Edition 10 Volume 1 - September 11, 2003
Two years after 9/11
• Winners and losers: an interim assessment -
byYossi Alpher
The world's leading intelligence establishments have registered serious failures in the past two years.
• Iran and 9/11 -
byAbumohammad Asgarkhani
Only by becoming a nuclear weapons state, can Iran consolidate its social coherence.
• Delegating the dirty work -
byAboubakr Jamai
If the war against terrorism requires the use of police and interrogation measures, uprooting terrorism requires facing a more difficult challenge.
• Two years later, at a crossroad -
byMarina Ottaway
The American public must make a choice between supporting the policy of force, and the desire to slip back into normalcy.
Winners and losers: an interim assessment
by Yossi Alpher Two years after 9/11, is there a scorecard of who is winning and who is losing? While it is not too early to attempt a preliminary and cautious assessment, we must bear in mind that all 9/11 related issues remain extremely dynamic.
Thus, for example, the Bush presidency first gained, and is now losing. An untried president emerging from a contested election was "defined" by 9/11. He rose to the occasion and demonstrated leadership and determination in America and beyond. The conquest of Afghanistan--striking directly at al Qaeda's leadership and cadres and the regime that supported them--was a "no brainer," and in any case proved doable at low cost in lives and money.
Yet the Taliban and Qaeda leaderships remain at large, and now the world is aware that the occupation and reconstruction of Afghanistan are problematic and hard to sustain. Still, these difficulties experienced by the Bush administration pale compared to Iraq. The neoconservative ideological approach to dealing with hostile radical Islam and the Middle East that Bush bought into has led the United States into a far more dangerous situation in Iraq, for which it is already paying dearly in lives, funds, prestige and clarity of strategic purpose. The notion that the three disparate ethnic-religious components and multiple tribal elements of Iraq, once conquered, could be governed democratically and peaceably and rebuilt cheaply, and that the impact of the benevolent American presence there would radiate throughout the Middle East and catalyze processes of democratization, moderation and reconciliation (between Israelis and Palestinians, for example), seemed ludicrous from the outset.
In this regard the world's leading intelligence establishments, in Washington, London and to some extent Tel Aviv, have registered serious failures in the past two years. First, they failed to pick up the signs and predict 9/11, which will go down in history as an intelligence surprise on the magnitude of Pearl Harbor and the Yom Kippur War. Then they allowed themselves, to an alarming degree, to adapt their assessments to political trends and provide a foundation for endorsing the Iraq adventure. This setback at the level of national intelligence assessment has damaged their credibility.
The United Nations has come out a loser, largely because its institutions, and especially the Security Council, have not adapted to the post-Cold War age in which the United States, the world's hyperpower, will act without its blessings. US President George W. Bush, we recall, distanced himself from international treaties and institutions (Kyoto, arms control) well before 9/11. In the immediate aftermath of that tragedy, he was able to persuade the other world powers to back him in Afghanistan. But not in Iraq, where he was doing an admirable thing (getting rid of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein) for all the wrong reasons: there were no weapons of mass destruction and no terrorist connections.
The US now realizes it went into Iraq without an effective post-war plan, and cannot go it alone. But it is still at odds with its potential allies, who increasingly fear what they identify as American neo-imperialism, and who have plenty of petty national ego hang-ups of their own.
The Arab world, as usual, is engaged in a balancing act based on each regime's reading of its own narrow interests. It is cordial and helpful with the Americans because they are strong and they are now neighbors. But it treats Washington's "with us or against us" mentality and its zeal for democratization with great suspicion. These days, in view of the chaotic situation in Iraq, most Arab rulers are breathing easier, in the knowledge that their regimes are not likely to be threatened by a successful and dynamic experiment in grassroots democracy in Baghdad or even by US military might based there.
Saudi Arabia offers the most clear-cut case of a key non-combatant Middle East country that has suffered obvious reverses as a result of 9/11. The Wahabi origins of Osama bin Laden and many of his followers; the evidence that the state-sponsored export over recent decades of the Wahabi Islamic philosophy has radicalized Muslims in Chechnya and Islamist streams in southeast Asia; the trail of terrorist support funds traceable to official and non-official sources in Saudi Arabia; the recent arrival of al-Qaeda terrorism to the heart of the kingdom--have all triggered alarm signals in both western and Middle East capitals. One consequence is that the United States, the world's biggest oil consumer, is actively seeking to generate alternative sources to Saudi oil--in Iraq, for instance.
