The Middle East Quartet was invented in 2003 as an instrument designed to reopen the dark Israeli-Palestinian tunnel and show both peoples the light at its end. More than eight years later, the Quartet is still looking for the tunnel.
The light is clear to most reasonable observers: it flickers around the 1967 lines with mutual territorial swaps and a realistic solution to the 1948 refugee problem. Unfortunately, it is hard to find a single political analyst who believes that current diplomatic efforts will lead us there. The gap between the present Israeli and Palestinian leaderships on all the core issues is a prescription for the instant collapse of final status negotiations. This could precipitate another round of violence, perpetuation of the occupation and regional instability.
Hence, given the risk that attempting to resolve the conflict will exacerbate it rather than bring forth a solution, there is no interest in entering that tunnel. The statement issued by the Quartet's delegation after last week's visit to the region is an indication that this distinguished forum is becoming a conflict-management instrument rather than advancing conflict resolution. Practically speaking, the Quartet is using the language and methodology of final status negotiations to manage the conflict. This creates the illusion of constant momentum and seemingly fills a political vacuum.
Keeping the peace process on the back burner is a legitimate option only if there is good reason to believe that the status quo can prevail for a reasonable time. But this is definitely not the case. Once it becomes clear that President Mahmoud Abbas has failed to convince the international community to play a truly active role in the Palestinian-Israeli arena, Fateh will have very little to offer its people. And when the two-state solution is removed from the Palestinian agenda and the way is cleared for the resumption of violent struggle, the little that remains of the so-called "Zionist left" in Israel will fade away.
Neither the Quartet nor the United States is able to resolve the conflict or should be expected to do so. As long as the parties involved are not ready to make concessions that can be accepted by the majority of Israelis and Palestinians, the Quartet can only play a limited role.
Limited, yet very significant. First, it needs to reveal the positions of the two parties on all core issues. Second, it must offer a clear interpretation regarding the way these positions do or do not correspond with international law and consensus. Third, the Quartet will have to put forward bridging ideas, followed by a list of "carrots"--benefits to the party or parties that are willing to take risks for peace--and "sticks" for those who refuse to take the risks.
The prerequisite to meeting these challenges is to bring the parties to the negotiating table. However, the Quartet, like the Obama administration, is caught up in the settlements moratorium trap. The Palestinians argue that the 2003 roadmap, which is mentioned in the Quartet's September 23 statement, requires a complete freeze of settlement activity in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. They claim that respecting this previous agreement cannot be considered a "precondition", and refuse to enter negotiations until this demand is satisfied.
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu claims that this issue should be discussed in bilateral negotiations and insists that any moratorium should exclude the Jewish neighborhoods across the 1967 lines in "united Jerusalem". It is also very likely that if he ever gets to the negotiating table, Netanyahu will insist that the terms of reference of the talks include his problematic demand that the objective be "a Jewish state, next to a Palestinian state".
Another 90-day moratorium will not make a practical difference to either the Palestinian or the Israeli side. It can be expected that the strongest party, namely the Israelis, will make the concession and remove this impediment to negotiations. The Palestinians, who live under occupation, are suffering from the status quo much more than the Israelis. The Quartet has to offer Abbas a strong commitment that once he opens the way to bilateral talks with Israel, the Quartet will insist that Netanyahu immediately put his final status map on the table. It has to promise Abbas that if Netanyahu's border lines are far from those of June 4, 1967, the road to United Nations recognition of a Palestinian state based on those lines will be opened.
Abbas keeps complaining that President Barack Obama convinced him to join him atop the tree of his demand for a complete settlement-construction moratorium, then abandoned him alone at the top of the tree without a ladder. This is quite an accurate metaphor. But Abbas should know that leaders are judged by their courage to jump from high places whenever they believe that it is required by the vital interests of their people.-
Published 31/10/2011 © bitterlemons.org
