Should he or shouldn't he? This question is probably not relevant any more to PLO Chairman Mahmoud Abbas' decision (read, intention) to scale the glass walls of the United Nations building in New York this week. This is a slippery and dangerous climb.
Abbas has been threatened by the United States and Israel; he cannot be sure yet that the major European countries will support him; and he has Arab League backing but at home faces enormous difficulties with Hamas. The Palestinian Diaspora fears that his initiative will kill the Palestinian refugees' right of return, and that even if the Palestinian state is recognized it will mean nothing more than an empty declaration.
Little wonder that these pressures do not take Abbas aback. After years of hollow negotiations with Israeli prime ministers, broken promises, inefficient American diplomacy that offered nothing more than moral support and with no political solution on the horizon, Abbas has a lot to gain and not much to lose. He has learned from the Israeli experience that the real negotiations are not with the Israelis but with Washington. Thus, even the mere "threat" to deliver his request for recognition to the Security Council immediately started a flurry of intense diplomatic activity aimed at saving Obama's--not Israel's--neck at the UN.
While Arab revolutions are in full swing, a fierce competition over influence has emerged among states like Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia in the inner circle and Russia, France and Britain in the outer circle. Under these circumstances, the US cannot afford to use its veto power against a Palestinian state lest this open a new dispute between the peoples of the area and Washington. Since peoples rather than regimes are beginning to make decisions in the Middle East, and as anti-Americanism is not unknown to the region, a vote against a Palestinian state might be devastating for America's image.
This argument also applies to the threat to cut American aid to the new Palestinian state, should it be recognized. The threat could well boomerang, as the US would be perceived as Israel's partner in occupation--a superpower that does Israel's bidding, hence can no longer be considered an "honest broker". Thus, even if Washington uses its veto power, Abbas will end up as a winner pointing to the US as the direct culprit for Palestinian failure.
Far more dangerous implications would ensue from an Israeli decision to impose an economic siege on the Palestinian Authority. In this case, Turkey would not be the only state waging diplomatic war against Israel. This time, Israel would be perceived as acting not only against Gaza, which is perceived as a Hamas outpost, but against an internationally-recognized state. It would then be of interest to compare the list of states that supported the Palestinian state bid with the list of those that boycott Israel.
Even the Israeli threat to consider the Oslo agreements null and void if a Palestinian state is recognized should not be taken too seriously. The Oslo agreements are already considered dead by the Israeli government and the Israeli public. Yet, the vital security cooperation between Israel and the PA that is based on the Oslo agreements is still alive. If Israel declares a one-sided official annulment of Oslo, it might have to return to direct military occupation of the West Bank, with all this implies.
It is difficult to imagine that, following the enormous efforts Abbas has invested to mobilize the support of almost two-thirds of UN members--itself an historic achievement--he will acquiesce in vague promises for a Palestinian state sometime in the future, subject to negotiations with a non-partner. However, even if Abbas decides at the last moment and despite his own declarations not to approach the Security Council but to seek only the General Assembly's approval, this will grant the Palestinian issue a new status.
First, it will expand international involvement in the conflict beyond the defunct Quartet. Second, it will put the US and Israel under pressure to proceed with serious negotiations, this time with the US as a partner and not merely a mediator or guarantor. Third, it may pressure Hamas, which has objected to approaching the UN, into reconsidering its position against a Palestinian state, especially in light of its crumbling sanctuary in Syria.
Whatever the outcome at the UN--member state or observer state--any new Palestinian status will require that tangible steps be taken by supporting states: from establishing embassies in the West Bank to capital transfer and direct investments; from recognizing Palestinian passports to issuing visas. These measures are essential not only to demonstrate that the UN resolution is not another empty declaration. These measures may also reassure the Israeli public, if not the government, that a Palestinian state is a better guarantee for its security than the current situation.-
Published 19/9/2011 © bitterlemons.org