Finally Israel has, on balance, gained from the events of the last two years. The American commitment to the war on terrorism has provided Israel with a vital ally in its own fight, particularly against Islamic radical organizations like Hamas. Washington's determination to eliminate rogue state sources of weapons of mass destruction, most of which are in the Middle East, is also a net gain for Israel, which is concerned with nuclear weapons programs in countries like Iran that openly boast of targeting Tel Aviv. And the defeat of Saddam's army has effectively eliminated any near term threat of a classical military offensive against Israel launched by an Arab coalition.
There is also a downside. If, and as, the US falters in Afghanistan and Iraq, its regional deterrent profile will weaken, with negative ramifications for its Israeli ally. And America, which found relatively little by way of terrorist infrastructure in Iraq, is now drawing terrorists into that country from across its borders, and its presence is inspiring terrorism elsewhere in the region.
One conclusion is that the saga of 9/11 is in many ways just beginning. Hopefully, intelligent lessons will be drawn from these early mistakes made in the campaign against Middle East rogue regimes and Islamic radical terrorism.-Published 11/9/2003 ©bitterlemons-international.org
Yossi Alpher is coeditor of the bitterlemons.net family of internet publications. He is former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University.
Iran and 9/11
by Abumohammad AsgarkhaniTo the countries of the former eastern bloc and parts of the so-called “rogue states” of the Middle East, a short rain of intervention came gently just after the Cold War. The principle of intervention--based on redefining the collective security regime--entered into force in four areas: gross violations of human rights, civil wars, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.
The Balkan crises came to serve as a precedent in cases of human rights and civil wars, while the problems of the Middle East were mainly considered as falling into the unknown but highly controversial domains of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The outcome of 9/11 was only to accelerate the pace of intervention. The desire of the United States for a regime change in Afghanistan was already on the agenda. Mention could be made, for instance, of Congressman Bill Campbell’s call as early as September 1, 2000 to convene a “loya jirgah” and reestablish a representative government in Afghanistan. The US acted too late and Al Qaida carried out a preemptive attack. Shortly after the attack, I argued in the Iranian press that the United States would seek to decapitate the target regimes in three phases: first, Afghanistan; then the Middle East (Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon and Iran); and finally North Korea and other Asian countries (Kashmir, China and Indonesia).
I also argued that in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, the US would launch a decapitation attack, while in other cases it would pursue a “process” of decapitation. Accordingly, the use of force through Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), based on a series of United Nations resolutions, toppled the Taliban and the Ba’ath regime in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. By next March, Iraq will be stable enough to implement UN Resolution 1483 or its complementary resolution, which is currently being debated at the UN. A stable Iraq together with Qatar can replace Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as the pillar of stability and center of US free trade in the Persian Gulf region. This free trade might change the pattern of economic behavior in the Middle East. The United States and the United Kingdom as the authority under UN mandate can thus influence the course of events in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an organization upon which the future of oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran is highly dependent.
Yet the process of regime change in Saudi Arabia will not be an easy task. The US problem with Saudi Arabia is much deeper than one resolved by mere decapitation. If broached, the US dilemma would be how to change the attitude and mentality of the young Neo-Wahabi generation, and to change the Saudis’ educational system.
In the case of Iran, I would argue that the US is neither willing nor able to bring about prompt regime change, for several reasons. First, the US is preoccupied with Afghanistan, Iraq and Wahabism in the Arab world. Its commitments, human costs and military expenditures could drain US desire for a major military operation in Iran. Second, US decision-makers do not have a common stance on Iran. They are highly divided on the issue. Third, despite great political rhetoric against each other, the US and Iran have frequently compromised in a give-and-take process (see my article in Arbitration International, Issue 2, Vol. 19, 2003). The US has traditionally been advised by the British to be prudent with the Persians. And, Americans are convinced that resorting to hard power in the case of Iran would be costly and that soft power can better materialize a regime change in Iran, especially when that soft power is supported by domestic forces.
The US has resigned itself to the use of threats in order to cause serious pain in Iran, and these ultimatums have been wired through diplomatic channels to Tehran in a diplomatic process of “shock and awe.” The final tick in US calculations is that the above-mentioned areas of intervention are not genuine problems with Iran. On the surface, three of the four areas--human rights, proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism--are on the US agenda. None of them, however, is really a big deal for America. Underneath them lies the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; if it is resolved, the controversial disputes will wither away in a twinkle.
