to Egyptian troops.

This landmark undertaking could be a win-win proposition for two countries that have shared a frosty peace for a quarter of a century.

Israel, mistrustful of the Palestinians, gets a reliable party to take over its security mission on the southern edge of the coastal enclave. Having evacuated its 8,000 settlers last month, it no longer has any interest in risking the lives of its soldiers inside the Strip itself.

Egypt, fearful that its home-grown Islamic extremists behind recent suicide bombings in Sinai might get ideas from Gaza's militant groups, gets to shore up its own national security by keeping a close eye on the area.

Meanwhile, both sides gain kudos, particularly from the US, which continues to pour vast sums of military and economic aid into the neighboring states.

Egypt's military deployment along its 14 km border with the Gaza Strip will consist of some 750 border police equipped with light arms, armored vehicles and radar equipment, as well as helicopters and a small naval unit to patrol the maritime border.

Under an accord signed on September 1 in a closed ceremony in a military base near Cairo, Egypt will take action "to prevent terror, smuggling and infiltration" along the frontier separating the Sinai from Gaza, known in Israel as the philadelphi route and in Egypt as the Salah al-Din corridor.

In a late addition to the military accord, named the Philadelphi Agreement, Egypt also undertook not to provide weapons and ammunition to the Palestinian Authority.

With the transfer of border control, Egypt inherits the task of stopping weapons smuggling by Gaza's militant groups through cross-border tunnels, which some Israelis have accused Egyptian troops of being complicit in.

Israel's technologically advanced army failed to eradicate smuggling into Gaza, despite destroying some 1,600 Palestinian homes in the Rafah area of the southern Gaza Strip in numerous military incursions since 2000, described as tunnel hunting missions.

Israeli opponents of the high-level security co-operation between the two states include two ministers from the ruling Likud Party, as well as the former finance minister and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's party leadership contender, Benjamin Netanyahu.

Netanyahu argues that the arrangement will increase rather than stem the flow of weapons into Gaza and that the deployment of Egyptian troops amounts to a "re-militarization" of the Sinai in violation of the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Under that agreement, Israel agreed to hand back all territories seized from Egypt in the 1967 war on condition that Egyptian military forces would not be deployed in the Sinai Peninsula.

While Egyptian security officers have been training Palestinian security forces in Gaza for months, the Philadelphi Agreement is a departure because it gives Egypt hands-on involvement in the arena of Palestinian-Israeli security. Some critics say this further marginalizes the Palestinians--whose aspirations Sharon certainly did not have in mind when he foisted upon them his unilateral plan to "disengage" by evacuating all settlers from Gaza as well as a small pocket of the northern West Bank.

For Sharon, the presence of Egyptian troops on the Gaza border bolsters his claim that once the Israeli military has pulled out of the Strip Israel will no longer be an occupier.

But for Egypt's involvement to be a domestic success, it must not be seen to be merely taking over Israel's role as gatekeeper to a Gaza jail.

"Egypt has to be more sophisticated than that," says Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, a Cairo-based analyst and member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs think-tank.

"Gaza is very important to Egypt. You see Gaza is on Egypt's immediate border. The relationship of Egypt with the rest of the Arab world goes across Gaza and Israel."

Some analysts see Egypt's involvement in promoting regional stability as a way for its autocratic ruler Hosni Mubarak to deflect American pressure for more commitment to democratization at home. Egypt also has economic interests compelling closer trade and co-operation with its Jewish neighbor as it seeks to expand the number of recently established special industrial zones producing goods that can be exported tariff-free to the US, provided they contain a minimum amount of Israeli-produced material.

Palestinians, meanwhile, remain deeply suspicious that Israel is using the pullout from Gaza to consolidate and expand its hold on the larger occupied West Bank.

Egypt still faces resentment from Palestinians, and many Arabs, over the failure of the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace deal to resolve the Palestinian question.

Egypt's enhanced economic and security relations with Israel will be tempered by the political reality that it does not want to be identified, however obliquely, with any scheme that would further crush prospects for a future viable Palestinian state.- Published 8/9/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Nuala Haughey reports from the Middle East for the Irish Times.

Israel is changing its definition of vital interests. Withdrawal from the Gaza Strip with its 1.3 million Palestinians, regardless of the immediate motivation, fits well into Israel's desire to remain Jewish and democratic. But instead of negotiating the conditions of its withdrawal with the Palestinian Authority--thereby paying a heavy price in the West Bank--it is willing to withdraw unilaterally. In doing so, it is ready to abandon long term demands, such as a presence along the external borders and at the Palestinian international border crossings. The new Egyptian-Israeli security arrangement along the Rafah border made it easier for Israel to make the change. In doing so, it also served Palestinian and Egyptian interests, a true non-zero sum bargain.

With the new security arrangements, Israel seeks to reduce its risks as it unilaterally separates from the Palestinian demographic and other "threats". The option of deploying Egyptian forces along the Egyptian side of the border with the Gaza Strip is the least costly for Israel. The alternative, inviting a third party such as international or multilateral forces, with deployment on the Palestinian side of the border, would have required negotiations with the Palestinians and would have reduced Israel's room for maneuver by restricting its freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip after withdrawal. Since the Egyptian deployment is on Egyptian, rather than Palestinian soil, Israel can still maintain its ability to enter the Gaza Strip whenever it wishes. The other alternative, asking Palestinians to provide for border security, requires a much greater level of Israeli-Palestinian trust and security cooperation than currently exists. Moreover, Palestinians lack the capacity to do the job and Israel refuses to allow them to acquire that capacity. For now, the Egyptian role serves a stopgap function until Palestinian capacity is acquired and trust restored.

For the PA, the Egyptian deployment along its southern border makes a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip more likely. As importantly, it provides an important precedent for its eastern borders with Jordan. Soon, Israel will face a West Bank situation similar to that it faced in Gaza. In the absence of permanent status negotiations--a most likely scenario--it could find it to its advantage to make similar arrangements with Jordan along the Jordanian-Palestinian borders and its border crossings instead of inviting a third party role. Negotiations with the PA might not be an option as Israel will not agree to withdraw completely from the West Bank and the PA will most likely refuse to negotiate provisional borders.

Moreover, a greater security role for Egypt at this time helps the PA meet its own security obligations while providing it time to rebuild its own capacity. Egypt will now have a greater stake in preserving the existing calm by working closely with all armed factions in Gaza. It will have a similar interest in helping reform and rebuild Palestinian security services so that they can assume their own border responsibilities.

For its part, Egypt gains a greater security presence in Sinai. It also gains a greater role in the Arab-Israel peace process and in domestic Palestinian politics. Egypt's success in securing the borders with the Gaza Strip improves its regional standing and its relations with Israel and the US.

There are risks. Continued violence and settlement construction in the West Bank could create greater motivation to smuggle arms across the border. If successful in preventing the smuggling, Egypt would be seen as a state that protects Israeli interests. If it turns a blind eye or if smuggling continues despite its efforts, Egypt's relations with Israel and the US would most likely deteriorate. If Egypt was made to pay for lack of enforcement, it might blame the PA for that. The PA might lose a friend as well as the opportunity to present the Egyptian deployment as a viable model to employ on its eastern borders.- Published 8/9/2005 (c) bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Khalil Shikaki is director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research.