Seemingly, the case pending before the international community against Iran involves the failure on the part of Iran to comply with its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) obligations as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To facilitate the process of transparency and inspection anytime and anywhere, the US and the EU want Iran to sign an additional protocol to the NPT. Geoffrey Kemp’s monograph at the Nixon Center elaborates on Iran’s nuclear options and recites two of my statements made at the Institute for Political and International Studies of Iran and the Majlis Research Center. The monograph goes on to say that my remarks, according to Kemp’s interpretation, signify that Iran has nuclear weapons.
Such is not the case. I made those statements at a time when India and Pakistan tested their nuclear weapons. I simply said that Iran should invoke Article 10 of the NPT and consider those tests as “an extraordinary event” against the “supreme interest” of Iran and therefore should render notice to step out of the NPT before the NPT and the CTBT monitoring systems and inspections regimes are in place. Iran failed to do so. That opportunity was lost and Iran has to pay the price. If you ask me as to whether or not Iran possesses the weapons, I would say no. If you ask me as to whether or not Iran will live up to its NPT commitments, I would say yes. If you ask me if Iran needs to nuclearize itself, I would say this is a must for Iran’s strategy of survival. A nuclear Iran must not be seen as a threat to its neighboring countries or to Israel. The weapons would serve as a minimum deterrence for self-defense in a world of uncertainty. It is necessary not only as a substitute for fossil energy but also for Iran’s social cohesion and prestige.
Six years ago, I warned that internally Iran is in a state of disarray. That argument still holds water. I would now argue that, only by becoming a nuclear weapons state, can Iran consolidate its social coherence. Iran needs both soft and hard power to regain its national identity and prestige. I strongly believe that if the underlying cause of conflict between Iran and the US--the Palestinian-Israeli issue--is resolved, those three outstanding issues would be irrelevant in the eyes of Americans. September 11 militates against all forms of radicalism, including radicalism in Israel. The solution can hardly be located in arms control regimes such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and NPT. It must start within the ambit of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR). September 11 is driving Iran and Israel toward that resolution.-Published 11/9/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Abumohammad Asgarkhani is professor of international relations at the University of Tehran, Iran.
Delegating the dirty work
by Aboubakr JamaiSeveral months ago, the Washington Post published a report disclosing the methods that are being used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency in their hot pursuit of the terrorist Qaeda. We learned that the United States commissions friendly Arab countries to carry out some of the tasks needed to pursue its security interests. In fact, it only gives the ethically-dubious jobs to the security apparatuses of countries that do not really care a lot for human rights, thus delegating to others the work of violent interrogation and torture.
Given the knowledge that the security apparatuses are the main tools of stifling any democratic aspirations of the Arab citizenry, one can imagine the impact of this information on public opinion. The issue offers one idea of muddled US policy confronting a region more complex than the Pentagon's oversimplified analysis. This crude US vision of the Middle East revealed by the events following September 11, 2001 has tragic ramifications. If the war against terrorism requires the use of police and interrogation measures, uprooting terrorism requires facing a more difficult challenge: allowing the countries of the region to produce their own pattern of democratic practices and to work on integrating those countries into a just international governing system. The recognition that “almost anything goes” in the war on terrorism has consolidated an image of the West that exploits the weak Arab and Islamic world. In turn, this perspective is an excuse and pretext manipulated in the strong polarization of terrorists.
There are two main factors that feed this image. Exploiting the US reaction to the September 11 events, a group of regimes in the region began to narrow the ceiling of freedoms and liberties of their citizens (which had little margin to start with). Thus, the corrupted power structure whose systems contradict in principle democratic precepts felt that it was becoming stronger by contributing or demonstrating cooperation in the war against terrorism, which is also a good excuse for oppressing those who oppose the regime. Since the Islamic movements in most cases represent the sole credible opposition, the war against terrorism frequently became a war against Islamists. As for the Arab and Islamic element that feeds this confrontational vision of civilizations, it is of course agitated by the lack of any settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by the international community. The pain and suffering of a people that have lost 78 percent of their land and who continue to remain at the mercy of a shameful occupation goes on.
The irrefutable reality is that the Palestinian cause is central vis-à-vis Arab public opinion and its relationship with the West, in general, and with the US, in particular. The similarity and congruency of the positions of US President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and the hegemony of the Israeli right-wing lobby over US foreign policy have convinced some Arab citizens that a peaceful and just settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is only an illusion.
In the same context, the war on Iraq and its occupation, accompanied by United Nations indifference, has consolidated the idea that the US defies international law when it comes to its own interests. And this perception, of course, obliterates any credibility afforded the many speeches averring global values and the need to respect international law.
On the other hand, will the Americans learn something of value from the problems that they are facing in Iraq? The simplistic tendencies of the US administration have run headlong into the complexities of the Middle East region. Will the current situation imposed by force, such as that in Iraq today, require US decision-makers to change their vision for the region? Will they be afforded better understanding of the dimensions of Palestinian society so that one will be able to ask whether there is real interest and concern about our region? We certainly hope so.-Published 11/9/03©bitterlemons-international.org
Aboubakr Jamai is editor of Lakome.com. He is former editor of the Casablanca-based Le Journal Hebdomadaire.
Two years later, at a crossroad
by Marina OttawayWithin days of September 11, many analysts defined the event as a historical turning point with lasting consequences for the United States and its role in the world. The American public, while deeply shaken by the catastrophe, did not quite perceive it the same way. After the initial shock, the public responded by trying to get back to normalcy as quickly as possible. It gave the president carte blanche in fighting the war on terrorism, but expected life to go on in a peacetime mode.
Two years later, the public's complacency is finally being shaken by the combination of bad news coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the president's admission that the war on terrorism has just begun and, most importantly, the realization that the new, aggressive US policy carries a staggering price tag. While blind faith in the Bush administration's foreign policy is being replaced by a more questioning attitude, it remains unclear whether the public will ultimately rally behind the administration and its politically and financially costly policy of preemptive intervention, or opt for a more cautious policy, entailing less glory but also less cost. For the public, the post-September 11 turning point is now and it is not clear what direction Americans will choose.
After September 11, US citizens were subjected to a barrage of contradictory messages from the government. They were urged to return to normal life as quickly as possible--"go to a theatre and eat out," Mayor Rudolph Giuliani told New Yorkers just days after the attack. They were also invited to be on guard. They were simultaneously promised increased homeland security and told that more terrorist attacks were inevitable. They were inundated with security alerts without any guidance, other than vague platitudes like "be vigilant" and recommendations to buy duct tape and bottled water. The war on terrorism seemingly required simultaneous implementation of contradictory policies, rather than choices.
In the confusion, most people heeded the message that they should go back to ordinary life. Security alerts soon left the public indifferent after threats failed to materialize. Outside the major cities, most convinced themselves that their towns were too insignificant to be terrorism targets. After a short-lived run on duct tape and bottled water, even people in large cities learned to ignore security alerts--today, most would be hard put to tell whether the alert code for the day is an alarming orange or a less threatening hue.
What the administration failed to tell America was that the war on terrorism, of which the invasion of Iraq is the most visible manifestation, entailed a long-term commitment of military personnel and carried a hefty price tag. It did not tell the public and it refused to tell Congress. Bush declared victory in Iraq and kept quiet about the continuing casualties. When senators, including high-ranking Republicans, started asking pointed questions about troop levels and cost in July 2003, administration officials cited the unpredictability of the occupation and refused to provide specifics. As a result, neither Congress nor the public was prepared for the developments of the last two weeks, which shattered the illusion that the US could fight the war on terrorism with the instruments chosen by the Bush administration without paying a high price.
First, a report by the Congressional Budget Office concluded that the US could not possibly maintain 140,000 troops--the present level--in Iraq past next March without calling up reserves for long periods. Then came the administration's about face on United Nations involvement. The decision to seek a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the deployment of an international force in Iraq constitutes a de facto admission that the United States needs help so badly that it is willing to make at least limited concessions to obtain it.
Next, President Bush gave a speech on September 7 warning that the war on terrorism, including the occupation of Iraq, would require a long-term commitment and sacrifices. The warning was not simply election year rhetoric, as evidenced by the following day’s request for $87 billion for the 2004 fiscal year to support the occupation and the reconstruction of Iraq. The war on terrorism, which most Americans had dismissed as a figure of speech, suddenly became a very concrete and costly conflict. And the illusion that this war could be fought while everything else stayed the same was quickly dissipated.
For the first time, the American public is faced with the full implications of September 11 and must make a conscious choice between supporting the administration’s policy of force, and the desire to slip back into normalcy. It is a choice the public did not expect to confront, particularly not at this late date, when the shock of September 11 has worn off, threat perceptions have attenuated, and people are more complacent.
It is thus impossible to predict whether Americans will back Bush or balk and look for new leadership. But it is clear that two years after September 11 Americans are at a crossroads--they have discovered that even the world's only superpower cannot wage war while feigning peacetime normalcy, and thus must choose.-Published 11/9/2003©bitterlemons-international.org
Marina Ottaway is the director of the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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